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PREFACE
At first blush a dissertation with the words “market systems” in the title appears
out of place in the mechanical engineering department. The dissertation is motivated
by two observations. The first is that establishing the product development problem
as I have posed it requires engineering insight. The goal here is to make product design
decisions endogenous to the overall product planning decision. Achieving this goal
requires the ability to model the technology capability of the firm. This is precisely
what engineers do: describe the physical interactions within a product that lead to
the complex attribute colinearities lamented by marketers and economists.
The second observation is that engineers are the primary customers of this work.
The benefits from the insights gained from a market system approach that includes
the ability to change vehicle design are most valuable in the early stages of product
planning. At the early stage planners have the most design freedom. A methodol-
ogy for exploring the potential economic desirability of future technologies provides
insight into R&D investment. Additionally, integrating engineering design models in
a market system context begins to provide tools to engineers to enable communica-
tion with the broader product development organization. As communication across
the organization improves, the expected outcome is improved profitability, product
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ABSTRACT




Chair: Panos Y. Papalambros
The motivating application for this work is the tension between the public versus
private tradeoff in the automotive industry between firm profit and the public nega-
tive externalities of automotive transportation, particularly fossil fuel energy use and
greenhouse gas emissions.
This dissertation establishes a methodology for evaluating automotive vehicle de-
sign according to private (firm profit) and public (fuel consumption) criteria. The
methodology set forth relies on developments from engineering, economics, and mar-
keting. The primary contribution of this dissertation is that these disparate devel-
opments have been brought together in a single mathematical problem formulation
for a large-scale problem. The integrated problem formulation will allow study of
interdisciplinary issues related to product development in a new way. Other work has
begun to develop similar comprehensive problem formulations. This work points to
some of the challenges that must be addressed in such formulations. Specifically, the
functional form of the cost models, and the utility specification of the demand models
can have a large impact on the market outcomes even when the differing models ap-
xxviii
pear to fit the underlying data similarly well. A second contribution is the application
of the notion that we can explore the tradeoff between private interests and public
interests by simulating market response under different hypothetical scenarios. We
can then gain deeper insights by examining the tradeoff relationships between the
different scenarios.
The strength of the approach, at its current state of development, lies not in a
claim to predict future automotive market behavior but in establishing a quantitative
approach for evaluating the implications of future scenarios were they to become
reality. Individual firms and policy makers can learn from this approach by comparing
the differences between the scenario outcomes.
The problem formulation integrates models of demand, cost, and product per-
formance in order to implement a game-theoritic formulation of producer behavior
where producers choose the attributes of the products they produce and the prices
they will charge in order to maximize profit. Two variations of a newly estimated
mixed-logit discrete choice model of new car buyer purchase behavior are developed
for incorporation as demand models. Three cost model formulations are developed
and compared in the context of the problem formulation. An explicit representation of
an automotive manufacturer’s technology capability in the form of a comprehensive
yet stylized engineering performance model is developed. Novel metrics are estab-
lished for comparing the Pareto set of solutions from one hypothetical scenario to the
next. Hypothetical scenarios are evaluated involving the design of a single vehicle
within a price-equilibrium market context and the design of multiple same-segment
vehicles within a price-equilibrium market context. The differences in scenario out-
comes based on differences in the demand and cost models are explored. The results
show that improving the fuel economy of a specific vehicle does not always lead to a
reduction in US fleet fuel consumption.




Increasing environmental sustainability related to the automotive vehicle industry
can be seen as a public good. Negative externalities from the existing automotive-
centric transportation system vary from harmful airborne emissions, traffic conges-
tion, noise, and crashes, to greenhouse gas emissions. Fuel taxes, emissions standards,
and fuel economy standards transfer the costs of these externalities to private actors,
namely automotive manufacturers and individual drivers. There is much debate about
the effectiveness of the current set of regulatory policies in mitigating the negative
externalities of automotive transportation especially as climate change has captured
public attention. A diversity of technologies is expected to proliferate over the next
decades including hybrid, plug-in hybrid, clean diesel, bio-fuels, and fuel cells [J.D.
Power and Associates (2006)] that could have a substantive impact on greenhouse
gas emissions from automotive trasnportation.
This dissertation establishes a methodology for evaluating automotive vehicle de-
sign according to private (firm profit) and public (fuel consumption) criteria. The
methodology set forth relies on developments from engineering, economics, and mar-
keting. The primary contribution of this dissertation is that these disparate devel-
opments have been brought together in a single mathematical problem formulation
for a large-scale problem. The integrated problem formulation will allow study of
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interdisciplinary issues related to product development in a new way. Other work has
begun to develop similar comprehensive problem formulations. This work points to
some of the challenges that must be addressed in such formulations. Specifically, the
functional form of the cost models, and the utility specification of the demand models
can have a large impact on the market outcomes even when the differing models ap-
pear to fit the underlying data similarly well. A second contribution is the application
of the notion that we can explore the tradeoff between private interests and public
interests by simulating market response under different hypothetical scenarios. We
can then gain deeper insights by examining the tradeoff relationships between the
different scenarios.
The strength of the approach, at its current state of development, lies not in a
claim to predict future automotive market behavior but in establishing a quantitative
approach for evaluating the implications of future scenarios were they to become
reality. Several areas for modeling improvement are identified. Individual firms and
policy makers can learn from this approach by comparing the differences between the
scenario outcomes.
This dissertation develops model components that represent the technical feasi-
bility, the cost, and the consumer demand of new automotive vehicles. The approach
is not tied to the automotive industry. It can be applied to a range of products and
markets as well as a range of public interests.
1.1 Product Development as a Quantitative Decision-making
Process
The description of a product depends on the disciplinary perspective adopted. For
example, a product may be a complex assembly of interacting components to an engi-
neering designer. It may be a sequence of development and production process steps to
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a supply-chain manager. The product may be a bundle of attributes to a marketer, or
it may be viewed by an executive as the outcome of an organizational process [Krish-
nan and Ulrich (2001)]. Each description is useful in achieving the goals of a product
development organization. None of the descriptions are complete. Analogous to the
communication in actual organizations, we can develop mathematical abstractions of
each description. Using the mathematical descriptions of a product we can observe
the interactions between stakeholders, and we can exercise the mathematical frame-
work under different scenarios to gain insights into the actual product development
problem. The decision-making framework to be implemented is adapted from that
introduced by Georgiopoulos [Georgiopoulos (2003)] and Michalek [Michalek (2005)].
1.1.1 Design for market systems framework
We adopt quantitative measures for each product development perspective. En-
gineering design will be represented as a vector of performance criteria z = f(x)
that are a function of product design variables x. The marketing interest is as-
sumed to be a representation of consumer demand Qj(Uij); i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , J
where Uij = u(α(zj), pj) is the utility of consumer i as a function of product at-
tributes Product attributes α(zj) including price pj for product j. Product cost
Cj = c(xj, Qj(Uij)), a function of product design variables xj and quantity demanded
Qj(Uij), represents operations. Single-period profit π = Qp − C is taken as the
organizational objective. In general, each firm will produce multiple differentiated
products (Qf =
∑Jf
j=1Qj). Finally, each firm in the market faces competition from
other firms. By adopting a consumer utility measure based on product attributes
and price we assume that a firm’s products compete in the market on these at-





i=1Qj(Uij,Uik), ∀k = 1, . . . , J 6= j.
















Figure 1.1: Single-firm design-decision-model schematic




subject to: engineering constraints
regulatory constraints (1.1)
where the objective is to maximize profit with respect to design variables x and price
p, given a set of fixed parameters v, subject to engineering and regulatory constraints.
A graphical description of the interacting functions is shown in Figure 1.1.
The design decision model can be expanded to include multiple firms. The firms’
decisions are coordinated using a game-theoretic structure describing the competition

















Figure 1.2: Multi-firm design-decision-model schematic
A mathematically formalized decision model as described in Equation (1.1) is a
suitable subject for counterfactual experiments. Counterfactual experiment is a term
derived from economics to describe the exercise of modifying model parameters in
order to study the model response to the new parameter values. The word counter-
factual is used to textslasize that the model is exercised using parameters other than
those originally found to estimate best the observed market activity without implying
that the results reflect a prediction of future market activity. For example, using data
on vehicle miles traveled in the US, it may be possible to fit a model that estimates
the vehicle miles traveled in a given year as a function of gasoline price, gross domestic
product, etc. A counterfactual experiment would be to change the price of gas for a
given year and observe the difference in vehicle miles traveled between the original
model and the model with the change in gas price.
The work in design for market systems has evolved from the notion that coun-
terfactual experiments can indeed inform future design decisions either as scenario
generators or as full-fledged prescriptive models. This is a similar view to the market-
ing community whose work seeks to be normative rather than positive [Chintagunta
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et al. (2006)]. A question in design for market systems is how to identify sensible
optimization outcomes within a counterfactual experiment. If the original market is
in price and design equilibrium and the demand and cost models capture this, then
a design optimization market simulation should replicate the existing vehicle prices
and designs. The researcher could then experiment with counterfactual demand- or
supply-side shocks.
If the market is not in design (or price) equilibrium, then a design optimization
market simulation will suggest changes to firms’ designs (prices) in order to maximize
profits. The confounding question becomes how to differentiate a situation where
the market is in design and price equilibrium but the cost and demand models are
inadequate from a situation where the market is not in equilibrium and the cost and
demand models are reflective of the market. We conjecture that one way forward is
to develop models with sufficient flexibility to allow testing of either scenario. Such
models would necessarily accommodate the effects of attribute and not only price
changes. This dissertation is a first step in establishing such models.
Although the majority of the design examples in the literature have adopted pub-
lished choice models, we hypothesize that this practice may contribute to poor market
simulation results regardless of whether the market is in equilibrium or not. This can
occur when the estimated choice model describes well the aggregate consumer be-
havior given a fixed vehicle fleet, but misses preference nonlinearities and correlations
between attributes, which would mislead the design optimization. In this dissertation
we seek to expand the understanding of demand modeling in a design context, leaving
the comprehensive evaluation of integrated engineering, product cost, and demand
models to future work.
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1.1.2 Economic Assumptions
The development of the previous sections implies three economic assumptions.
Namely, producers are profit-maximizers; consumers are utility-maximizers; and com-
petitive behavior is well-defined. There is a tension between these assumptions and
the aims of the analyst. The assumptions are intuitively appealing, and they make
the problem computationally tractable. However, we desire the results to be useful
for normative rather than positive analysis. If the basic assumptions held in reality,
then producers would have already determined methods for maximizing profits, and
the market would be in price and design equilibrium. This dissertation assumes that
the automotive market demonstrates static price equilibrium during a single period
(year). We also assume vehicle producers seek to produce vehicles that maximize
profit. However, we make no assumption about the state of market equilibrium with
respect to vehicle designs. Calculating price equilibrium of the US automotive mar-
ket under policy changes by a firm or firms (i.e., design changes in one or a small
number of vehicles) is then used as one method for evaluating market response to the
introduction of new technology or regulation.
We make several assumptions about the structure of competition. Much of the eco-
nomics literature evaluating the automotive market assumes that the vehicle producer
sets vehicle price directly. Recent work in the design for market systems literature
confirmed that modeling the vehicle producer and the vehicle dealer as independent
decision-makers changes the nature of the design decision problem for the vehicle
producer [Shiau and Michalek (2009)]. To simplify the discussion of the work in this
dissertation we evaluate the case where the dealer markups are fixed and assumed
known a priori.
Policy analysts have used a single-stage equilibrium where a producer makes all
decisions simultaneously. Industrial organization economists view this approach as
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simplistic. They suggest a subgame perfect equilibrium where all producers make
product design decisions before making a subsequent decision to update prices. This
idea is supported by the notion that producers have more freedom to control prices
than vehicle designs [Tirole (1988)]. We adopt a subgame perfect equilibrium ap-
proach where the pricing game is the subgame within the product design game. We
adopt a fixed-point iteration algorithm for computing price equilibrium of the auto-
motive fleet as developed in [Morrow (2008)].
1.1.3 Automotive Vehicle Application
The mathematical model described by Equation (1.1) and Figure 1.2 is illustrated
through an example representing the US automotive market. Models have been de-
veloped to represent product attributes, demand, and cost.
Product attributes
Product attributes α are assumed to be functions of product design variables x.
Product attributes may be a one-to-one or some other transformation of product per-
formance criteria z(x). The fidelity of product attribute representation is determined
by the quality of the models translating the physical design variables to product per-
formance criteria. For the purposes of this research we assume that the engineering
models of vehicle performance adequately describe the relationships between product
design decisions and product attributes. Sensitivity analysis can be employed to look
at the effects of uncertainty.
Engineering design models were built to represent a five-passenger mid-size crossover
vehicle to evaluate proposed vehicle concepts in terms of vehicle attributes such as
fuel economy, acceleration, range, crashworthiness, and cargo capacity. Three pow-
ertrain options are modeled for the vehicle: gasoline spark-ignition internal combus-
tion engine; gasoline turbocharged direct-injection internal combustion engine; and a
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split-mode hybrid vehicle design with a battery for energy storage, a gasoline internal
combustion engine, and two electric machines for battery charging and locomotion.
New engineering models were developed for this dissertation with the exception of the
hybrid vehicle model which was developed by Kukhyun Ahn from other work [Ahn
(2008)]. The engineering design model is described in Chapter 3.
Consumer demand
Consumer demand for new automotive vehicles is modeled based on random utility
theory [Keeny and Raiffa (1976)]. A choice model indicates the probability that
individual i selects a product j given a utility expression Uij. A specific choice model
may represent consumers as having homogeneous or heterogenous preferences. We
adopt utility expressions that are a function of individual demographics s such as
income, household size, location of residence, etc.; and product attributes α. We
assume that the aggregate choice shares Pj for each product j can be represented by







Market demand is the product of aggregate choice share and total marketsize M .
Qj = MPj (1.3)
In this dissertation we briefly discuss existing choice models from the literature in
Chapters 2 and 4, and we estimate new choice models for the US automotive industry
as described in Section 4.2. The data for the new models comes from a survey of new
car buyers and detailed vehicle data.
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Cost model
A cost model represents all of the relevant economic information about a firm’s
technology for maximum profit considerations [Varian (1992)]. The cost model relates
company cost to specified levels of outputs or, in our case, to a product with specified
attribute levels. A cost model can be expressed as a function of product attributes
or directly as a function of design and process variables. The domain of the cost
model describes the feasible output levels of the firm. We present and compare
three cost modeling approaches for the US automotive market. One approach seen
in the marketing and economics literature is to assume pricing decisions represent
market equilibrium outcomes. Then, cost and utility model forms are postulated
and unknown coefficients are estimated for both models. This approach was taken
in [Berry et al. (1995)], for example. We implement this approach as described in
Section 5.1.4.
A second approach we propose here is to identify cost drivers from the physical
components of the product and regress a cost relationship based on price (see Section
5.1.3). We have implemented such an approach using data from model year 2005 in
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [Wards Communications (2006)].
The third approach modifies a cost model from De Weck [De Weck et al. (2006)]
and Cook [Cook (1997)] and is described in Section 5.1.2. It is based on assigning
a cost to a hypothetical average vehicle and then computing the cost for a specific
vehicle based on design deviations from the average. Approaching cost modeling in
this way enables design-specific cost differences to be considered without requiring a
complete bottom up cost structure. This approach requires individual cost models
for each vehicle class of interest, as opposed to the other approaches that suggest cost
relationships for the entire vehicle fleet.
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Competition
The mathematical modeling of the competitive interaction among firms is de-
scribed in Chapter 6.
Optimal Vehicle Design Problem
The implementation of the optimal vehicle design problem is described in Chapter
8.
1.2 Public versus Private Tradeoffs
This dissertation follows previous work on public and private interest in vehicle
design [Michalek et al. (2004); Wissmann and Yassine (2005)]. We look at this prob-
lem in more detail by developing an engineering model with greater delity for a specic
vehicle class, by developing new demand models from disaggregate consumer data,
by considering the impact of the entire market through rm pricing behavior, and
by formalizing metrics for comparing bi-objective optimization problems that can be
applied to public versus private tradeoff scenarios.
Increasing the energy efficiency of personal transportation, reducing vehicle miles
traveled, or switching to more efficient modes of transportation are three high-level
strategies for decreasing the environmental impact of personal transportation. Given
a fixed number of vehicle miles traveled, emissions outcomes are directly related to
the fuel source and fuel economy of transportation vehicles. Fuel consumption is
adopted as the public good objective in these studies.
1.2.1 Externalities
Economic externalities affect decision-making. An externality exists when con-



























(a) Market equilibrium compared to societal ideal with externality inter-
nalized by supplier. (b) Market equilibrium compared to societal ideal
with externality internalized by consumer
their choices, as observed by society. A negative externality occurs when a decision
maker does not bear the full cost of a decision and over-produces or over-consumes.
Figure 1.3 shows two cases where the market equilibrium point is different compared
with the societal ideal. Figure 1.3a shows the case where all external costs have been
internalized by the supplier. For example, this situation could result if automotive
vehicle producers were taxed directly for each vehicle they produced. Figure 1.3b
shows the case where all external costs have been internalized by the consumer. For
example, this situation could result if consumers were taxed directly for each vehicle
they purchase. In fact, both of these examples already occur in the US automotive
market. The size of the tax on consumers and producers determines how different the
observed market equilibrium is from the hypothetical unregulated market equilibrium.
Externalities occur frequently with public goods such as clean air because a public
good is not excludable and is nonrival [Varian (1992)]. This means that an individual
can not be excluded from consuming the good and one person’s consumption does not
limit another persons ability to consume the good. Negative externalities related to
automobiles include traffic congestion, harmful pollutant emissions, road degradation,
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accidents, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. For example, increased vehicle fuel
economy has a personal benefit through lower cost of transportation. However, the
societal benefit of lower greenhouse gas and other harmful emissions and greater
energy security are not captured in the vehicle or fuel purchase transaction. The
result is lower production of higher fuel economy vehicles, or fuel and vehicle prices
that are too low.
The basic strategy for eliminating externalities is to create a new market (convert
the public good into a private good), or to incorporate the costs and benefits that
were once external into an existing market. The debate surrounding externalities is
not usually about their existence, but the price society should be willing to pay to
encourage positive externalities and discourage negative externaities.
Mechanisms such as fuel taxes, emissions standards, and fuel economy standards
are all measures that place additional cost on consumers or vehicle producers. How-
ever, one may argue that these measures do not internalize the total cost to soci-
ety, and that an externality still exists, particularly with respect to GHG emissions.
This dissertation will not discuss public valuation [Arrow et al. (1993)] or finding the
“right” price for GHG emissions. Instead, we present analysis of the trade-off between
profit and fuel consumption to support the private decision of a producer to act in its
best interest. This construction has the side-benefit (i.e., positive externality) that
it can be used to aid policy makers in quantifying one aspect of the public versus
private debate with respect to fuel consumption and the automotive vehicle industry.
1.2.2 Firm Perspective
We adopt an enterprise-wide trade-off model [Hazelrigg (1998); Michalek et al.
(2004); Wassenaar and Chen (2003)] with two objectives: a private one (a firm’s
stated business objective to maximize profit) and a public one (a firm’s stated social
objective to minimize environmental impact). The enterprise balances these compet-
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ing objectives with price and product design as decision variables. Firm motivation to
pursue a social objective may come from a desire to pursue corporate social responsi-
bility for brand building purposes, from anticipation of future government regulations,
from anticipation of changing consumer preferences, from a desire to proactively shift
consumer preferences, or from a desire to mitigate risk under uncertain exogenous
effects such as fuel prices.
The firm may choose to see its influence on the public objective on multiple levels.
Firms whose revenue stream relies on the sale of new vehicles may influence the public
outcome primarily by reducing the on-road GHG intensity of one or multiple vehicle
offerings. They may assess their impact on multiple levels: the firm’s fleet GHG
intensity, the firm’s sales-weighted fleet GHG intensity, or the entire US automotive
new vehicle sales-weighted fleet GHG intensity compared to a baseline scenario.
1.2.3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions as a Negative Externality in the Auto-
motive Industry
Transportation in the US delivers a significant environmental burden, causing
about 28% of the greenhouse gas emissions in the US in 2004. Light-duty trucks alone
accounted for over 27% of the total greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation
sector [USEPA (2006a)]. In addition, light duty ground vehicles (passenger cars and
trucks) contribute about 28% of CO, 11% NOX , and 15% VOC emissions in the U.S.
and are also sources of PM, SO2, and NH3 [USEPA (2000)].
Numerous methods have been proposed for analyzing and labeling environmental
impact of products and services [EUCAR et al. (2004)]. Areas of concern for the
automobile include contribution to global warming, harmful emissions, and nonre-
newable resource and energy use. The vehicle-use phase constitutes as much as 85%
of GHG and other emissions [Keoleian et al. (1997); Graedel and Allenby (1998)].
Research has found significant correlation between cumulative fossil fuel energy use
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and numerous other environmental indicators [Huijbregts et al. (2006)], so fossil fuel
use attributed to the use phase of a vehicle life cycle (fuel economy) appears to be a
suitable metric for assessing environmental performance. For advanced technologies,
gasoline equivalent fuel economy measures are being proposed and developed [Gonder
and Simpson (2006); Markel et al. (2006)].
A miles per gallon gasoline equivalent metric for advanced technology vehicles
may be difficult to interpret. What could once be communicated in a single number
now requires multiple metrics to communicate (e.g., $/mile, frequency of trips to the
pump, barrels of foreign oil consumption, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions). Should
a miles per gallon gasoline equivalent (MPGGE) that is calculated on a mile/joule
or mile/$ basis become prevalent in the future, some other metric for recognizing the
GHG contribution of driving a vehicle may be relevant. A straightforward approach
for doing this is to follow a well-to-wheels approach for energy required in the use
phase similar to what will be done for any MPGGE calculation. Several well-to-wheels
studies have been performed that track such factors as total energy use, fossil fuel use,
GHG emissions, criteria pollutant emissions, etc. in the US [Wang (2001); Brinkman
et al. (2005); ANL (2007); Wang (2002)] and in Europe [EUCAR et al. (2004, 2006)].
These studies typically consider numerous energy paths including production and
distribution of conventional gasoline, hydrogen, biofuels, and electricity. Data from
these models could support future work for well-to-wheels GHG emissions calculations
for proposed vehicle designs.
1.2.4 Previous Studies
The National Energy Modeling System developed by the Energy Information Ad-
ministration [Gabriel et al. (2001)] uses an equilibrium framework to project energy
consumption and prices for the US. It has been used to analyze various scenarios re-
garding penetration of advanced technology vehicles among others. Argonne National
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Lab’s VISION model [ANL (2006)] is a spreadsheet model specifically for projecting
impacts of advanced technology transportation vehicles on energy and greenhouse
gas emissions outcomes. The base case for this model is updated from the Energy
Information Administration’s annual report.
General Motors, Argonne National Lab, and Shell partnered to develop well-to-
wheels analysis for a full-sized pickup truck [Brinkman et al. (2005)]. Their intent was
not to look at market dynamics, but instead to capture the vehicle characteristics and
the associated environmental impact that would result from a fully-functional pickup
truck using various powertrains and fuel pathways. They could then use this data to
assess the economic viability of each option.
A 2004 NESCCAF report [Cooper et al. (2004)] studied the emissions impacts
of various advanced vehicle technology packages across five different vehicle classes.
They considered a cost-effectiveness metric to make recommendations about which
technologies should be adopted by the market.
These previous studies are primarily analysis tools. They do not project auto-
motive vehicle demand; rather, they require this as an input to then analyze the
environmental outcomes.
As cited previously, some preliminary work has proposed using a design for market
systems approach to study the public vs. private goods automotive design problem.
Michalek et al. [Michalek et al. (2004)] focused on the impact of producer design
decisions (engine selection) in the face of various hypothetical regulatory regimes.
Wissmann and Yassine [Wissmann and Yassine (2005)] developed a design for market
systems framework that demonstrated how producers may adapt designs over time
given changes in fuel price, price of steel, and regulation.
The goal of this dissertation is to bring greater fidelity to the engineering applica-
tion and greater sophistication and modeling insights to the demand and cost sides
to enable more realistic application of the design for market systems idea.
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1.3 Expected Contributions
The methodology set forth relies on developments from engineering, economics,
and marketing. The primary contribution of this dissertation is that these previously-
made disparate developments have been brought together in a single mathematical
problem formulation for a large-scale problem. The integrated problem formulation
will allow a new way to study interdisciplinary issues related to product development.
Other work has also begun to develop similar comprehensive problem formulations.
This work points to some of the challenges that must be addressed in such formula-
tions. Specifically, the functional form of the cost models, and the utility specification
of the demand models can have a large impact on the market outcomes even when
the differing models appear to fit the underlying data similarly well. We show this by
comparing outcomes for the vehicle design problem formulation using two different
cost models and two different demand models.
A second contribution is the application of the notion that we can explore the
tradeoff between private interests and public interests by simulating market response
under different hypothetical scenarios. We can then gain deeper insights by exam-
ining the tradeoff relationships between the different scenarios. Novel metrics are
established for comparing the Pareto set of solutions from one hypothetical scenario
to the next that can be public and private tradeoffs derived from hypothetical market
simulations.
Practical contributions include the development of several models that can be
applied to other similar problems. Specifically, the problem formulation integrates
models of demand, cost, and product performance in order to implement a game-
theoritic formulation of producer behavior where producers choose the attributes of
the products they produce and the prices they will charge in order to maximize profit.
Two variations of a newly estimated mixed-logit discrete choice model of new car
buyer purchase behavior are developed for incorporation as demand models. Three
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cost model formulations are developed and compared in the context of the problem
formulation. An explicit representation of an automotive manufacturer’s technol-
ogy capability in the form of a comprehensive yet stylized engineering performance
model of a midsize crossover vehicle is developed. A methodology for developing
and estimating mixed-logit choice models accessible to the design for market systems
researcher is documented.
Hypothetical scenarios are evaluated in order to test the vehicle design problem
formulation involving the design of a single vehicle within a price-equilibrium market
context and the design of multiple same-segment vehicles within a price-equilibrium
market context. The differences in scenario outcomes based on differences in the
demand and cost models are explored. The results show that improving the fuel
economy of a specific vehicle does not always lead to a reduction in US fleet fuel
consumption.
Caution should be taken in interpreting the results of this study. The optimal
vehicle design problem solutions presented in Chapters 7 and 8 represent a stylized
equilibrium rather than a formal, full-market design and price equilibrium. Significant
obstacles remain in studying maximum profit formulations in vehicle design including
questions about underlying demand model validity and realistic cost models among
others. Furthermore, regulatory scenarios can be considered, such as the CAFE
standard, a fuel tax, or a CO2 tax. Therefore, the numerical results presented here
are useful in illustrating the proposed concept of public and private alignment rather
than suggesting specific decisions or policy outcomes.
1.4 Dissertation Overview
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature from discrete-
choice modeling, emperical cost modeling, multi-objective programming, game the-
ory, market simulations in the automotive industry, and design for market systems
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research. Chapter 3 develops the engineering model for a midsize crossover vehicle.
Chapter 4 describes the newly-estimated demand models of the US automotive in-
dustry and presents methods for evaluating the suitability of such demand models.
Chapter 5 presents the three cost modeling approaches. Chapter 6 briefly reviews the
mechanics of game-theoretic market simulations. Chapter 7 expands the public versus
private tradeoff discussion by presenting measures for comparing tradeoffs between
hypothetical future scenarios. Chapter 8 details several hypothetical scenarios. The
first set of studies focuses on a single producer modifying a single vehicle in the fleet.
The second set of studies focuses on the midsize crossover segment where three firms
can modify their midsize crossover vehicle. Chapter 9 concludes with a summary, con-
tributions, and future work. One appendix supplements the dissertation. Appendix




This chapter reviews literature and background related to the many disciplines
touched by this dissertation. Section 1 reviews discrete-choice modeling. Section 2
reviews empirical cost modeling. Section 3 reviews game theory. Section 4 reviews
multiobjective programming. Section 5 reviews previous work in market simulations
of the automotive vehicle industry. Section 6 reviews design for market systems
research.
2.1 Discrete-choice Modeling
Choice models can be useful in estimating demand for products. Many econo-
metric demand models have been estimated for the automotive market, for example
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes; Beresteanu and Li; and Train and Winston [Berry et al.
(1995); Beresteanu and Li (2008); Train and Winston (2007)]. These models predict
choice share as a function of product attributes, individual demographics, product-
demographic interactions, and other factors.
Table 2.1 lists the model variables or, covariates, used in three mixed-logit choice
models developed for the automotive industry. (BLP 95: [Berry et al. (1995)]; B&L:
[Beresteanu and Li (2008)]; T&W: [Train and Winston (2007)]). The first column
labels the choice model. The second column lists the years over which the choice model
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was estimated. For example, BLP95 used vehicle and sales data from 1971-1990 to
estimate their choice model. The third, fourth, and fifth columns list the covariates
for each model. The covariates are divided by vehicle attributes, household attributes,
and other factors. Some covariates can take on continuous values such as vehicle price
or size. Other covariates are discrete such as household size, and others are binary
taking a value either 0 or 1 such as Automatic transmission or Air conditioning. The
last column lists the cost model attributes for cases where a cost model was jointly
estimated with the choice model. The respective references contain the full definition
of each covariate and the functional form of consumer utility.
2.1.1 Choice Paradigm
Random utility theory is the most common choice paradigm in marketing and
economics work. It assumes that consumers seek to maximize satisfaction or utility
from their purchases. An individual’s utility Uij is assumed to be composed of two
parts, a systematic component νij and a random component εij. The role of the utility
specification is to describe the preference structure for an individual by providing a
mapping from a preference ordering of each choice alternative to a numerical ordering
of each choice alternative. The analyst assigns the systematic component of utility
νij to each individual i for each choice alternative j.
In one typical arrangement, the utility is expressed as a linear combination of
product attributes dj with fixed effects δ, demographic and attribute interactions bij
with fixed effects β, attributes or interactions mij with individual-specific random
effects µi [Train and Winston (2007)], and in independent and identically distributed
random variable εij. The random effects allow for individual taste differences inde-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The probability Pij that an individual i chooses product j is the probability that
the difference in the systematic component of utility between product j and any other
product k is greater than the difference in the random component of utility of the
other product k and product j,
Pij = Pr(νij − νik > εik − εij|∀k). (2.2)
For the special case where we assume that the portion of the random component εij is
independent and identically distributed across individuals according to the extreme
value type 1 distribution and the product and product and demographic interaction
random components are assumed known for each individual, a closed-form expression









When a sample population is assumed representative, the aggregate choice shares are






The simple logit model results when we assume that all individuals have homo-
geneous taste preferences (Equation (2.5)). This model still allows heterogeneity to




I∑ eδ′dj+β′bij∑K eδ′dk+β′bik (2.5)
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2.1.2 Consumer preference and product differentiation
Economic theory describes two forms of product differentiation: Vertical differ-
entiation results when consumers agree on the relative value ordering (or quality)
of competing products or attributes of a product but differ in their willingness to
pay for increased quality. Horizontal differentiation results when consumers disagree
about the relative ordering of goods or attribute levels of a good. In the new vehi-
cle automotive market we observe products that appear both vertically (e.g., various
grades of luxury for a full-size sedan) and horizontally (e.g., various vehicle classes)
differentiated. We also observe that manufacturers produce a portfolio of products
rather than a single product offering. Consumer preferences can be one factor mo-
tivating firms to produce multiple products that are both vertically differentiated
and horizontally differentiated. For example, industrial organization theory suggests
that when consumers have nonidentical preferences product differentiation tends to
weaken price competition [Tirole (1988)].
The previous discussion motivates the challenge of developing choice models that
capture consumers’ vertical as well as horizontal taste differences. It is expected
that a choice model that only represents vertical preference differences (willingness to
pay) would suggest policies different from a model that represents horizontal prefer-
ence differences (“distance from ideal”). In the former, the dominant tradeoff for the
firm is between cost and improvement of the attribute but in the latter, the impor-
tant tradeoff is choosing which group of consumers to address. We may conjecture
that for the new car buyer vehicle acceleration, fuel economy, safety features, and
luxury appointments are examples of attributes for which preference may be char-
acterized best by vertical differentiation. On the other hand, preference for brand,
vehicle class, overall size, drivetrain (i.e., FWD, RWD, AWD, 4WD), ride, handling,
and transmission (i.e., automatic, manual) may be best characterized by horizontal
differentiation.
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The consumer preference structures across individuals in the population can be
categorized by their tendency to promote vertical differentiation between product
offerings or horizontal differentiation. Following the development of Tirole [Tirole
(1988)], one example of a preference structure leading to vertical differentiation is
described by the utility function in terms of price p and quality r for consumer i and
product j in Equation (2.6).
Uij = δirj − pj (2.6)
The utility of the outside good is assumed to be 0.
Two market cases can result for a monopolistic firm considering two products
with different prices (p1, p2) and qualities (r1, r2). We consider a consumer population
that is represented by a distribution of preference parameters µj that are assumed
distributed according to some known distribution (µj ∼ f(µ)). In the case where









where F () denotes a functional relationship. In other words, consumers with µj ≥
p2/r2 purchase Product 2; otherwise, they do not purchase either product. When
r2/p2 ≤ r1/p1, consumers with µj > (p2 − p1)/(r2 − r1) purchase the higher quality
good (i.e., Product 2). Consumers with p1/r1 < µj ≤ (p2−p1)/(r2− r1) purchase the
























One example of a preference structure leading to horizontal differentiation is de-
scribed by the utility function for consumer i and product j in Equation (2.10).
Uij = βi(γi − αj)2 − pj (2.10)
Two parameters identify each consumer; µi represents willingness to pay similar to the
vertical differentiation case but should have a negative sign; γi represents consumer i’s
preferred level of attribute α. The specific functional form (in this case a quadratic)
controls the change in utility as an attribute’s value is further away from the ideal
one (γi). Following the linear city analogy [Hotelling (1929)] consumers’ preferred
attribute levels are assumed distributed on a continuum. If we assume two competing
firms will offer one product each, most consumers will experience some disutility (or
“transportation cost”) by purchasing a good away from their ideal. In the first case,
Product 1 is priced below Product 2 such that the reduced price compensates for the
transportation cost for all consumers. In the second case, there is a tradeoff between
price and transportation cost such that some consumers prefer Product 1 and some
consumers prefer Product 2. A variant on this case occurs when both products are
priced so high that the consumers in the middle purchase neither product due to the
additional transportation cost.
With the exception of dummy coding [Beresteanu and Li (2008)], the typical
utility function of mixed-logit specifications found in the literature is formulated as
in Equation (2.1). Studying this equation reveals that linear-in-attribute specifica-
tions primarily imply vertical differentiation through the monotonicity of utility with
respect to each attribute.
Linear-in-attribute specifications do allow for two commonly seen cases and a
third less utilized case implying horizontal differentiation. The first is when a random
coefficient straddles 0 so that increase in the given attribute provides utility to some
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individuals and disutility to other individuals—implying that consumers either like
or dislike the attribute monotonically.
The second opportunity for horizontal differentiation from the conventional util-
ity forms comes from the dummy variables associated with brand, vehicle class, or
other attributes. When the coefficients on these dummies are treated as random, it is
possible for the preference ordering between vehicle class, for example, to vary across
the population. This will occur if the estimated variances are large enough to dom-
inate the estimated mean effects. Interacting vehicle class dummies with observed
demographics is the systematic analog to this idea. When the estimated parameters
are constant across individuals then the utility function represents a homogeneous
ranked-ordering of brands or vehicle classes (i.e., vertical differentiation). This ap-
proach is quite common; however, it requires specifying the structure of differentiation
a priori (e.g., the vehicle classes).
A third, less common approach is to transform a product attribute such that it
does not enter into the utility function monotonically. In Chapter 4 we propose an
ideal-point utility formulation for vehicle size that gives an example of this approach.
We choose vehicle footprint for the ideal-point because we believe it is the continuous
attribute that is most likely to demonstrate horizontally differentiated preference.
2.1.3 Stated vs. Revealed Choices
Demand models can be estimated from a variety of data sources including revealed
choice (actual product purchase) and stated choice (respondent’s preferred alternative
in a thought experiment). Individual-level revealed-choice data can be collected at
the point of sale (e.g., scanner data), or through a survey mechanism after the sale.
Aggregate sales data may also be collected through various reporting mechanisms.
Individual-level purchase observations represent the gold standard for data in much
applied economics work. These data have high face validity because they represent an
27
actual choice (involving an exchange of money or allocation of some other resource).
However, revealed-choice data only inform models of consumer preference based on
the alternatives that each consumer actually saw.
Stated-choice data allow researchers to extend investigations beyond the scope
of current product availability and investigate product attributes or other factors of
interest at finer detail than provided by the market [Louviere et al. (2000)]. One form
of stated-choice data useful for demand modeling is collected by gathering responses
to hypothetical-purchase-choice experiments. Because this data comes from planned
experiments, it is almost always collected at the individual level. The stated-choice
approach is particularly appropriate for considering future demand for alternative fuel
vehicles given their limited market penetration and rapidly evolving technology [Po-
toglou and Kanaroglou (2007); Bunch et al. (1993)]. However, there is no guarantee
that a consumer will behave the same way in the market as in the stated-choice
experiments.
It is possible to combine revealed and stated preference data. Hybrid models com-
bining stated and revealed choice are an active area of research [Kumar et al. (2007);
Feit et al. (In Review)]. Louviere et al. include a discussion on this topic [Louviere
et al. (2000)], and Brownstone et al. show a combined data model for alternative fuel
vehicles [Brownstone et al. (2000)]. The model we present in Chapter 4 follows the
development of Train and Winston [Train and Winston (2007)] where we supplement
observed vehicle purchases and demographics with stated information about other
considered vehicles.
2.1.4 Choice Model Evaluation
Chintagunta et al. [Chintagunta et al. (2006)] propose four criteria for evaluat-
ing choice models in their review of the economic and marketing literature regarding
structural choice models. They are fit, interpretability, predictive validity, and plausi-
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bility. The econometrics literature has developed and applied many statistical tests to
address these criteria in the context of choice share predictions [Train (2003)]. How-
ever, other properties of choice models are important to investigate for engineering
design, particularly how the design optimization model will behave based on the given
demand model. One approach to begin to address this question is to consider how
the demand model covariates (particularly those associated with product attributes)
and their functional forms affect choice shares.
Interpretability and Fit
Traditional measures of interpretability are tests of significance of the estimated
parameters, and checking parameter sign against intuition.
A standard measure of fit for logit models is the likelihood ratio index:
ρ2 = 1− LL(δ̂, β̂, µ̂)/LL(0), (2.11)
which measures how well the estimated model performs compared to a model where
all of the parameters are zero (i.e., no model).
The likelihood function L is the product of choice probabilities Pyj for each in-
dividual for all choice observations for the choice the individual actually made given
a set of estimates for the model parameter values {δ̂, β̂, µ̂}, where fyj is a dummy



















We take LL(0) to be the log likelihood function where all parameter values are set
equal to 0. This is equivalent to predicting that each choice alternative has the same
choice probability, i.e., Pyj = 1/J . An alternative definition for LL(0) is to substitute
Sj for all Pyj in Equation (2.13), where Sj is the percentage of observed choices for
product j from the data sample.
Values between 0.2-0.4 represent very good model fits, and have been equivalenced
to 0.7-0.9 R2 values for linear ordinary least squares regression [Louviere et al. (2000)].
This statistical measure can only be used to compare the goodness-of-fit of two or more
models if they are estimated from identical data sets and choice alternatives [Train
(2003)].
Predictive Validity and Plausibility
The goal of estimating the demand model in design for market systems is to predict
demand for products under counterfactual scenarios. Properties of particular interest
to design optimization relate to how the model predicts consumers trade off product
attributes and how their willingness to pay for improving an attribute compares to
the cost of improvement.
Whereas fit measures the ability of the model to describe the in-sample data, pre-
dictive validity evaluates the ability to describe out-of-sample data. This may include
a hold-out sample from the same time period for which the model was estimated, or it
could be a sample from another time period or population. The likelihood ratio index
can be used to evaluate a model’s ability to predict choice shares from this out-of-
sample set. This evaluation is one measure of a model’s ability to capture consumer
tradeoffs among attributes because one way to interpret superior model performance
(i.e., higher ρ2) on out-of-sample data is that the model better captures consumer
tradeoffs better than simply describing the data (i.e., a good fit).
Similarly, another test that can be performed to evaluate indirectly the validity
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of the attribute valuation described by a particular model is predicting prices for
products in an equilibrium framework as performed by Morrow [Morrow (2008)]. If
accurate cost data are available, then the demand model can be used to generate
equilibrium prices for all products under assumptions of competitive behavior. This
evaluation is stronger than the likelihood ratio index because it can be used to identify
systematic errors in predicting attribute tradeoffs such as if prices for higher quality
products were underpredicted compared to observed market behavior.
We define plausibility as the ability of the estimated model to produce outcomes
that represent market behavior based on theory or observations. One way to assess
plausibility in the absence of cost and constraint models is to examine substitution
patterns between competing goods given changes in price and other attributes, as
measured by own- and cross-elasticities [Train (2003); Nevo (2000)]. The substitution
patterns can then be compared to observed market behavior where possible.
2.2 Cost Modeling
Product planning and investment decisions rely on estimates of design and produc-
tion costs, and yet cost estimates are a key element of uncertainty in the formulation
of design and product development problems. The cost of a product is an outcome of
various supply markets and labor inputs. Simplifying the discussion to focus on how
product attribute changes affect cost is no less problematic. Costs change for iden-
tical components based on volume and from year to year. Cost to produce a vehicle
includes not only the direct production costs, but also a firm’s overhead. The cost
models developed in this study do not attempt a bottom-up estimation for an entire
vehicle. Rather the cost formulations focus on differences in cost from a baseline vehi-
cle due to differences in powertrain and vehicle geometry. More sophisticated models
could be included in the design optimization framework as they become available.
Examples of cost models for automotive vehicles include an ACEEE model that
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estimates incremental cost increases for advanced powertrains [Kliesch and Langer
(2006)], and studies by the national labs [Markel et al. (2006)]. The AVCEM model
provides estimates for alternative and traditional powertrains [Delucchi (2005)].
Three approaches to cost modeling are illustrated in Chapter 5: (1) an analytical
model based on attribute differences, (2) a parametric model based on attribute
regression of presumed costs (based on market prices and dealer markups), and (3)
a parametric model derived from the price-equilibrium conditions given a demand
model. The first two models are primarily motivated from an engineering perspective.
The third model is motivated from an economics perspective. The following sections
briefly review cost modeling from an engineering and economics perspective.
2.2.1 Cost Models from the Engineering Literature
Cost modeling as described in the engineering literature usually falls into one of
three categories, or the approach is a combination of two or three of the categories.
These catagories are parametric, analogous, and analytical. Parametric modeling
seeks to define relationships between attributes of interest (design variables) and cost.
This can be accomplished by using regression to match historical data. Analogous
models use historical cost data from similar products in order to estimate the cost
of a new product. Analytical models are explicit functions based on known (or pre-
sumed) relationships used to predict cost. One type of analytical modeling is based
on detailed models of manufacturing processes. Another is based on abstract relation-
ships between product characteristics and cost. Fixson reviews several levels of cost
analysis and hypothesizes that as the scope of the analysis broadens from estimat-
ing the cost of operating a single machine towards estimating the costs of the entire
enterprise, the fraction of indirect cost increases and the cost becomes increasingly
nonlinear [Fixson (2004)].
Direct and abstract modeling are the two primary means whereby the three cost
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modeling approaches are applied. Direct modeling links cost directly to manufactur-
ing and production operations through analytical, parametric, or analogous models.
This approach has the potential to give an accurate cost estimate. However, these
models are generally more difficult to associate directly with design variables and
they are resource intensive to create and maintain.
Abstract modeling uses a proposed analytical or parametric model as a surrogate
model for a detailed cost model. The abstract model is intended to provide some of
the trade-off features of a detailed cost model without being tied directly to specific
cost drivers such as machining time or energy use. Such models may use informa-
tion such as sales prices, or they may develop cost of variety functions based on the
number and variety of components. Design variables appear in these models, but
they make assumptions about the impact the design variables will have on final cost
of the product rather than rely on historical data or detailed manufacturing models.
Although they predict design and production costs, they cannot usually assure manu-
facturing feasibility. This type of model is meant to guide product planning decisions
and not to be used as a rigorous cost analysis tool. For a more detailed review of cost
modeling in the engineering literature see [Frischknecht (2006)].
2.2.2 Cost Models and Economic Theory
Market equilibrium simulations have become common practice in the marketing
and economics literature, see for example, the various examples cited in [Chintagunta
et al. (2006)]. Two approaches in these studies for handling costs are (1) obtain
actual cost data [Chintagunta et al. (2003)]; or (2) estimate a cost model from price
equilibrium conditions assuming a specific model of competition [Berry et al. (1995);
Beresteanu and Li (2008)]. Obtaining manufacturing costs for the automotive market
appears highly unlikely. This would require multiple manufacturers to share closely-
held cost information. It may be possible for someone close to the industry to develop
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working approximations of vehicle costs for various firms. However, this approach is
not practical for academic studies. We therefore look to the work based on equilibrium
assumptions described briefly below.
Economists expect producers to behave as profit maximizers. This implies that for
any two production plans with the same quantity and quality of outputs, the producer
will choose the production plan with the lowest cost. We can then say that producers
are cost minimizers. Therefore the cost model that is relevant to the economist is
not the cost of every possible production plan (i.e., the type and number of inputs
required to produce a certain quality and quantity of outputs), but the minimum
cost for each set of outputs. Given a description of a technology (i.e., the relationship
between costs and quantities of inputs to quantities and qualities of outputs), the
relevant cost function can be derived by solving the cost minimization problem for
each output level [Varian (1992)].
Technology descriptions are complex, proprietary, and often not fully articulated
even within a given firm. One economics approach is then to work backwards by
making some assumptions about the competitive behavior in a market. For example,
if we assume a given market is in Nash-Bertrand price equilibrium we can assume that
the market prices reflect the profit maximizing behavior of the firms in the market.
We can then write out the equilibrium conditions implied for each firm by setting
the derivative of each firm’s profit function equal to 0. In the simplest case profit π
is a function of revenue R and cost C, where revenue and costs depend on demand
Q and price p, π = Q(p)(p − c). The costs can then be computed by rearranging
the equilibrium conditions. A functional form for cost can be postulated (typically a
function of product attributes believed to impact demand), and the cost values can be
regressed on cost factors. A variation on this approach is to co-estimate the demand
and cost parameters simultaneously by enforcing the equilibrium conditions at each
iteration of the estimation procedure [Berry et al. (1995)].
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The cost models developed using the equilibrium approach are typically described
as functions of product attributes. It is an open question whether cost models that
were a function of more elementary vehicle characteristics could yield better results.
For example, intuition indicates that a cost model that was a function of engine power
and size (measured as the product of vehicle length and width) may better capture
cost tradeoffs than one that is rather a function of acceleration (related to the ratio
of engine power to vehicle mass), fuel consumption, and size. Although acceleration
and fuel consumption are important to the consumer, there is no physical reason why
these attributes should contribute to vehicle cost in an additively separable way as is
frequently modeled.
2.3 Multi-objective Optimization
Mathematical multi-objective problem formulations are appropriate when there
are important criteria, believed to be competing, that are noncommensurable (i.e.,
they cannot be compared directly with the same units of measurement and it is
difficult to convert them into a common unit of comparison such as dollars). A mult-
objective optimization problem can be mathematically stated as:
min
x
f(x; v)| h(x; v) = 0, g(x; v) ≤ 0, x ∈ X (2.14)
Here f(x; v) is a vector of criteria of interest fn, n = 1, . . . , N . The set of variable
values x that satisfy all constraints is the feasible (design) domain, X . The set of
parameters v take on fixed values. The set of all vectors f mapped from the feasible
domain is the attainable set A = {f(x; v)|x ∈ X}. A point in A, f(x∗), is said to be
non-dominated or Pareto optimal, if there exist no f(x; v) such that f(x; v) ≤ f(x∗; v)
and fn(x; v) < fn(x
∗; v) for at least one n. Ideal values f ◦n are the optimal criterion
values obtained optimizing one criterion at a time. The ideal or utopia point is the
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Special cases of multicriteria optimization occur when the criteria are dependent.
Following from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for noninferiority of vector opti-
mization problems [Karush (1939); Kuhn and Tucker (1951); Kuhn (1976)]1, when
the gradient of one criterion function can be expressed as a linear combination of the
other criteria functions (∇fr(x) =
∑N
n 6=r wn∇fn(x) then one of the following condi-
tions exists: (1) If wn ≥ 0 for all n, then objective fr can be eliminated from further
consideration. (2) If the summation is negative and wn 6= 0 for all n 6= r, then all
feasible solutions are noninferior [Cohon (1978)].
The Pareto set of a multicriterion optimization problem may have regions where a
very small improvement in one objective leads to a large decline in another objective.
Kuhn and Tucker [Kuhn and Tucker (1951)], and Geoffrion [Geoffrion (1968)] labeled
these regions as improper Pareto points.
2.3.1 Multi-objective decision making
The concept of Pareto optimality was introduced by Edgeworth in 1881 [Edge-
worth (1881)] and advanced by Pareto in 1906 [Pareto (1906)]. During the first half
of the 20th century numerical techniques for multi-objective optimization were devel-
oped by mathematicians and economists. Engineers began to apply these techniques
widely in the 1960s [Stadler (1979)]. Within engineering most early applications were
large-scale civil projects. Most of civil applications were water resource management
applications [Stadler (1981)]. Often these decisions were concerned with public pol-
icy. The utilization of multi-objective optimization can serve in the public debate by
making trade-offs explicit and analysis transparent [Cohon (1978)]. Early engineering
academic work concentrated on linear programming. Closed-form expressions can be
developed for the Pareto set for small problems [Lin et al. (1975)].
1A summary of the unpublished 1939 Master’s thesis of W. Karush was published as an appendix
to [Kuhn (1976)].
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Multicriterion decision making can be broken into three different approaches [Evans
(1984)]: (1) Preferences are determined a priori and expressed as a value function; (2)
Preferences evolve iteratively by solving a problem and adjusting preferences multiple
times; 3) The range of solutions is presented and preferences are established a poste-
riori. In all cases, making a final decision about a single solution requires decisions
to be made about the decision maker’s preferences. Preferences can be described
mathematically by value functions. A value function is often called a utility function,
and it can include consideration of risk or uncertainty [Keeny and Raiffa (1976)].
If preferences for all criteria are monotonic, then the decisions under consideration
can be reduced from the attainable set to the Pareto set [Athan (1994)]. Pareto
optimality is the most common vector (multiobjective) optimality concept; however,
there are others, especially from game theory, such as some equilibrium concepts and
min-max solutions [Stadler (1988)].
This dissertation adopts utility functions from random-utility theory as the value
function for consumer preferences. No preference structure is defined for the firm-level
public private tradeoff between firm profit and vehicle fuel consumption. Instead we
present the first part for approach three above by presenting the range of solutions
before establishing preferences.
2.3.2 Solution techniques
Several solution techniques exist for generating Pareto optimal points. A common
approach is to convert the vector objective function into a scalar objective and solve
the problem once, or a number of times, using the techniques of scalar optimization.
Multiobjective genetic algorithm methods generate an approximation to the Pareto
set at once as an envelop of the attainable set [Fonseca and Fleming (1993)].
Popular scalarization methods include the weighted criteria, global criterion, and
ε-constraint method (or constraint trade-off method) [Osyczka (1984)] including the
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lexicographic method [Waltz (1967)], and others [Rao and Papalambros (1989); Athan
and Papalambros (1996); Das (1999)]. A limitation of the linear weighted criteria
method is that it cannot find Pareto points in a non-convex region of the Pareto fron-
tier. Generalized weighted criteria methods consider functions in the place of constant
weighting parameters [Athan and Papalambros (1996)]. We adopt the ε-constraint
method because of its straight-forward application in the case of two criteria and the
ability to identify non-convex Pareto solutions.
A brief review is presented of common solution techniques. These techniques can
be divided into those that provide Pareto optimal solutions and those that provide
solutions based on some other solution strategy.
Pareto-optimal techniques
ε-constraint
The approach is to minimize one criterion with constraints on all other criteria. It
can find Pareto optimal solutions in regions of nonconvexity. However, it may require
a large number of constraint level combinations when the number of criteria is large.
A special case of this method is the lexicographic method. The lexicographic method
is not a Pareto optimal solution strategy and is described below.
Weighted Criteria
The weighted criteria method solves a single objective problem that consists of the
weighted sum of the individual objectives. This method can be incorporated with
no change to existing single objective optimization routines. However, because a
weighted sum is a convex combination of the two objectives, the solution algorithm
will not identify nonconvex regions of the Pareto frontier. Also, an even distribution
of weights will not lead to even distribution of points on the Pareto curve. The
distribution of the solutions generated therefore is highly dependent on the scale of
each criterion and the weighting factors chosen.
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Compromise Programming
Compromise programming sets a target point f t. Then, a regret function, defined
to be a norm of the target point and the criterion vector, is minimized [Yu and
Leitmann (1974)]. The target point can be set to the ideal point to ensure that
solutions are Pareto optimal. Determining the ideal point requires separate scalar
optimization runs for each criterion. The form of the regret function is typically
R(f) = (
∑n
i=1(fi−f ti )p)(1/p). A p = 1 value treats each criterion as equally important
and commensurable (i.e., the lowest sum of values in the criterion vector is sought).
p = 1 is similar to goal programming and majority rule. For a bicriterion minimization
problem the slope of a line tangent to the Pareto curve at the p = 1 solution is equal to
-1. A p = 2 value corresponds to the Euclidean distance from the target point to the
Pareto surface. It treats each criterion as equally important but noncommensurable
(i.e., the value that is geometrically closest to the ideal point is preferred). A p =∞
value corresponds to the L∞ norm. It treats each criterion as equally important and
seeks to minimize the maximum deviation from the target value for each criterion.
For a bicriterion problem the solution will be found at the intersection of the Pareto
curve and a line with slope equal to one that also intersects the target point. Setting
p =∞ is also called the min-max, or Tchebycheff method.
Given that the range of each criterion may be vastly different and compromise pro-
gramming with regret functions typically treats each criterion as equally important,
designers typically scale each criterion over its range in order to normalize the criteria
comparison. Yu and Leitman document some characteristics of compromise program-
ming including how the methodology implicitly imposes an intercomparison among
criteria because the solution is not independent of a positive linear transformation of
criteria (i.e., scaling of objectives matters). Also, for problems where the individual
criterion represent the objectives of multiple independent stakeholders, as p increases,
group utility decreases, but individual regret reduces as well. As p decreases group
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utility increases, but individual regret increases as well [Yu and Leitmann (1974)].
Curve Tracing using Homotopy Techniques
This method is specifically for bi-objective problems. The principle is to move along
the Pareto frontier from one Pareto-optimal point to the next using local informa-
tion at the current solution. For further description of this method see [Rao and
Papalambros (1989)].
Normal-Boundary Intersection
This method begins with the ideal values for each objective (or an approximation).
A line search is then conducted in the direction normal to the hyperplane intersecting
the ideal values. The search continues until no further improvement in the objective
is achieved. The solution is guaranteed to be Pareto optimal for most cases. There
are notable exceptions when a Pareto set contains “folds” that the algorithm can ter-
minate prematurely at a dominated point. This method is very useful for developing
an even distribution of solutions across the Pareto frontier [Das (1999)].
Non Pareto optimal solution techniques
Goal Programming
Goal programming requires setting a priority for all criteria and establishing con-
straints for each criteria. The objective is to minimize deviations from each criterion
goal [Ignizio (1976)]. Pareto optimality is not relevant in this framework because the
preferences for criteria are not monotonic but based on the criteria prioritizing and
the goal values. The goal values or targets may or may not be attainable. This is a
primary difference from compromise programming where the targets are unattainable
to ensure that the solution will be Pareto optimal.
Game Theory
In game theory the multiple criteria are typically broken down and adopted by mul-
tiple agents, or players [Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)]. One objective of game theory
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is to observe outcomes based on the actions of multiple agents given specific decision
strategies. The strategies may or may not be based on monotonic preference for a
given set of criteria. Some game theory solutions will generate Pareto optimal points
and some will not depending on the particular strategy employed. For example, some
models of competition may put more textslasis on reducing the outcome for a com-
petitor rather than maximizing own benefit. Game theory is discussed in more detail
below as it relates to market simulations.
Multilevel programming (lexicographic or hierarchical)
A special case of the ε-constraint method is multilevel programming, sometime called
the lexicographic or hierarchical method. The lexicographic method is not a Pareto
optimal solution strategy because the problem is divided into subproblems that are
solved sequentially rather than all at once. The decision maker incorporates prefer-
ences into the solution strategy by ranking criteria in order of importance. Then, a
series of sequential scalar optimization problems are solved in the order of the ranked
criteria subject to problem constraints. The attained value of each succeeding crite-
rion is maintained as a constraint for the remaining problems [Waltz (1967)]. The
technique can be useful when there are many degrees of freedom. If there are low
degrees of freedom the solution will be fixed after the first optimization runs.
Parameter Space Investigation and Genetic Algorithms
Parameter Space Investigation was developed for low-dimensional problems that are
highly nonlinear and nonsmooth. Adaptation of the method beyond ten decision
variables has proven difficult computationally. Furthermore there is no guarantee
of Pareto optimality. The method involves sampling design points randomly or by
some prescribed method. Infeasible points are discarded, and the remaining points
are ordered. Sampling and selection occur in an iterative fashion [Steuer and Sun
(1995)].
Genetic algorithms have been applied to multi-objective problems in much the
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same way as for parameter space investigation. However the genetic algorithm han-
dles the sampling, ordering, and selection procedure. See for example [Horn et al.
(1994)].
2.4 Game Theory
Game theory is a large and active area of research. Many of the ideas were first for-
malized by Von Neumann [Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1944)]. Several textbooks
have been dedicated to the topic including [Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); Friedman
(1986)]. Several key terms are provided here as background for the development of
the market simulations described in Chapters 6 and 8.
2.4.1 Structure of a Game
A game is defined by identifying the players (i.e., decision makers), the strategies
(i.e., the choices faced by each decision maker), the payoffs (i.e., the consequence for a
player of each choice), and the sequence of decisions to be made. The simplest games
assume players simultaneously make one decision each.
The decision-making strategy of each player will determine the choices the player
makes. Individual utility (i.e., payoff) maximization is a frequently adopted strategy.
In this case each decision maker will seek to maximize individual utility while consider
the actions of the other players. A mixed strategy is one where the decision maker
does not always make the same choice in a repeated game. A pure strategy is where
a particular choice will be made every time.
A Nash equilibrium is defined as a solution strategy for each player such that
one individual cannot unilaterally change strategies and increase payoff. A Nash
equilibrium solution is expected when all players have correct information about the
likelihood of each individual choosing each strategy, and each individual is acting to
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maximize payoff. Nash showed that given these assumptions with a finite number of
agents and a finite number of pure strategies an equilibrium will always exist [Varian
(1992)].
2.4.2 Game variants
Single vs. Multi-stage Game
A single-stage game is a game where players make choices simultaneously. Other
games can be developed where players make a series of choices either simultaneously
or in sequence. One example of such a game is where one player is the leader and the
others are the followers. That is, one player makes his or her choice first. The other
players then simultaneously make their choices. When players face a set of decisions
given that some decision has already been made, the reduced decision context is
called a subgame. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy for each player that
results in an equilibrium to the overall problem, which is also an equilibrium of the
subgames [Varian (1992)].
Static vs. Dynamic Games
A single-stage game can be repeated. When the players know that the single-
stage game will be repeated we have a simple dynamic game. A player’s preferred
strategy may change from the single-stage game strategy knowing that the game will
be repeated. More complicated dynamic games can be developed that incorporate
multi-stage games.
2.4.3 Application to Market Simulations
Published market simulations for the automotive industry have focused on static
games. This is clearly a simplification because we expect manufacturers to have
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expectations about the future actions of competitors that would influence decisions
today. Dynamic games are computationally much less tractable than static games.
We follow previous research and choose to focus on a static-game representation of
the automotive industry. The players (vehicle manufacturers) are assumed to be profit
maximizers. Price is chosen as the strategic variable controlled by firms implying that
the resulting equilibrium solution to the market pricing game will be a Nash-Bertrand
equilibrium [Tirole (1988)]. This means that we assume that producers are capable
of supplying arbitrary quantities demanded exactly. This is a simplification adopted
by other researchers for the automotive industry. Another simplifying assumption
we make is that each producer will adopt only pure strategies. This means that
each producer will charge a specific price for each vehicle, rather then, for example,
charging one price 40% of the time and another price 60% of the time.
A different situation (typical of many commodities) would arise if we assumed
that each producer was production constrained. In this case, firms would allocate
resources to produce a specific quantity of a good. Price would then be determined
by the overall market demand and the total quantity supplied. The result would be
a Cournot equilbrium [Tirole (1988)].
The textslasis in design for market systems is to study the implications of the
market on the decisions that firms make about product design decisions, not only
price. We therefore adopt a two-stage (or subgame) approach where firms first design
products and then set prices. The subgame is the pricing problem given all vehicle
designs. We limit the number of players to one player or a small number of players
to clarify the discussion of the results for the market simulations. In the case of
one player, the manufacturer will design a given vehicle (the first stage) considering
that the price for all own and competing vehicles can be adjusted based on the given
designs (the second stage). In the multi-player case, a limited number of firms design
one vehicle each (the first stage) considering that the price for all own and competing
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vehicles can be adjusted based on the given designs (the second stage). Conducting
two-stage games where each player designs multiple vehicles is beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
2.5 Market Simulations in Automotive Industry
Many econometric demand models have been estimated for the automotive mar-
ket [Beresteanu and Li (2008); Petrin (2002); Brownstone et al. (2000); Train and
Winston (2007); Goldberg (1995); Sudhir (2001)]. These models are often tailored
for specific analyses such as interpreting firm pricing behavior rather than pricing
and design decisions. For example, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [Berry et al. (1995)],
abbreviated BLP95, estimated a mixed-logit model of the automotive market to intro-
duce a method for estimating demand in differentiated-products markets accounting
for price endogeneity, and using only aggregate level demand and known population
demographic distributions. They simultaneously recovered demand and cost param-
eters assuming observed prices satisfied Nash equilibrium. Many succeeding papers
describing the automotive market have followed the BLP methodology.
Several drawbacks to the BLP approach can be identified. It is not clear that
the BLP-style model supports counterfactual analyses based on changes in product
attributes because the estimation procedure assumes design decisions are exogenous
[Nevo (2000)]. Also, the exogenous specification of distributions for demographics,
such as income, risk affecting parameter identification through erroneous correla-
tions between demographics and product choices. Additionally, the utility specifi-
cation enforces counterintuitive notions about consumer preferences. For instance,
the utility specification contains the attribute “miles per dollar” (fuel economy di-
vided by the price of gas), which lowers the relative importance of fuel economy as
gas price increases. Although all three of the more recent demand models corrected
the “miles-per-dollar” error—in favor of either a “dollars per mile” or “gallons per
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mile” attribute—both [Petrin (2002)] and [Beresteanu and Li (2008)] formulate util-
ity as monotonic with vehicle size when it is possible that an individual could prefer
a specific size vehicle.
2.6 Design for Market Systems Research
Engineers have begun to adopt, modify, and develop econometric models to serve
in design for market systems applications, especially applied to automotive vehicle
design [Michalek et al. (2004); Shiau and Michalek (2007); Frischknecht and Pa-
palambros (2008); Wassenaar et al. (2005); Donndelinger et al. (2008)]. Michalek
[Michalek et al. (2004)] and Shiau and Michalek [Shiau and Michalek (2007)] ex-
tracted the price, fuel economy, and acceleration pieces of utility from an existing
automotive demand model, assuming all other product attributes (e.g., dimensions)
are fixed. Frischknecht and Papalambros [Frischknecht and Papalambros (2008)] used
these same assumptions while including vehicle size decisions but also adjusted the
parameters for fuel economy and acceleration, recognizing the fleet average (i.e., con-
sumers’ expectations) of these attributes have changed since the time the model was
estimated. These heuristic methods allow demand models to be used in design opti-
mization for illustrative purposes but the interpretation of the results is uncertain.
Kumar [Kumar et al. (2007)] and Shiau [Shiau and Michalek (2009)] constructed
their own demand models for the purpose of design optimization. However, little
textslasis has been placed on the choice of the functional form of utility used in
these models. Wassenaar et al. [Wassenaar et al. (2005)] presented a first attempt
at addressing this issue, applying the Kano method to select the functional form
for each product attribute, but offered no methods for evaluating the suitability for
design optimization of the resulting demand model beyond measures of fit.
Other work in design for market systems research includes topics such as how
to allocate resources between projects and what should be the product of each
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project [Georgiopoulos et al. (2005); Michalek et al. (2006); De Weck et al. (2006); Ku-
mar et al. (2009)]; how to translate product attribute targets into engineering design
and compare the value of different designs [Cooper and Papalambros (2003)]; how to
integrate experimental techniques from marketing with engineering design [Michalek
et al. (2005); MacDonald et al. (2007a); Hoyle et al. (2008); Kumar et al. (2007)];
how distribution channels affect product design [Williams et al. (2008)]; and many





An engineering model representing a midsize crossover vehicle is developed by
combining powertrain performance simulations and other empirically or analytically
derived models representing other vehicle characteristics. Three separate powertrain
configurations are developed: conventional spark-ignition (SI) gasoline engine, gas
turbo direct-injection gasoline engine (GTDI), and a split-mode hybrid electric ve-
hicle with a conventional spark ignition gasoline engine (HEV). The hybrid electric
powertrain model is a backwards-looking simulation built by Kukhyun Ahn based on
his dissertation work [Ahn (2008)]. Section 3.1 defines the modeled vehicle character-
istics. Section 3.2 defines the design variables, parameter values, and the engineering
constraint functions. Section 3.3 presents model validation data, and Section 3.4
summarizes the chapter. Additional details describing the engineering performance
model are found in Appendix A.
3.1 Vehicle characteristics
Vehicle characteristics are presented in three categories: powertrain performance,
packaging (which includes curbweight), and safety.
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3.1.1 Powertrain
Vehicle simulations for SI and GTDI were developed using the AVL Cruise soft-
ware package [AVL (2008)]. The vehicle powertrain was configured to represent a
standard automatic transmission front-wheel-drive vehicle with a gasoline engine. In
addition to powertrain specifications (i.e., gear ratios, gear shifting schedule, engine
number of cylinders, vee or inline configuration, bore, and stroke, valvetrain configu-
ration, and final drive ratio) Cruise also receives other vehicle parameters as inputs,
including curbweight, frontal area, drag coefficient, tire radius, and center of gravity
location under various loads. These parameters were developed from the other char-
acteristic models as described below or taken from data describing one 2007 model
(i.e., Ford Edge). In all, over 30 parameters were tuned for midsize crossover vehicles.
All other parameters were left at the default passenger vehicle levels.
Five performance tests were simulated in Cruise: The US city driving cycle
(FTP75), the US highway driving cycle (HFET), used to calculate combined city
and highway fuel economy, zmpg; an acceleration test starting from rest, used to cal-
culate 0-60 mph time, z060, and vehicle top speed, zTS; an elasticity test, used to
calculate 30-50 mph acceleration time while towing, z3050; and a gradeability test,
used to calculate maximum grade at 65 mph while towing, z65T . The 30-50 mph
acceleration test simulated towing by adding the maximum towing capacity to the
mass of the vehicle. The gradeability test simulated towing by using the virtual trailer
option, which allows specification of trailer mass and an estimate of losses.
Cruise characterizes engine performance by reference to engine maps derived from
experimental results of a baseline engine. The fuel consumption map for SI was taken
from a 2.5 l, V-6 engine with BMEPPpeak = 1068 kPa. The full load characteristic
was scaled from the Duratec35 engine (BMEPPpeak = 1085 kPa) used in the Ford
Edge. The GTDI baseline fuel consumption map was adapted from an SAE pa-
per [Kleeberg et al. (2006)]. The full load characteristic was adopted from a “best
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guess” transcription from the EcoBoost YouTube video hosted by Derek Kuzak of
Ford [Ford Environmental (2009)]. Additionally, Cruise provides modules for model-
ing turbo-charger behavior (see Appendix A for more details). The fuel consumption
map and full-load performance characteristic for HEV were taken from a data based
on the engine in the Toyota Prius.
Engine maps were scaled for a given evaluation as functions of xB and xBtS fol-
lowing established scaling relationships [Chon and Heywood (2000)]. We assume the
peak power brake mean effective pressure of the engine is 1085 kPa and mean piston
speed at peak power out is 18.1 m/s for all SI designs. We assume the peak power
brake mean effective pressure of the engine is 2047 kPa and mean piston speed at peak
power out is 16.7 m/s for all GTDI designs. The advanced friction module found in
Cruise, which incorporates engine and valvetrain architecture, based on [Patton et al.
(1989)] was used to integrate frictional engine losses into the simulations for SI and
GTDI.
Surrogate models were obtained from Cruise simulations to reduce computational
expense during design optimization. A Latin hypercube experimental design with
1000 numerical experiments was executed for the SI. A similar experiment with 1600
experiments was executed for GTDI and 500 experiments for HEV. The HEV sim-
ulation was developed in Matlab rather than Cruise, and the HEV simulations were
executed by Kukhyun Ahn. Table 3.1 shows the experimental factors and the upper
and lower bounds for each factor for each powertrain.
3.1.2 Packaging
Vehicle characteristics derived from simplified assumptions of vehicle geometry
include an estimated engine length, zEL; cargo volume index behind 2nd row, zCV I ;
ramp breakover angle, zA147; angle of departure, zA107 [SAE International (2005)];































































































































































































































































































































Vehicle characteristics related to the mass properties of the vehicle include vehicle
curbweight and gross vehicle weight rating, zVM , zGVWR; and the minimum required
payload capacity, vpay. A regression was fit (R
2:0.92) to estimate curb weight (re-
ported in lbm) using data for 2005 light-duty trucks from Ward’s automotive year-
book [Wards Communications (2006)]. Here zEDisp is the engine displacement vol-
ume in cubic centimeters, length and width in inches. vFWD, vAWD, v4WD, vRWD are
dummy variables {0,1} for driveline configuration, and vHEV is a dummy variable
{0,1} for a hybrid electric powertrain. Table A.3 lists the parameter values.
zVM = c1((xL103 × xW105)/100)2 + c2(xL103 × xW105) + c3zEDisp
+c4vFWD + c5vAWD + c6v4WD + c7vRWD + c8vHEV + c9
(3.1)
3.1.3 Safety
Vehicle characteristics modeled that influence vehicle safety include the static
rollover score based on the static stability factor [NHTSA (2009)], zRoll; vehicle center
of gravity position in longitudinal and vertical direction, zCGlong, zCGvert; bumper to
driver heel crush space, zCS; Minimum required crush space for a given average force,
vMCS; and estimated peak deceleration in front crash test, vMD;
The static stability factor is a function of vehicle geometry and vertical center of
gravity position. A correlation has been made between the static stability factor and
the risk of rollover [NHTSA (2009)]. Vehicle center of gravity is determined by vehicle
geometry and a prescribed subsystem mass distribution [Malen (2005)]. Bumper to
heel crush space, minimum required crush space, and estimated peak deceleration are
derived from vehicle geometry, underhood component geometry, and assumptions of
crush efficiency and 50% of crush load born by midrails.
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Table 3.3: Upper and lower bounds on design variables
xB xBtS xFD xH101 xL101 xL103 xW105 xPGR xBPow
Units mm - - mm mm mm mm - kW
SI, V-6
86 0.95 1.1 1600 2286 3556 1600
100 1.18 4.0 1930 3048 5080 2000
GTDI, I-4
80 0.9 2.5 1651 2286 4318 1727
92 1.18 5.0 1803 2286 5080 1982
HEV, I-4
88 0.9 3.5 1651 2286 4319 1727 0.3333 45
92 1.18 5.0 1803 3048 5080 1982 0.6666 65
3.2 Design Variables and Constraints
The design variables are: engine bore, xB; engine bore to stroke ratio, xBtS;
final drive ratio, xFD; vehicle length, width, and height, xL103, xW105, xH101; vehicle
wheelbase, xL101; and for HEV planetary gear ratio, xPGR; and peak power for the
battery, xBPow. Other parameters include the minimum height between seat and roof,
vMSH , and the underhood midrail width, vMRW among others. Table 3.3 gives the
upper and lower bounds of the design variables organized by powertrain.
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The constraint set is as follows:
g1 = 5%− z65T ≤ 0
g2 = 13
◦ − zA107 ≤ 0
g3 = 12
◦ − zA147 ≤ 0
g4 = 29ft
3 − zCV I ≤ 0
g5 = zCV I − 60ft3 ≤ 0
g6 = zRoll − .21 ≤ 0
g7 = 50%− 100(1− zCGlong − xL104/xL101 ≤ 0
g8 = vpay + zVM − zGVWR ≤ 0
g9 = zMCS − zCS ≤ 0
g10 = zMD − 20(9.81m/s2) ≤ 0
g11 = (2zTF + 2vMRW + zEL + 50.8)− (xW105 − 254) ≤ 0
g12 = xL101 + vL104 − xL103 ≤ 0
g13 = 115mph− zTS ≤ 0
g14 = vMSH − xH101 ≤ 0
(3.2)
Table 3.4 lists an explanation for each constraint. Cargo volume and rollover
constraints [NHTSA (2009)] were relaxed: g4 (min cargo volume) from 32 ft
3 to
29 ft3; g6 (max rollover score) from 0.1999, a 4-star rating, to 0.21, to account for
differences between the model and real-world data.
3.3 Model Performance
This section presents data to illustrate the performance of the engineering mod-
els. Results for the three powertrain configurations are given. Each of the powertrain
sections presents the curve-fits for the surrogate models. The SI and GTDI sections
also compare the AVL Cruise simulations with data from specific vehicle actual ve-
hicles. The curbweight section compares the model predictions to actual data for the
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Table 3.4: Explanation of engineering constraints
Constraint Description
g1 Minimum grade towing 3500 lbm at 65 miles per hour greater than 5%
g2 Rear wheel to bumper angle of departure greater than 13 degrees
g3 Ramp breakover angle between wheels greater than 12 degrees
g4 Minimum cargo volume index greater than 29 cubic feet
g5 Maximum cargo volume index less than 60 cubic feet
g6 Maximum rollover score less than 0.21
g7 Minimum of 50% of vehicle mass distributed on front axle
g8 Vehicle gross vehicle weight rating greater than the vehicle curbweight
plus a minimum payload vpay = 100 kg
g9
Minimum hood compartment crush space greater than calculated required crush
space
g10 Maximum deceleration less than 20 g’s in a 35 mile per hour front crash
g11
Vehicle width great than tire flop, midrail width (vMRW = 74.5 mm), and engine
length
g12 Vehicle length greater than front overhang and wheelbase
g13 Vehicle top speed greater than 115 miles per hour
g14






Satisfactory polynomials were found for both driving cycles, and the gradeability
simulation (R2: 0.998 City, 0.994 Hwy, 0.997 Grade). Three neural nets were gener-
ated in Matlab, one for z060, one for zTS, and one for, and z3050. z060 and z3050 had
R2 values for the training and test points of 0.999. zTS had an R
2 of 0.988. The R2
values reported for the neural net fits are for the test points. Figure 3.1 plots the
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Predicted 0-60 mph time, s
ValidationTraining Testing
Figure 3.1:
(a) City driving cycle fuel economy; (b) Highway driving cycle fuel econ-
omy; (c) Maximum gradeability at 65 mph while towing; (d) 0-60 mph
acceleration time; (e) 30-50 mph acceleration time; (f) Maximum vehicle
velocity
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Attributes for midsize crossover vehicles were gathered from the Internet including
values for all design variables, transmission ratios, and other model parameters [Con-
ceptcarz.com (2008); Edmunds Inc. (2008); LLC Classified Ventures (2008)]. In ad-
dition to scaling the fuel consumption map and full-load performance characteristic
by engine geometry, the fuel consumption map was further scaled by the ratio of the
baseline and modeled engine peak power brake mean effective pressure. Single Cruise
simulation runs were performed for each vehicle and the values of the attributes were
recorded. The vehicle simulation was rerun using the reported curb weight for zVM in
cases where the vehicle curb weight prediction deviated by more than 50 kg from the
reported curb weight. This was to make a fair assessment of the simulation tool rather
than bias the results based on weakness in the curbweight model. Table 3.5 lists the
comparisons between the modeled vehicles and the actual quoted performance values.
Fuel economy values for the actual vehicles are those reported as combined fuel econ-
omy ratings according to the pre-2008 window sticker reporting method. The 0-60
times for the actual vehicles are approximate and were primarily gathered from pop-
ular press. The Nissan Murano was not simulated in Cruise due to its continuously
variable transmission. Figure 3.2 shows the difference in reported versus simulated
fuel economy. Most vehicles are simulated within 6% of the reported value. The
Santa Fe simulation deviates 9% and the Suzuki XL7 deviates 19%.
Gas Turbo-charged direct Injection
Simulation fits
Satisfactory polynomials were found for both driving cycles, the gradeability sim-
ulation, and 30-50 mph acceleration time while towing (R2: 0.998 City, 0.995 Hwy,
0.999 z65T , 0.998 z3050). Two neural nets were generated in Matlab, one for z060 (R
2:
0.99) and one for zTS (R
2: 0.987), where the R2 values reported are for the test points.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of SI reported fuel economy and simulated fuel economy
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Table 3.5: Comparison between actual vehicles and SI simulated vehicles
zMPG z060 z3050 z65T zTS zVM zEDisp xB xBtS xFD
Units mpg s s % mph kg cc mm - -
2007 Edge 21 7.4-8.4 unavail. unavail. 111 gov. 1859 3496 92.5 1.07 2.77
Edge Calc.
zVM
20.5 7.5 5.2 6.8 134 1768 3496 92.5 1.07 2.77
Edge Act.
zVM
20.2 7.7 5.3 6.6 134 1858 3496 92.5 1.07 2.77
2006 Mu-
rano
22 8.0 unavail. unavail. unavail. 1747 3494 95.5 1.18 5.17
Murano
Calc. zVM
unavail. unavail. unavail. unavail. unavail. 1744 3494 95.5 1.18 5.17
2006 High-
lander
21 7.8-9.4 unavail. unavail. unavail. 1655 3309 91.9 1.11 3.48
Highlander
Calc. zVM
19.9 7.9 6.0 5.1 131 1658 3309 91.9 1.11 3.48
2006 Santa
Fe
22 8.7 unavail. unavail. unavail. 1691 3339 91.9 1.10 3.68
Sant Fe
Calc. zVM
20.0 7.7 6.0 6.1 125 1708 3339 91.9 1.10 3.68
2006
Tribeca
20 7.4-9.5 unavail. unavail. unavail. 1885 2997 89.2 1.11 3.58
Tribeca
Calc. zVM
20.9 7.8 5.6 6.1 128 1717 2997 89.2 1.11 3.58
Tribeca
Act. zVM
20.5 8.3 5.9 5.8 128 1885 2997 89.2 1.11 3.58
2006 Vue 23 8-9 unavail. unavail. unavail. 1578 3462 88.9 0.96 4.06
Vue Calc.
zVM
22.6 8.7 6.9 3.5 112 1640 3462 88.9 0.96 4.06
Vue Act.
zVM




20 8.2 unavail. unavail. unavail. 1763 3563 94.0 1.10 2.48
Suzuki XL7
Calc. zVM
16.3 8.0 4.2 0.0 132 1794 3563 94.0 1.10 2.48
2006 En-
deavor
20 8.4 unavail. unavail. unavail. 1810 3824 95.0 1.06 4.32
Endeavor
Calc. zVM
20.6 9.9 7.0 3.4 124 1793 3824 95.0 1.06 4.32
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Figure 3.3 plots the predicted vs. actual Cruise responses.
Single model comparisons
The GTDI concept was introduced by Ford in 2007-08. For a comparison with
actual vehicle data we use the 20-30% fuel economy improvement quoted for the 2008
Explorer America concept car from the 2008 North American Auto Show [Ford Motor
Company (2009)] compared to the V-6 conventional Explorer. The simulated values
are reported in Table 3.6 for the Explorer America concept car, the conventional
Explorer, and a conventional Explorer with the V-6 engine replaced by the 2 liter, 4
cylinder GTDI engine. The simulated fuel economy difference between the conven-
tional and the concept car was 29%. We also present the results for a GTDI equipped
Ford Edge with similar 0-60 time as the baseline Ford edge and compare the fuel




For the HEV model, satisfactory polynomials were found for all powertrain per-
formance characteristics (R2: 0.998 City; 0.999 z060; 0.99 z65T ; 0.999 z3050; 1.0 Peak
power output from motor-generator one, zMG1; 1.0 Peak power output from motor-
generator two, zMG2;) except the fuel economy for the highway driving cycle, and the
vehicle top speed. These two outputs were fit with neural nets (R2: 0.99 Hwy, 0.97
zTS for the test points). Figures 3.4 and 3.5 plot the predicted vs. actual Matlab
simulation responses. The HEV fuel economy and 0-60 time were adjusted to account
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Figure 3.3:
(a) City driving cycle fuel economy; (b) Highway driving cycle fuel econ-
omy; (c) Maximum gradeability at 65 mph while towing; (d) 0-60 mph
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(a) City driving cycle fuel economy; (b) Highway driving cycle fuel econ-
omy; (c) Maximum gradeability at 65 mph while towing; (d) 0-60 mph




Comparison between 2007 Ford edge and 2008 Explorer America concept
car with SI and GTDI simulated vehicles
zMPG z060 z3050 z65T zTS zV M zEDisp xB xBtS xFD
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(a) Power required for electric machine zMG1 (b) Power required for elec-
tric machine zMG2
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An additional 0.9 seconds was added to the 0-60 mph acceleration time for the HEV
model. A scaling factor of 5.778/4.5772 was applied to the test cycle city fuel con-
sumption for the HEV model. These changes were recommended by the author of
the HEV model to account for the overly optimistic performance of the HEV model.
The Ford Escape Hybrid/Mercury Mariner Hybrid, Toyota Highlander Hybrid,
and Lexus RX400h were all SUV hybrids in the 2006 model year. The Saturn VUE
Hybrid was added in 2007.
3.3.2 Vehicle Mass Prediction
curbweight
Figure 3.6 plots the predicted versus reported curbweight (zVM) for the crossover
segment based on Equation (3.1).
3.4 Summary
Engineering models representing the midsize crossover vehicle segment were devel-
oped representing three powertrain options: conventional spark-ignition engine (SI),
gas turbocharged direct-injection engine (GTDI), split-mode electric-gasoline hybrid
(HEV). Powertrain attributes were modeled using the AVL Cruise simulation soft-
ware. Surrogate models were generated for each powertrain simulation. The simulated
versus predicted powertrain attribute results were presented. Packaging and safety
attributes were modeled using a combination of empirical and analytical equations.
Comparisons of the modeled attributes to the reported attributes were given.
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This chapter describes various methods adapted from the literature for developing
and then assessing discrete choice models for the purpose of design optimization.
A suitable demand model is one piece of the required framework for conducting
design studies with market simulations. Two newly developed discrete-choice models
are presented that were developed from individual-level survey responses of new car
buyers. Particular emphasis is made on comparing the substitution patterns implied
by the attribute elasticities of demand between the two models. Both newly developed
models appear to have avoided extreme price sensitivity as observed with the BLP95
model. The US automotive market was selected to illustrate the choice modeling
for design optimization approach. However, the same approach can be applied to
a wide range of products and industries. Key features of a product or market that
could benefit by the approach are an established market with observable consumer
purchase data and a product with technical attributes and constraints that require
engineering modeling to compare feasibility of the product design.
Some challenges with estimating choice models are selecting a suitable utility spec-
ification where the utility specification is the mathematical formulation that maps
product and consumer attributes to consumer preference for product choices; lack of
disaggregate consumer data where disaggregate consumer data mean recorded pur-
66
chase observations and demographic information by individual; correlation of price
with unobserved attributes of products; and modeling of the outside good, where the
outside good represents the value to the consumer of not purchasing any product in
the market.
We test two variations of a utility specification that contains similar elements
to previous choice models of the automotive industry. We obtained individual con-
sumer data from a new car buyer survey conducted by Maritz Research. To account
for the correlation between price and unobserved product attributes (i.e., price en-
dogeneity), we instrumented for price endogeneity using a previously demonstrated
approach. We ignore the possibility of product attribute endogeneity, or the corre-
lation of unobserved vehicle attributes with vehicle attributes that are included in
the systematic component of utility. While we think this is an important issue to
be explored, it was beyond the scope of this work. Additionally, we did not model
an outside good in our choice model. This is common practice in many automotive
studies because the choice model is estimated on observed data (i.e., only buyers are
observed not individuals who “walked away”).
There are two elements that are new with our approach that have not been high-
lighted in the literature. The first element is that we take a larger than normal set of
vehicle alternatives. Most automotive studies have used on the order of 200 vehicles
per model year. Our study includes 473 vehicle alternatives. Increasing the number
of alternatives allows finer product differentiation by permitting attribute differences
associated with power and fuel economy to be captured between same models that
come with different engine options. We approximate observed market shares at this
level by referencing the EPA collected sales figures, which are organized at this level
of detail. The intention is that the large vehicle set allows for improved parameter
identification including individual taste differences (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity).
The second novel element is a model specification that incorporates an explicit
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ideal-point for consumer preferences for vehicle size (i.e., length×width). This model
assumes that individuals have an ideal vehicle size rather than a monotonically in-
creasing or decreasing preference for increased vehicle size.
Section 4.1 reviews traditional methods for evaluating demand models . Section
4.2 presents the choice modeling approach and derives the expressions for the relevant
vehicle attribute point-elasticities. Section 4.3 presents the horizontal differentiation
hypothesis and the model specifications to test the hypothesis, the estimation results,
and the model comparisons. Section 4.4 discussions the findings from the model in a
design for market systems context, and Section 4.5 summarizes the chapter.
4.1 Methods for Evaluating Demand Models
We define interpretability as a qualitative assessment of how well the functional
form of utility is supported by theory or beliefs of market behavior. Questions that a
modeler should ask when checking for interpretability before estimation include: Do
all components of utility have behavioral or physical significance? Does each behav-
ioral or physical factor influence choice probabilities in a manner that is consistent
with theory or belief? After estimation, the modeler should check interpretability
by conducting various tests: (1) The significance of the estimated parameters, with
particular attention to those deemed to support theory or beliefs; (2) the signs of
the estimated parameters; (3) over-fitting; (4) colinearities among attributes. We
will report on the new model performance on items 1-2. Items 3-4 require further
development and are left for future work.
The form of the choice model can influence decision outcomes more or less in line
with economic observations. We postulate that an appropriate choice model should
account for price endogeneity, at a minimum. Endogeneity of other vehicle attributes
may also be important. The choice model should yield to several intuitive checks:
(i) the sum of the non-price component of utility and the price component due to
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product cost for an individual’s utility maximizing vehicle should be interior to the
vehicle attribute space for the majority of individuals; (ii) price equilibrium calcula-
tions employing the choice model should yield increasing markups with price; (iii) a
design optimization should yield firms that are incentivized to produce a portfolio of
differentiated products. For example, the simple logit does not meet the second check
as it is known to exhibit constant markups for all products of a firm irrespective of
price [Shiau and Michalek (2009)]. The choice models estimated in this dissertation
account for price endogeneity. We leave non-price attribute endogeneity for future
work. The performance of the choice models on the three checks is discussed in the
market simulation results in Chapter 8.
4.1.1 Measures of Fit
Metrics to evaluate the fit of a choice model can be directly applied from econo-
metrics. Measures of fit emphasize the descriptive power of a model with respect to
the same data set used to estimate the model. However, they do not indicate if the
model is correctly describing the most important factors or how well the model will
predict outcomes based on changes in behavior, both of which are important for de-
sign optimization. One primary measure of fit is the likelihood ratio test as described
in Chapter 2.
Another common measure of fit is to count the choice shares correctly predicted
by the model. However, choice models are probabilistic by nature, dealing in expected
choice shares. Correct prediction counts are therefore of limited value [Train (2003)].
In addition, recent practice in economics is to employ an alternative-specific constant
for each alternative during the estimation procedure. This means that each alternative
(except one baseline alternative) is identified in the utility specification by a dummy
variable. Augmenting the utility specification in this way allows the predicted choice
shares to be matched to the observed market shares. We do not include alternative-
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specific constants in the model specification. However, we emphasize the importance
of considering model performance without the aid of the alternative-specific constants
because (1) a designer comparing different models should consider how much vari-
ance can be described by design attributes before the aid of the constants, (2) the
values for alternative-specific constants are not available for many published models,
and (3) including alternative-specific constants can add computational burden to the
model estimation process. One way to visually assess how the model is doing without
alternative-specific constants is to plot observed market shares and predicted market
shares on the same graph as a function of a given attribute (e.g., price).
Alternative-specific constants are essential for improving choice share prediction.
However, their importance in a design optimization context is less straightforward.
It is true that increasing or decreasing the utility of a particular vehicle through
an alternative-specific constant could change its own or another vehicle’s optimal
design decisions. This is expected especially for the mixed-logit case where the cross-
elasticities of demand are affected by all vehicle choice alternatives, not only the two
vehicles being compared. Future work should study the difference in optimization
outcomes between a model that was estimated without alternative-specific constants
and one with alternative-specific constants. In the end, this work is computationally
limited (i.e., in computer memory) in its ability to explore models with the additional
472 parameters (or 200+ if consolidated to the model level) required to represent the
alternative-specific constants. The vehicle brand parameters in the present study act
as a coarser version of true alternative-specific constants.
4.1.2 Attribute Elasticity
The elasticity of demand EjXmk for vehicle j is the percentage change in demand for
j given a percentage change in attribute m of product k. Computing own- and cross-
elasticities is then an indication of the substitution patterns expected given changes
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to vehicle attributes. Given two choice models with identical fit characteristics, the
model with the substitution patterns more reflective of the market should yield more
useful design optimization results.
The formula for cross- and own-elasticities for individual i given a mixed-logit
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∫








µ′Xik)f(µ)dµ is the unconditional likelihood individual i




µ′iXik is the conditional likelihood individ-
ual i chooses vehicle j for a particular µi with similar interpretation for Lik for vehicle
k, Xmk is the value of attribute m for vehicle k, and B
m
ik is the partial derivative of
utility with respect to Xmk .
The integrals in these equations can be simulated by computing the inner terms
for a number of draws from the parameter distributions and then dividing by the
number of draws D, where the market-level elasticity EjXmk can be approximated by
summing the individual elasticities of a representative population and dividing by the







∑D BmikdLikd(µd)(1− Lijd(µd)) if j = k
Xmk
ID
∑I − 1Pij ∑D BmikdLikd(µd)Lijd(µd) if j 6= k
(4.2)
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4.2 Estimating Mixed Logit Choice Models from Disaggre-
gate Data
Two mixed-logit discrete-choice models of the US new vehicle industry were esti-
mated. The goal for the estimation was to develop models that could be used in the
design optimization market simulation. A schematic of the choice model development
is shown in Figure 4.1. The following subsections describe each of these steps in more
detail.
4.2.1 Choice Data
Data for the estimation came from the Maritz Research 2006 New Vehicle Cus-
tomer Satisfaction survey [Maritz Holdings Inc. (2007)] and additional vehicle speci-
fication data came from Chrome System Inc.’s New Vehicle Database and VINMatch
tool [Chrome Systems Inc. (2008)].
The choice set for each individual was selected from 473 vehicles (a subset of 2006
model year vehicle styles corresponding to available make, model, and engine op-
tions). We eliminated vehicles priced over $100,000 as well as seven alternatives that
were not observed in the survey data, and further reduced the vehicle choice set by
consolidating pickup truck and full-size van models with gross-vehicle-weight ratings
over 8,500 lb to 2 models each. Summary vehicle data are provided in Table 4.1.
The table lists manufacturer suggested retail price MSRP ; vehicle attributes for fuel
economy, engine peak horsepower, vehicle curbweight; and vehicle dimensions length,
width, and height.
4.2.2 Instruments
We instrumented for price endogeneity (R2=0.78) using attribute distance metrics

























































































































































































































variables consist of differences between vehicle attributes (zhp and zL×zW×zH) among
a firm’s vehicle fleet and among competitors’ vehicles as well as the systematic product
attribute components of utility. We ignore product attribute endogeneity assuming
that the observed non-price attributes are uncorrelated with the unobserved utility
component.
4.2.3 Estimation Approach
We estimate new mixed-logit choice models according to the simulated maximum
log likelihood approach using Matlab code modified from Kenneth Train’s publicly
available estimation code [Train (2009)].
An individual’s choice set was taken to be 100 vehicles including the purchased
vehicle, the vehicles strongly considered (up to 3 vehicles as reported by the sur-
vey respondent), and uniformly-conditioned randomly-selected vehicles up to the 100
vehicles. We take the reported order of considered vehicles as a preference ranking
and treat the overall estimation as an exploded (or rank-ordered) logit. Assuming
the error term εi is independent and identically distributed following the extreme
value type 1 distribution in the mixed logit model allows ranked observations to be
treated as seperate choice observations [Train (2003)]. An individual’s choice set for
the pseudo-observations is the same as for the purchased vehicle observation choice
set with the purchased and higher-ranked considered vehicles removed.
A set of 6,563 individuals were sampled from 81,705 survey respondents1 using
1Nineteen percent of the survey respondents did not report income. These individuals were set
Table 4.1: Summary vehicle attribute data
MSRP zMPG zhp zVM zL zW zH
units $ mpg hp lbm in in in
min 11925 11.0 65 1975 143.1 65.7 47.6
max 97485 56.6 520 6400 249 86 93.1
median 27330 21.0 230 3682 189.7 72.2 58.7
mean 32675 21.5 241 3887 190.9 72.8 63.4
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Regression showing reported vehicle MSRP as a function of the instru-
mented price p̂
choice-based sampling to approximate 2006 market shares. In some cases either too
few vehicle choices were available in the survey to match the sales or too few respon-
dents would be sampled to represent the demographics of purchasers of a vehicle.2
To account for this, a set of weights was generated for each individual in the sam-
ple to adjust the log-likelihood calculation to correctly match 2006 market shares.3
aside for sampling purposes as well as individuals who purchased model year 2007 vehicles in 2006.
2A minimum of five observations for each vehicle alternative was set (if at least five were available)
to increase the sample of demographics for consumers of low market-share vehicles.
3The weighting procedure used was available in Train’s code. This procedure multiplies the log
of each individual’s logit probability (including all choice observations) by the weighting value for
that individual.
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The assumption made with this choice-based sampling approach is that the sampled
individuals who purchased a particular vehicle alternative are representative of all
individuals who purchased that vehicle.
4.2.4 Attribute Elasticity
We examine the substitution patterns produced by both models by looking at own-
and cross-elasticities. Table 4.2 gives the values of Bmik required for Equation (4.2) for
the several attributes of interest.
4.3 Testing Newly-estimated Demand Models
4.3.1 Horizontal Differentiation Hypothesis
We conjecture that optimization studies of the automotive market using demand
models with little horizontal differentiation will be oversensitive to price and under-
predict differentiation in product attributes compared with the observed market. Our
hypothesis is that functional forms of econometric demand models that have more
freedom to capture horizontal differentiation, if it exists, will perform better in terms
of fit than those that imply consumer preferences are predominantly based on vertical
differentiation. The improved fit could be taken as one measure that the conventional
models underpredict the level of horizontal preference heterogeneity in the market.
Additionally, we hypothesize that substitution patterns between vehicles will be no-
ticeably different between the conventional and the increased horizontal differentiation
Table 4.2: Partial derivatives Bmik of attributes evaluated for elasticities




zL × zW µzL×zW 2µ(zL×zW )2(zLkzWk)− 2µ(−2zL×zW )
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models.
We choose vehicle footprint to test an ideal-point preference model because we
believe it is the continuous attribute that is most likely to demonstrate horizontally
differentiated preference.4
4.3.2 Model Specification
The utility specification can be broken into three parts following Equation (2.1):
Terms that rely on the product alone δ′dj (brand dummies
5 European dEur, Japanese
dJap, Chrysler dChr, General Motors dGM , and Korean dKor); interactions between
product attributes and demographics β′bij (minivan and children bm·c, SUV and chil-
dren bs·c, pickup truck and rural living bp·r); product-attribute or attribute-demographic
interaction terms with individual-specific random coefficients (assumed normally dis-
tributed) µ′imij (vehicle price divided by individual income pj/sinc,i, power to weight
ratio (a proxy for acceleration) zhp/zVM , combined city and highway fuel consumption
100/zMPG, vehicle footprint zL × zW ; class dummies based on EPA vehicle classes:
Two seater or minicompact mtsmc, minvan mmvan, Sport utility vehicle mSUV , full
size van mvan, pickup truck mpup; and a hybrid powertrain dummy vHEV )
6.
Model 1 assumes utility is monotonic in vehicle footprint: µ1(zL × zW ). Model
2 assumes an ideal-point model of footprint: µ1(µ2 − zL × zW )2, which implies an
interior maximum when µ1 is negative. Variation across individuals in µ2 represent
individual-specific ideal footprints for a vehicle. In order to use estimation techniques
built around linear-in-parameters utilities we simplify the expression by expanding
the quadratic: µ1µ
2
2 − 2µ1µ2zL × zW + µ1(zL × zW )2 and drop µ1µ22, leaving µ1(zL ×
zW )
2 − µ̂22zL × zW (Note: µ̂2=µ1µ2), which we use in the estimation. We can drop
4We expect preference for acceleration and fuel economy to be monotonic although not necessarily
linear.
5Ford was considered the baseline brand, so no dummy variable was used for Ford vehicles. This
means that all brand coefficient values are with respect to Ford.





2 from the expression because it is constant across vehicles and only relative utility
affects choice probabilities.
4.3.3 Model Identification
Parameter estimates and standard errors are reported in Table 4.3.
4.3.4 Model Comparisons
Fit
The log-likelihood ratio, or psuedo-R2 value, for the models were 0.115 and 0.119
respectively. While these values are substantially lower than the target range of 0.2-
0.4, the likelihood ratio cannot be compared across other models in the literature
estimated on different data. Overall, both models are comparable in terms of fit.
Interpretability
Attributes and demographics were chosen with physical interpretations related
to design optimization and product planning. Price divided by income allows sen-
sitivity to price to change nonlinearly with income. This follows the intuition that
price influences choices more when it represents a higher percentage of annual in-
come. Horsepower over curbweight is a proxy for acceleration, which we believe is
an important factor in purchases. Other performance metrics may be better suited
for certain vehicle classes concerned with towing, for example, but this extension is
beyond the scope of the present study. Vehicle size should also be relevant to the car-
buying decision. However, the monotonic formulation of Model 1 seems nonsensical
when carried to extremes. The formulation in Model 2 maps more naturally to the
observation that different size vehicles (of the same price) succeed in the market.
The vehicle segment dummies match observed vehicle classes in the market. Sedans
(ranging from subcompacts to full-size) represent the baseline vehicle, so values of the
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segment dummies are relative to those vehicles. The majority of two-seater and mini-
compact vehicles are sports cars. We included this parameter to see if this class would
command a premium above the average tradeoff for acceleration and other attributes.
A hybrid dummy was also included to account for any influences on purchase decisions
Table 4.3: Vehicle demand model parameter estimates
Mean values
Model 1 Model 2
Parameters Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
p/sinc 3.29 0.13 4.11 0.16
10zhp/zVM 0.4 0.13 0.62 0.13
100/zMPG -0.82 0.03 -0.86 0.03
zL × zW 5.33 0.13 - -
(zL × zW )2 - - -15.6 0.94
−2zL × zW - - -25.5 1.37
mtwmc -1.7 0.46 0.25∗ 0.23
mmvan -6.03 0.69 -4.74 0.53
mSUV -0.56 0.11 -0.56 0.11
mvan -13.2 3.55 -7.72 0.97
mpup -4.79 0.46 -1.77 0.14
vHEV -3.89 0.48 -4.97 0.63
dEur -0.38 0.055 -0.18 0.059
dJap 0.15 0.036 0.24 0.038
dChr 0.16 0.043 0.13 0.044
dGM -0.43 0.036 -0.34 0.038
dKor -0.63 0.059 -0.55 0.06
bm·c 2.87 0.31 2.53 0.26
bs·c 0.74 0.13 0.76 0.13
bp·r 4.66 0.53 2.07 0.22
Standard Deviations
p/sinc 0.88 0.17 0.79 0.19
10zhp/zVM 0.19∗ 0.3 0.04∗ 0.32
100/zMPG 0.73 0.03 1.01 0.03
zL × zW 0.36∗ 0.33 - -
(zL × zW )2 - - 0.17∗ 0.17
−2zL × zW - - 4.29 0.23
mtwmc 2.47 0.3 1.08 0.27
mmvan 5.12 0.47 4.16 0.37
mSUV 3.19 0.15 2.93 0.13
mvan 8.17 2.15 4.91 0.63
mpup 6.21 0.5 2.42 0.17
vHEV 2.16 0.38 2.94 0.44
∗ not significant at 95% confidence interval
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of hybrids independent of fuel economy.
Brand differences were consolidated into six groups (European, Japanese, Chrysler,
GM, Korean, and others–i.e., Ford). Other combinations could also be tested but are
outside the scope of this study. The demographic interactions of minivan and SUV
purchases in households with children and pickup truck purchases in rural areas are
intuitive.
The signs of both sets of parameters are generally as expected including the signs
for the footprint terms in Model 2, which implies local maximum values. It is non-
intuitive that individuals would prefer lower fuel economy, but the large standard
deviations on the fuel consumption parameter implies this behavior. This is a case
where either the model lacks appropriate instruments to tease apart the power to
weight ratio versus fuel consumption interaction, the model should be respecified to
get at a more intuitive preference structure, or the data set should be improved. For
example, an alternative would be to use a cost to drive attribute such as $/mile and
estimate a model where gasoline price is determined using date of purchase.
Another observation is that the mean value for the two seater or minicompact
vehicle class is positive but not significant in Model 2 and negative and significant
in Model 1. Both standard deviations are significant. This is likely related to the
differences in the footprint specifications. This case illustrates the challenge working
with these models because a change in specification propagates to other elements of
the specification that may have very different interpretations in a design optimization
context.
Model 2 includes two more terms than Model 1 and has one more term that is
significant in a two-tailed t-test at a 95% confidence interval as noted in Table 4.3.
Notably, the standard deviations for footprint and power to weight ratio in Model
1 are not significant. Model 2 appears to support our initial hypothesis with both
mean and one standard deviation footprint term significant.
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Predictive Validity
The use of choice-based sampling did not allow true hold-out sample testing from
the 2006 survey data. Comparing model behavior on data from another year is a
next step for future work. A psuedo-hold-out-sample test was generated by drawing
a new choice-based sample from the 2006 survey data. The log likelihood ratio for
the pseudo-hold-out-samples for Model 1 was 0.106 and for Model 2 was 0.113. This
was an overlapping sample because the low observation choices in the survey data
where identical in both samples.
Plausibility
We investigate the plausibility of the models through visualization schemes. First,
we compare existing market shares in Figure 4.3. The purpose for the comparison
with the BLP model is not to compare performance directly per se given that BLP was
estimated on 1971-1990 vehicle data, but to illustrate a potential pitfall in adopting
an “off-the-shelf” choice model for a design for market systems study7.
We simulated own- and cross-elasticities for each vehicle alternative using the
estimation population of individuals (I = 6, 563) and 100 standard normal random
draws for each individual. Figure 4.4 shows the own-elasticities for price, hp/wt,
gal/100 mi, and zL×zW for both Model 1 and Model 2 for all 473 vehicles. The cross-
elasticity for zL× zW is shown for both models in Figure 4.5. In both figures vehicles
were ordered to aid interpretation: From left to right the vehicles were grouped by
class; for Figure 4.4 vehicles were ordered within class from smallest to largest value
of the corresponding attribute; for Figure 4.5 vehicles were ordered within class from
7To make the comparison as fair as possible, the following steps were taken. All attributes
involving dollar values were scaled from 2006$ to 1983$ for BLP utility evaluation. Additionally,
a model of the outside good was reported in BLP but not in model 1 and model 2. We normalize
utility comparisons between all models by differencing the maximum utility for each individual from
the other utilities for that individual. For BLP we further eliminate individuals whose maximum

































































































































































































































least to most expensive.
Comparing own-elasticities in Figure 4.4 reveals that Model 2 has greater hetero-
geneity in the zL × zW and gal/100 mi attributes. The own-elasticities for zL × zW
in Model 2 are large positive values indicating that, in the overall market, increasing
size is preferred. Another important difference is that while Model 1 indicates that,
on average, size is more important as the vehicle size increases (shown by increasing
elasticities from smaller to larger classes), Model 2 shows that increased size is more
important for the large sedans and much less important for full size vans and pickups.
Figure 4.5 is a gray-scale plot showing cross-elasticities for the zL× zW parameter
for Model 1 (a) and Model 2 (b). More negative elasticities are shown in darker
shades. Many effects can be observed by studying the plot in detail. For example,
changes in the sedan class affect shares in the two seater or minicompact class, but
changes in the two seater or minicompact class have less effect on the sedan class.
Panel (b) shows that some vehicles have positive cross-elasticities for zL × zW in
Model 2 (primarily for changes to the large pickup trucks and vans). This means
that increasing size of vehicle k will increase the market share of vehicle j. Both
models show much stronger substitution within class than between classes. Panel (b)
shows that vehicles within the same class and closer in price have greater magnitude
cross-elasticities (an intuitive property). This is seen by the lighter shading on the
upper diagonal for each block compared to the lower diagonal. This effect is less
pronounced for Model 1, but it is difficult to conclude from the plot if this is a real
difference between models or due to the difference in cross-elasticity magnitude.
4.4 Implications for Design for Market Systems
The results from the previous section point to the differences in choice model
behavior given different choice model specifications. Two questions relating to the























































































































































































































































































































































section. The first section looks at the influence of using different numbers of draws to
simulate the taste distribution for each individual in the simulated population. The
second section briefly highlights the fact that the effect of the specification differences
may be most pronounced when the entire vehicle fleet is free to change vehicle design.
This step is beyond the scope of this work.
4.4.1 Simulating population heterogeneity
With demand model in hand, the design for market systems goal is to incorporate
the demand model into a market simulation. Such a simulation evaluates product
demand given product attributes and prices. It may include a game that represents
competitive behavior. Product demand is evaluated by simulating a population of
car buyers with representative demographic characteristics. Random taste coefficients
are drawn for each individual. A set of coefficients µ for individual i from a single
draw can be used to compute the conditional probability of individual i choosing
each product j given µ. However, the individual’s “true” µ’s are not known, rather
the distribution of µ. The unconditional choice share over the distribution of µ for
an individual can be simulated by taking multiple draws of µ and averaging the
conditional choice shares. Each draw per individual adds additional computational
expense to the market simulation. What is the right number of draws to capture the
population heterogeneity? Figures 4.6-4.13 investigate this question by computing the
own-elasticity for each attribute for Model 1 and Model 2. The elasticity of demand
with respect to some attributes (those with little or no taste variation) changes little
between 1 draw/individual and 128 draws/individual. However, the elasticity for
attributes such as the footprint attribute in Model 2 change dramatically.
The simulations were performed on the identical population (I=6,563) used to es-
timate the models. Draws were standard normal random draws generated by Matlab.
Figure captions for Figures 4.6-4.13 indicate the number of draws in each illustrated
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case. The gray data are the elasticities from the previous case (i.e., the figure panel
for 2 draws shows the 1 draw results “grayed-out”). Figures 4.6-4.9 correspond to
Model 1 (linear in footprint). Figures 4.10-4.13 correspond to Model 2 (quadratic in
footprint).
Price elasticities change primarily for the most expensive vehicles, and here the
change is small. Therefore, the expectation is that price equilibrium results would
change little from the case with 1 draw to the case with many draws (i.e., 128).
However, elasticities for the the fuel consumption and size attributes change to a
large degree. Therefore, we expect the results of design simulation results that allow
vehicle attributes to change to change between the case with 1 draw and the case
with 128 draws per individual.
4.4.2 Model specification
We hypothesize that the differences in model parameter values and the differences
observed in the attribute elasticities will lead to different design optimization market
simulation outcomes given the same inputs. Testing this hypothesis is one of the
outcomes of the case studies detailed in Chapter 8. Future work remains to expand
the engineering modeling framework to allow modeling of multiple product offerings
across the vehicle fleet for each firm. This is an important piece to fully test the above
hypothesis because the most dramatic differences in elasticities occur for the luxury
models and for specialty market segments such as the two-seaters/minicompacts, and
the pickup trucks. For example, comparing Model 1 and Model 2 in Figure 4.4 shows
that the own-elasticities for footprint in Model 1a primarily monotonic relationship
across a vehicle class for the entire vehicle fleet. Own-elasticities for footprint in Model
2 are scattered. Notably, Figure 4.4 also shows that own-elasticities for footprint for
full size vans and pickup trucks classes are among the highest magnitudes across
classes in Model 1 and among the lowest magnitudes across all classes in Model 2.
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Methods were presented for developing and evaluating consumer choice models
that are suitable in a design optimization context. We used these methods to test the
hypothesis that allowing horizontal taste preferences to be expressed explicitly and
separately from distributions of random coefficients improves the performance of the
model with respect to these metrics. Results suggest that the inclusion of horizontal
preferences slightly improved fit and predictive validity, but this effect was not strong
enough to clearly support the hypothesis. With respect to plausibility, we show that
the inclusion of horizontal-preference terms significantly modifies substitution effects.
This behavior is expected to change optimization results as shown in Chapter 8.
Applying similar evaluation methods to those presented should be foundational to
design for market systems research in order to evaluate hypotheses about consumer-
preference relationships. Similar evaluation methods are needed for producer cost
models and for game-theoretic competitive behavior. The right combination of ap-
propriate demand and cost models, and competitive assumptions should lead to a set




A key component in testing hypotheses for market and environmental outcomes
assuming profit-maximizing firm behavior is an adequate representation of production
costs as a function of producer decisions. Here we explore the ability to capture such
a model relying on publicly available data rather than proprietary cost estimates
or joint demand and cost model estimations. Section 5.1.1 examines some publicly
available data for vehicle prices and projected dealer markups.
The objective of the cost model exploration is to identify promising approaches
for generating parametric cost representation of vehicle production costs. Parametric
cost models typically relate variable costs to a firm’s product design and production
decisions through a mathematical expression. Cost models of this form are particu-
larly well suited for integration within a design optimization context.
Three cost modeling approaches are examined in this chapter. The first two
approaches are motivated by work in the engineering community. The third approach
is motivated by the economics community. The first approach (Section 5.1.2) develops
a cost representation specifically for the midsize crossover segment. It is based on
establishing a baseline vehicle configuration and then linearly scaling costs based
on deviations from the baseline attributes. The second approach (Section 5.1.3)
develops a regression equation as a function of product characteristics for predicting
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pre-specified costs based on an assumed relationship between market prices, dealer
markups, and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) markups. The third approach
(Section 5.1.4) begins with the newly-estimated demand models and backs out the
costs for each vehicle by enforcing the equilibrium conditions for the given vehicle
designs and prices. The costs are then regressed on vehicle characteristics.
No approach has as yet yielded completely satisfactory results. One of the sim-
plifying assumptions for all three models is that the cost factors are additively sepa-
rable. This means that the total per vehicle cost is a linear combination of product
attributes. It is conceivable that the true cost relationship may be described by a
nonlinear interaction between product characteristics. Exploring cost models and
their implications for design optimization is an important area for future work.
Additionally modeling is required to supplement each modeling approach in the
case of new technologies. Section 5.1.5 presents models to account for incremental
costs associated with gas turbo-charged direct-injection engine technology and hybrid
electric vehicle technology. Section 5.2 summarizes the chapter.
5.1 Cost Model Approaches
5.1.1 Exploratory Data
The scaling and the empirical markup cost model representations rely on an esti-
mation of dealer and OEM markup, at least for an average vehicle. These estimates
were made by examining publicly available price data (i.e., quoted dealer invoice and
MSRP values). Wards automotive yearbook provides data on several vehicle charac-
teristics as well as MSRP for new vehicles sold in the US each year [Wards Commu-
nications (2006)]. In addition, many online sources such as Edmunds.com [Edmunds
Inc. (2008)] or Cars.com [LLC Classified Ventures (2008)] provide an estimate of the
dealer invoice price, destination charge, and MSRP. In the absence of transaction price
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Crossover 35 5.9% 12.4% 8.1% 1.9% 17.7%
Large Pickup 10 10.5% 15.5% 13.4% 1.8% 41.3%
Large SUV 11 9.3% 15.6% 13.2% 2.2% 40.2%
Large Van 13 9.9% 15.6% 13.9% 1.8% 43.9%
Mid-size SUV 18 5.5% 12.0% 8.9% 2.2% 20.7%
Small Pickkup 12 5.7% 11.9% 9.9% 1.6% 24.4%
Small Van 14 6.2% 12.3% 9.1% 1.8% 21.5%
Lux. SUV/Cross. 30 6.3% 14.3% 9.9% 2.0% 24.5%
data for vehicle sales, these data sources provide a comprehensive information source
that offers insight into the relationship between vehicle characteristics, price, and
cost. Examining 143 vehicle makes for model year 2005, as reported by Cars.com,
indicates there are differences by vehicle class for the percentage markup between
dealer invoice and manufacturer suggested retail price. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show
the average dealer markup for various classes of light-duty trucks. The error bars
in Figure 5.1 show ± 1 standard deviation assuming the markups are normally dis-
tributed. The trends match the historical belief that large trucks and large SUVs are
more profitable for dealers and OEMs than smaller vehicles.
5.1.2 Scaling Models
The cost model, modified from De Weck [De Weck et al. (2006)] and Cook [Cook
(1997)], is based on assigning a cost to a hypothetical average vehicle and then com-
puting the cost for a specific vehicle based on deviations from the average. Approach-
ing cost modeling in this way enables design-specific cost differences to be considered
without requiring a complete bottom up cost structure. The initial cost value is gen-
erated from assumptions about average profit margin γ = 20% (OEM plus dealer),
as well as the average operating leverage φ = 0.35 (relative distribution of fixed vs.
variable costs). No learning curve effect was assumed.
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Figure 5.1: Average percentage markups by class: Invoice to MSRP
Per vehicle variable cost UnitCvar is broken down into four subsystems, where
the relative cost of each subsystem (indicated as a percentage in parentheses) is a
function of design variables and parameters. Design variables corresponding to each
subsystem are listed after the subsystem percentage: Powertrain (30%): xB, xBtS;
Chassis (35%): xW105, xL101; Body (30%): xL103, xH101, xW105; Wheels (5%): Wheel
diameter vw, Tire width vtw. Total cost C is calculated according to the following,
where Cf corresponds to the total fixed cost for the manufacturer, cavg corresponds
to the per vehicle unit variable cost for the average vehicle, Qavg corresponds to the
sales volume of the average vehicle, cfun corresponds to the hypothetical variable cost
to produce a single unit given the specified learning curve effect with the additional
subscripts indicating the hypothetical variable cost to produce a single unit of a
given subsytem, and similarly for cj the per vehicle unit variable cost of vehicle j, G
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corresponds to the learning curve effect, the average variable and parameter values
(e.g., xL101,avg) are also indicated.




cavg = cfun ×QGavg
cfun = cfun,pwtrn + cfun,chas + cfun,bod + cfun,whe (5.2)











xW105 × xL103 × xH101





vtw,avg × vw,avgSalesV ol
G
cfun,pwtrn = 0.3(1− φ)(1− γ)pavg ×Q−Gavg
cfun,chas = 0.35(1− φ)(1− γ)pavg ×Q−Gavg
cfun,bod = 0.3(1− φ)(1− γ)pavg ×Q−Gavg
cfun,whe = 0.05(1− φ)(1− γ)pavg ×Q−Gavg (5.3)
Fixed cost Cf is the same for all firms and relates the operating leverage φ, the
average unit variable cost cavg, and the average sales volume for a model in the
midsize crossover segment Qavg. Vehicle model sales volume Qj is the product of the
vehicle choice share Pj and the total market size M . This cost model could be further
customized for individual firms by specifying a firm’s specific φ, γ, Qavg, and average
vehicle characteristics.
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5.1.3 Empirical Markup Models
A second approach we propose is to identify cost drivers from the physical com-
ponents of the product and regress a cost relationship based on price. We have
attempted such an approach using data from model year 2005 Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook.
The 2005 Wards light-duty truck database contains approximately 1650 unique
nameplates (e.g., Ford Escape XLS). There may be any number of nameplates pro-
duced under 1 of the approximately 160 models (e.g., Ford Escape). All models belong
to one of 34 makes (e.g., Ford). Vehicles with MSRP above $60,000 were filtered out
as well as a small number of specialty vehicles (e.g., Ford Escape Hybrid, Chevy SSR,
Dodge Ram Quad Cab SRT 10). An effort was then made to filter all vehicles that
had identical characteristics in the Wards data, but were differentiated significantly
in price. The higher priced vehicle was filtered from the data set. A large number
of pickup trucks were removed in this way. In total 800 nameplates remained in the
data set.
Vehicle data include gross vehicle dimensions, engine characteristics (e.g., bore,
stroke, compression ratio, ), engine performance (e.g., peak horsepower, peak torque),
transmission type, drive type, safety features (e.g., antilock brakes), curbweight, fuel
economy, and MSRP.
We make the common economic assumption that, for a given firm, the price they
charge in the market increases with product quality and that firms practice cost-
minimizing behavior, i.e., they seek the minimum cost of inputs to produce an output
of a given quality. Therefore, vehicle price and cost should both be monotonic with
respect to product quality (quality, here taken to be increasing levels of measurable
product characteristics).
We assume that there is a consistent relationship (or apportioning) between the
dealer invoice and MSRP markup and the amortized per vehicle OEM cost and
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the dealer invoice price markup. We assume further that higher percentage dealer
markups for certain classes of vehicles indicate vehicles with a superior value proposi-
tion affording the supplier more pricing power; and that as value increases, the OEM
has more pricing power than the dealer and thereby captures a greater percentage
of the available profit. For lower value products we observe lower percentage dealer
markups, and we assume the dealer has more pricing power than the OEM. This
affect has historically been compounded, at least for the U.S. automakers, by a down-
ward pricing pressure on fuel-efficient vehicles in order to sell those vehicles to satisfy
CAFE requirements.
The dealer markup data from Table 5.1 was used to compute average total markups
γT according to the following relationship. The formula is based on the assumption





(100γD − 7) + 2
)
γOEM = γT − γD (5.4)
Figure 5.2 plots the relationship from Equation (5.4). The equation, as it is currently
tuned, implies that nominally γD = γOEM when γD = 7%, and nominally γOEM will
be twice γD when γD = 13%. In practice the OEM markup will be slightly less than
the nominal value because the dealer markup acts on the price charged by the OEM,
not the cost to the OEM to produce the vehicle.
Relying on such a proposed relationship between price, dealer markups, and OEM
markups, we can compute assumed unit vehicle cost cj,a for each vehicle j = 1, . . . , J .
We then fit assumed vehicle costs as an output of a regression where components are
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Plot showing relationship between dealer markup and assumed total
markup








Cf = 0 (5.6)
by taking the natural log of both sides of the equation and then solving for the
unknown coefficients by minimizing the sum of the squared error between the assumed
cost based on markup assumptions cj,a and the predicted per vehicle unit cost cj
based on Equation (5.5). Fits with numerous vehicle parameters were made with
non-significant parameters being discarded. The set of vehicle cost parameters W is
as in Equation (5.8). Table 5.2 describes each parameter, and Table 5.3 gives the
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Allowing cost parameters to be fit in this way can result in nonintuitive rela-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.4: Cost formula coefficients for conventional powertrains
ωEng1 ωEng2 ωEng3 ωEng4
400 0.63 1625 0.1758
relationship between cost and a cost parameter before fitting the data. An alter-
native cost model was created that postulated a specific form for the relationship
between engine power, given in units of horsepower, and cost from [Michalek et al.
(2004)]. The light-duty truck price data was then fit by regressing coefficients for the
other vehicle parameters. The regression model had an R2 = 0.83. The form of the







+ cSIEng + cCIEng
cSIEng = (1− vDies)ωEng1 exp (ωEng2zhp/100)
cCIEng = (vDies)ωEng3 exp (ωEng4zhp/100). (5.9)
The final set of vehicle cost parameters W is as in Equation (5.11). Table 5.5





















One approach seen in the marketing and economics literature is to assume pricing
decisions represent market equilibrium outcomes. Then, cost and utility model forms



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































issues may detract from this approach. The first is that by assuming the market is in
price equilibrium it is no longer possible to test if the market is in price equilibrium.
Second, the analyst has generated the functional form of the cost model based on
experience, insight, or convenience. The static price and cost values may represent
an equilibrium. However, if the functional form of the cost model does not describe
the underlying relationship between cost and the cost factors, a design optimization
that suggests changes in design will result in different design solutions than would be
expected in the market
For the purposes of this dissertation, the first issue of assuming price equilibrium
is accepted. Prices are easily changed through changes to MSRP and OEM and dealer
incentives. Most models are sold over several years, so OEMs have considerable expe-
rience pricing their portfolio. The focus of the dissertation is on the implementation
of the design game on top of the pricing game, and so assuming price equilibrium
simplifies this discussion.
The second issue of unknown functional form of the cost model is truly problem-
atic. This is one of the reasons for including cost models with different functional
forms and developed using different approaches. Multiple cost models allow us to com-
pare and contrast the study results in Chapter 8. Improving cost modeling should be
the focus of future work.
The equilibrium-derived cost modeling approach is straightforward and intuitively
appealing even with its drawbacks. Here we present the derivation of the equilibrium
costs.
Firm profit πf is defined as a function of the choice share of all vehicles in a firm’s
fleet Pf , vehicle prices pf and vehicle costs cf ,
πf = Pf (pf − cf ). (5.11)
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Assuming prices are in equilibrium means that we assume that a firm’s profit can
not be increased by unilaterally changing its vehicle’s prices. Therefore, we take the






(pf − cf ) + Pf = 0. (5.12)
We now solve for the vector of costs.






where, for a simulated population (borrowing notation from [Morrow (2008)],
dPf
dpf














Equilibrium costs were computed for the 2006 model year data with the BLP95,
Model 1, and Model 2 demand models using a log normal distribution on income for
the BLP95 population and using the 6563 individual population from the demand
model estimation for Model 1 and Model 2. Forty draws were taken from the dis-
tribution of random coefficients for each individual. Figure 5.3 plots the calculated
equilibrium costs versus vehicle prices in 2006 dollars. The BLP95 model costs are
clustered closely together, and all costs appear in a range slightly below prices.
The Model 1 and Model 2 costs are more scattered, and a significant portion of
the lower-priced vehicles exhibit negative costs. Model 1 has the greater portion of
negative costs. The reason that the predicted equilibrium costs are negative relates to
the demand model estimation and the market equilibrium assumptions. Considering
111
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Calculated equilibrium costs versus market prices for 2006 model year
vehicles for demand model (a) BLP95, (b) Model 1, (c) Model 2
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Figure 4.3 indicates that Model 1 and Model 2 underpredict the shares of the most
popular vehicles in the market, which are also among the lower-priced vehicles. Model
1 and Model 2 also overpredict the shares of the least popular vehicles, which are also
among the higher-priced vehicles. We expect that this over and underprediction would
be compensated were we to employ alternative-specific constants in the demand model
estimation. However, as it now stands the true market prices appear quite generous
to a potential car buyer according to Model 1 or Model 2 who are more willing to buy
an expensive car compared to the market data. Therefore, in the equilibrium costs
formulation the rational explanation for the low prices must be that costs are very
low–so low that they are negative for some vehicles. The corollary of this observation
is seen in Section 6.2, where for fixed costs the resulting equilibrium prices are much
higher than those observed in the market.
The BLP95 model, on the other hand, is very price sensitive as shown by the
choice share distribution in Figure 4.3. Costs are then predicted to be close to prices
because if costs were lower, the firm would lower prices in order to capture the price
sensitive market.
With calculated costs in hand, a functional form for cost can be postulated and
fit. We assume a linear in coefficients model where the cost factors are a constant;
horsepower; footprint; diesel dummy vDies; 4WD or AWD dummy vAWD, v4WD; foot-
print interacted with two seater or minicompact class, minivan class, SUV class,
Van class, Pickup truck class; brand dummies Chrysler, GM, European, Japanese,
Korean; Turbo-charged dummy vTC ; Hybrid dummy. Table 5.7 lists the coefficient
values corresponding to each demand model.
Figure 5.4 shows the vehicle costs with the calculated equilibrium costs versus the
regressed cost values in 2006 dollars.
The postulated cost model form fits the data with an R2 of 0.74 for BLP95, R2












































































































Calculated equilibrium costs versus regressed costs for 2006 model year
vehicles for demand models BLP95, Model 1, and Model 2
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Table 5.7:
Coefficients for equilibrium cost models for BLP95, Model 1, and Model 2
Cost Factor BLP95 Model 1 Model 2
Constant -11640 -20200 -16790
zhp 8783 7153 7960
zLzW 8301 4230 3549
vDies 6249 4286 4844
vAWD, v4WD 990.5 941.5 1008
mtsmczLzW 4920 3479 2944
mmvanzLzW -378.1 -930.6 -536.4
mSUV zLzW -341.9 9.290 -211.4
mvanzLzW -3531 -6338 -5217
mpupzLzW -5115 -5182 -4765
dChr -1501 -1790 -1993
dGM -2004 -5138 -4852
dEur 9641 9421 9937
dJap 1222 1946 1829
dKor 1470 2950 2452
vTC -5380 -4486 -5419
vHEV 5936 1236 1243
assume that most of the vehicles remain unchanged, and the designed vehicles are
modifications from existing vehicles. Therefore, the residuals are kept for each vehicle
in the market. The cost model is used to compute changes to the base vehicle cost
based on changes in design variables.
5.1.5 Advanced technology costs
Models based on historical data will not give any information about the costs of
new technologies. Incremental cost models were developed for two advanced technolo-
gies: Gas-turbo-direct-injection gasoline engines (GTDI), and hybrid-electric power-
trains (HEV).
For GTDI we simply added a constant to the predicted cost from the cost mod-
els listed above. For the empirically fit cost models, the T2TSI parameter captures
some of the additional cost of the advanced technology. Additional comparisons are
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required to form an estimate for the additional cost. In the case of the empirically fit
cost model that includes separate engine cost calculations, besides the T2TSI compo-
nent, engine cost is a function of peak engine power rather than engine displacement,
thus accounting for the higher power output of the smaller GTDI engine and fully
accounting for the additional cost.
The additional cost of a hybrid electric vehicle powertrain is assumed to comprise
electric machine power, battery peak power, energy density, cell capacity, and con-
troller & inverter, and bracket & cable costs1 [Lipman and Delucchi (2006, 2003)].
Equation (5.17). Table 5.8 defines the parameters and lists the values used in the
HEV cost equation. The total per unit cost of the hybrid powertrain cHEV is made up
of electric machine 1 and 2 costs cMG1, cMG2, the cost of the controller cHEV con, the
cost of brackets and cable cHEV BC , and the cost of the battery cHEV B. All component
costs are multiplied by a constant markup factor ωHEVm. Several attributes of the
hybrid powertrain system are calculated and used to compute the hybrid powertrain
system component costs. The battery cell charge in Amp-hours zCAh, the energy stor-
age capacity of a battery cell zCE, the energy density of a battery cell in Watt-hours
per kilogram of battery zEDTBc3 , the per kilogram cost of a battery cell WHEV Bpk,
1This model is adopted from a paper by Lipman and Delucchi from UC Davis. “Retail and LCC
of HEVs,” Lipman, Delucchi, 2006, Transportation Research, Part D; see also, “Hybrid Electric
Vehicle Design Retail and Lifecycle Cost Analysis,” 2003-UCD-ITS-RR-03-01.
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and the total number of cells in the battery pack zNC .
cHEV = (cMG1 + cMG2 + cHEV con + cHEV BC + cHEV B)ωHEVm
cMG1 = −111.3 + 127.7 ln (zMG1)
cMG2 = −111.3 + 127.7 ln (zMG2)
cHEV con = 480 + (2.95(zMG1 + zMG2));
cHEV BC = 1.5(zMG1 + zMG2);
cHEV B = zNC × vcm ×WHEV Bpk
zNC = 1000xBPow/(vcV × vcI)
WHEV Bpk = vMCC∗ − ((zEDTBc3 − vEDTBc∗3)/vKBM ) ln(zEDTBc3)
zEDTBc3 = zCE/vcm
zCE = zCAh × vcV
zCAh = vcQ/3600 (5.17)
Table 5.8: HEV cost model parameters
HEV Cost Parameter Value Units Description
vcm 0.17 kg mass of single battery cell
vcI 175 A nominal peak current
vcV 1.55 V nominal cell voltage
vcQ 23400 A-s nominal cell charge
vMCC∗ 17.69 $/kg reference battery cost in $/kg
vEDTBc∗3 75 Wh/kg baseline EDTBc3 value
vKBM 15 scaling coefficient for battery cost
ωHEVm 1 multiplicative constant on all costs
The value computed by the HEV cost equation is added to the unit variable cost
for a new cv.
cv = HEV UnitCost+ cv (5.18)
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The empirically fit cost model with the explicit engine cost has been further ad-
justed for the HEV case by including additional details. The cost of the engine in this
cost model is based on peak engine power. We assume that HEVs employ spark igni-
tion engines running the Atkinson cycle rather than the Otto cycle, so these engines
have lower peak power than would be expected for engines of similar displacement. In
these cases engine displacement may be a better predictor of engine cost than engine
power. We compensate by adding a constant of 120 HP to zhp when computing the
cSIEng. A calibration constant ωHEV con is also added to cv resulting in the following
equation for unit variable cost.















A major component in a market equilibrium study is a representation of producer
costs. Three approaches were taken: (1) scaling costs around an average expected
cost, (2) employing empirical data on prices, (3) using market equilibrium assump-
tions, given a demand model, to estimate costs. The three approaches differ on the
data required and the assumptions made to generate the cost models. The scaling
cost model requires only average values for vehicle parameters and sales figures for
the vehicle segment of interest. The empirical model requires a set of individual ve-
hicle data. The equilibrium cost model requires a set of individual vehicle data and
a consumer demand model.
Some of the estimated costs for the equilibrium model are negative, and the costs
in general are much lower than expected. We conjecture that the low cost projections
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are based on the fact that the cost model was derived from a demand model that did
not match the sales for the market from which it was estimated. In other words, in
the real market a set of vehicles and vehicle prices produced a certain mix of sales.
When we simulate predicted sales volume using the newly-estimated demand model
with the same mix of vehicles and vehicle prices we predict a different sales volume
mix. If we take the modeled sales volume mix to represent market equilibrium with
its unrealistic sales, it makes sense that we will get unrealistic vehicle costs based on
the equilibrium costs method. The implications for the market simulation based on
the unrealistic cost behavior are discussed in Chapter 8.
The empirical cost model was fit to the data based on vehicle attributes alone.
The equilibrium cost model relied on vehicle attributes, but also on vehicle brand
because the demand model was estimated with brand coefficients. This is another
way that unexpected cost results may be generated by the equilibrium cost model.
Assumptions were stated about incremental costs for GTDI technology. A cost
model that was adapted from the literature for hybrid electric vehicles was also pre-
sented.
This chapter is a first step to identify the best methods for constructing empirical
cost models using publicly available (or at least not proprietary) data. A second
step would be to refine the formulations of the cost models to capture better the




The development in the previous chapters implies two economic assumptions,
namely, producers are profit-maximizers and consumers are utility-maximizers. This
chapter will describe a third assumption that is competitive behavior is well-defined.
There is a tension between these assumptions and the aims of the analyst. The
assumptions are intuitively appealing, and they make the problem computationally
tractable. However, we desire the results to be useful for normative rather than
positive analysis. If the basic assumptions held in reality, then producers would have
already determined methods for maximizing profits, and the market would be in
price and design equilibrium. This dissertation assumes that the automotive market
demonstrates static price equilibrium during a single period (year). We also assume
vehicle producers seek to produce vehicles that maximize profit. However, we make
no assumption about the state of market equilibrium with respect to vehicle designs.
Calculating price equilibrium of the US automotive market under policy changes by
a firm or firms, i.e., design changes in one or a small number of vehicles, is then used
as one method for evaluating market response to the introduction of new technology
or regulation.
Section 6.1 outlines the computational steps that are used to simulate a firm’s
profit maximizing behavior with respect to vehicle design decisions in the context
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of a market in price equilibrium. Section 6.1.1 discusses the case where we would
assume a combined design and price equilibrium. This is the approach adopted in
the automotive vehicle design example in Chapter 7. Section 6.1.2 discusses the case
where price equilibrium is treated as a subgame of the design game. The case of a
single designing firm, and the case of multiple designing firms are described. The
price equilibrium subgame is the approach adopted in Chapter 8. Section 6.2 shows
computational results for the price equilibrium problem alone when vehicle costs and
prices are given in order to demonstrate that the price equilibrium assumption appears
reasonable for the US automotive vehicle market.
We make several assumptions about the structure of competition. Much of the
economics literature evaluating the automotive market assumes that the vehicle pro-
ducer sets vehicle price directly. Recent work in the design for market systems lit-
erature confirms that modeling the vehicle producer and the vehicle dealer as inde-
pendent decision-makers changes the nature of the decision problem for the vehicle
producer [Shiau and Michalek (2009)]. To simplify the discussion in this dissertation,
we evaluate the case where the dealer markups are fixed and assumed known a priori.
6.1 Game Structures
Policy analysts have often used a single stage equilibrium where a producer makes
all decisions simultaneously. Industrial organization economists view this approach
as simplistic. They suggest a subgame perfect equilibrium where all producers make
product design decisions before making a subsequent decision to update prices. This
idea is supported by the notion that producers have more freedom to control prices
than vehicle designs [Tirole (1988)].
For simple cases it should be possible to derive equilibrium conditions that can
be solved directly with respect to price and design decisions. For complex cases
such a derivation is difficult. This dissertation employs a convergence criterion that
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references changes in vehicle attributes from one iteration to the next. When the
maximum vehicle attribute change from one iteration to the next is below the conver-
gence tolerance we take the solution as an approximation to an equilibrium solution.
In future work, we can verify that our solutions have behavior of equilibrium solutions
by checking 1st and 2nd order optimality conditions for the design game.
A complete product equilibrium process would allow each competitor to optimize
designs as well as prices with respect to all others’ designs and prices. The market
simulation scenarios could also be enhanced to allow for product entry and exit. In
the case of a homogenous multinomial logit model and identical underlying engineer-
ing and cost models, each firm would choose identical designs and prices, as seen
in [Michalek et al. (2004)]. Instead, assuming some fixed competitor designs coin-
cides with vehicle planning where a firm makes some educated assumptions about
the products competitors will produce. During product launch and subsequent sales,
all competitors are at liberty to adjust prices freely while the designs remain fixed.
Competitive behavior [Chintagunta et al. (2006)] among automotive manufacturers
considering the full market has been modeled, see for example [Sudhir (2001); Gold-
berg (1995)]. The simplified approach shown here includes competitive effects suffi-
cient to illustrate trends without greatly increasing the computational complexity of
the model.
6.1.1 Design Problem Formulation for Single-stage Design and Price Equi-
librium
The first F−1 competitors f = 1, . . . , F−1 maximize profit with respect to vehicle
price pj,f given the product designs z and prices pk 6=j of all competitors. A single firm
F is designated as the designing firm. The designing firm optimizes product design
variables xj,F and the price variable pj,F , concluding one iteration. Iterations continue
until price changes fall below a convergence tolerance ptol. The vehicle prices (and
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firm F design variables) are now set such that no firm can make a different decision
that would improve its own profits while the choices of the other firms remain fixed,
thus approximating a Nash equilibrium [Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)].
The following expression in Equation (6.2) is used to simulate computationally
the solution to a single-stage game where one firm (firm F ) controls design and price
variables and other firms (firms 1, . . . , F − 1) control price variables only. This is the
approach that was used in the automotive design example in Section 7.4.1.
Do while max{∆pj, j = 1, . . . , J} > ptol
for f = 1, . . . , F − 1
max
pj,f




πF (xj,F , pj,F ; zk 6=j,pk 6=j)
s.t. g(xj,F ) ≤ 0
end
where,
πf = (pf − cf )′ · qf (6.2)
In these expressions, the index j represents the individual vehicles being designed or
priced across all of the firms. The index f represents the individual firms that are
competing in the market. The combined subscript j, f , for example in the case of pj,f
signifies the price of vehicle j, where vehicle j is controlled by firm f . The index k
is used to differentiate the remaining vehicle choices in the market from the current
vehicle j.
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6.1.2 Design Problem Formulation for Two-stage Design and Price Equi-
librium
The difference between the two-stage game described in this section and the single-
stage game described in Section 6.1.1 is that the pricing problem for all of the vehicles
in the market is solved as a subgame to the vehicle design problem. Three market
scenarios of varying complexity are presented here. The first two scenarios are later
implemented in Sections 8.2-8.5. The third scenario is presented for illustrative pur-
poses only.
Single Firm with Two-stage Game
This market simulation scenario is the one employed in the vehicle design examples
in Sections 8.2-8.4.
A single firm is designated as the designing firm F . This firm controls all vehicle
design variables for its vehicle xj,F except for price pj,f . The price of the designed
vehicle and the prices of all of the other vehicles {pj, j = 1, . . . , J} in the market
are determined in a subgame that is computed at each function call of the designing
firm’s profit objective. This process iterates until the largest change in any of the
designed vehicle’s attributes zj,F is below a convergence tolerance ztol.
Do while max{∆zj,F} > ztol
max
xj,F ,p
πF (xj,F ,p; zk 6=j)





{πf (pf ; zf ), f = 1, . . . , F}
)
end,
where, πf is the same as Equation (6.2).
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Single Market Segment with Two-stage Game
This market simulation scenario is the one employed in the vehicle design example
in Section 8.5.
Multiple firms F − q + 1, . . . , F with competing vehicles in the same segment are
designated as the designing firms. The first designing firm (F − q + 1) maximizes
profit πF−q+1 with respect to the vehicle design variables xj,F−q+1 where all vehicle
prices in the entire market p are determined by a pricing subgame as in the single firm
two-stage game case. The second designing firm then maximizes profit with respect
to the vehicle design variables xj,F−q+2, and so on. This process iterates until the
largest change in one of the designed vehicles’ attributes is below the convergence
tolerance ztol.
Do while max{∆zj,f ; f = F − q + 1, . . . , F} > ztol
for f = F − q + 1, . . . , F
max
xj,f ,p
πf (xj,f ,p; zk 6=j) (6.4)









where, πf is the same as Equation (6.2).
Multi-product Firms with Two-stage Game
This market simulation scenario is not demonstrated in this dissertation and is
listed here for illustrative purposes.
Multiple firms F − q + 1, . . . , F are designated as the designing firms. Multi-
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ple products {jF−q+1; jF−q+1 = 1, . . . , JF−q+1} from each firm are designated as the
designed vehicles. The first designing firm maximizes profit with respect to the ve-
hicle design variables for all vehicles it will design {xjF−q+1 ; jF−q+1 = 1, . . . , JF−q+1}
where all vehicle prices in the entire market p are determined by a pricing subgame
as in the single firm two-stage game case. The second designing firm then maxi-
mizes profit with respect to the vehicle design variables of the vehicles it will design
{xjF−q+2 ; jF−q+2 = 1, . . . , JF−q+2}, and so on. This process iterates until the largest
change in one of the designed vehicles’ attributes is below the convergence tolerance
ztol.
Do while max{∆zjf ; jf = 1, . . . , Jf ; f = F − q + 1, . . . , F} > ztol
for f = F − q + 1, . . . , F
max
xjf ,p
πf (xjf ,p; zk 6=jf ); jf = 1, . . . , Jf (6.5)









where, πf is the same as Equation (6.2).
6.2 Automotive Market Price Equilibrium Comparisons
The price equilibrium represents the subgame in the vehicle design market simu-
lation. We compare the simulated market behavior for the case of price equilibrium
alone without the vehicle design problem for the BLP95 model and the two new
models presented in Chapter 4. The pricing problem is posed in the form of a dealer
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pricing problem. In other words, assuming that each dealer sells only vehicles from
a single manufacturer, what prices should dealers set collectively to maximize prof-
its for their vehicle sales. The fixed-point algorithm developed by Morrow [Morrow
(2008)] is used to compute optimal prices for a portfolio of vehicles for each firm in
the market by iteratively solving a fixed-point equation for price. Convergence is
evaluated at each fixed-point iteration by comparing a user-specified tolerance value
to the combined gradient norm. The combined gradient norm G is defined to be the
L∞-norm of the vector composed of the products of the choice-share derivatives λ
and the difference between the initial prices and computed fixed-point prices p− p′.
G = ||λ′ × diag(p− q)||∞ (6.6)
When the combined gradient norm is close to 0, it means that no firm can improve
its profits by changing prices unilaterally. For this reason we take the combined
gradient norm convergence below a given tolerance value as an approximation to a
Nash equilibrium solution.
The vehicle data came from a JD Power data set of 5,298 vehicle purchases during
the 2005 calendar year. This set of observations was reduced to a total of 993 vehicle
offerings corresponding to different model years and model names. Characteristics
for vehicles with the same model name and model year were averaged. The dealer
costs were taken to be the vehicle costs.
A simulated population was generated for each demand model evaluation. For
BLP95 the only demographic is income, so 1000 standard normal random draws were
taken and converted into annual incomes assuming a log normal distribution of income
in 1983 dollars with mean 10.33 and standard deviation of 1. Random coefficient
values for zhp/zVM , z$/mi, and zLzW were generated in the same way assuming normal
distributions on these parameters. All vehicles were assumed to have air-conditioning
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standard. The utility of each vehicle for each simulated individual was computed.
Choice shares were computed according to the standard mixed-logit formulation.
Price equilibrium prices were computed using the fixed-point iteration technique.
Prices and shares for the two newly estimated demand models from Chapter 4,
Model 1 that is linear in footprint and Model 2 that is quadratic in footprint, were
computed following the same methodology as described in the preceding paragraph.
However, the simulated population was taken to be the same population used to
estimate the models. Fifteen random draws were taken for each random coefficient
for each individual. The price equilibrium simulation was repeated several times for
each model all with similar results to those reported here.
Equilibrium prices were compared with the (average) transaction prices as shown
in Figure 6.1, and the estimated market shares were plotted in Figure 6.1. The equi-
librium prices for the BLP95 model match the reported transaction prices very well.
The equilibrium prices for Model 1 and Model 2 are offset higher than the reported
transaction prices and appear to have a percentage increase, i.e., slope greater than
1, compared to the transaction prices. Model 2 has a slight but noticeably smaller
slope than Model 1.
Additionally, the BLP95 simulation achieved a very small combined gradient
norm, G < 1 × 10−17. The fixed-point iteration code typically achieved a combined
gradient norm around values of G < 5 × 10−9 for both Model 1 and Model 2. The
difference can be seen by the increased “thickness” of the band of computed versus
reported prices in Figure 6.1. All three demand models preserve the price ordering
to a recognizable degree, i.e., the trend for computed vs. given prices lies along a
straight line.
We believe that difference in the convergence criterion values between the BLP95
model and the newly estimated model comes because of increased nonlinearities in
the choice share calculations for Model 1 and Model 2. Consumers, according to the
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Computed prices vs. reported prices. Left: BLP95; Center: Model 1;
Right: Model 2
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BLP95 model, are quite price sensitive, and so there is a clear ordering of sales volume
that corresponds well with vehicle price. The Model 1 and Model 2 demand models
show that some high-priced models achieve significant market share. This makes the
profit calculation for each firm much more nonlinear because vehicles across the firm’s
fleet (not only the inexpensive vehicles) contribute to firm profit.
The choice shares plots in Figure 6.2 show a contrast between the BLP95 perfor-
mance and the new model performance. The BLP95 model predicts very high choice
shares for the lowest priced models and almost 0 choice share for the remaining mod-
els. This behavior is more accentuated than in the 2006 model comparison shown
in Chapter 4. On the other hand, Model 1 and Model 2 show similar choice share
behavior to the 2006 comparison in Chapter 4. All models show a tendency toward
lower price vehicles as compared to the 2006 model comparison. The suggested cause
for this tendency is that the choice model, without alternative-specific constants, does
not capture the underlying preference for the most popular less expensive vehicles.
However, it appears that the models do capture this underlying preference because
when let loose in a market equilibrium simulation, the resulting shares look much
more similar to the observed market shares. This hypothesis is supported by the
equilibrium cost results in Chapter 5 that show that in order to produce the equilib-
rium outcome suggested by the demand models at the observed market prices, the
cost to manufacture the least expensive vehicles would be negative. It is natural, then
that when prices are free to vary, manufactures increase prices in order to rebalance
the market shares more similarly to what was observed in the actual market.
It should be noted that the choice set used in the market simulation in this section
spans multiple model years and is not known to be representative of the vehicles avail-
able in 2005. The robustness of the choice share results for Models 1 and 2 compared
to the 2006 data comparison provide a preliminary indication that they may exhibit
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Computed shares vs. computed prices. Left: BLP95; Center: Model 1;
Right: Model 2
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BLP95 model, on the other hand, demonstrates accentuated price sensitivity beyond
the already exaggerated behavior shown in Chapter 4.
One hypothesis about the poor performance of the BLP95 model is that consumer
preferences have shifted since the model was developed. This idea is worth investi-
gating since the BLP95 model was estimated on vehicle data from 1971-1990, and the
test data was from 2005. Figure 6.3 shows market equilibrium simulations for various
cost scenarios. Again, this is a dealer pricing problem, since we are maximizing profit
based on the retail price values. Panel (a) assumes that dealer markup is 10% of
MSRP. Panel (b) assumes that dealer markup is a fixed $512 for each vehicle. Panel
(c) assumes that percentage dealer markup increases linearly with MSRP and takes
values between 0%-30%.
For all the cases we observe that the choice share of the most popular vehicle has
been reduced by an order of magnitude. This observation supports the idea that the
BLP95 model is better suited for the older data. Without data on the actual sales of
the models in the choice sample it is difficult to draw further conclusions about the fit
of the 1985 data. The visual effect of the choice share spread in Figure 6.3 compared
to the 2006 market shown in Figure 4.3 suggests that the 1985 market was much more
skewed toward inexpensive cars or that the BLP95 model exhibits oversensitivity to
price even in the model years for which it was estimated. The oversensitivity to price
may be accounted for completely by the alternative specific constants. However, those
constants are not reported in the BLP95 paper. The oversensitivity to price of the
model without the constants highlights one of the dangers of adopting models from
the literature for design for market systems studies.
More specifically in Figure 6.3, we observe that for the constant 10% margin case
(a), the shares are more dispersed and the prices are overpredicted compared with
Figures 6.1-6.2. For the fixed margin case (b), the prices for high-priced vehicles are
overpredicted even more than in case (a) and the share dispersion is similar. For the
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Computed shares vs. computed prices for BLP95 model using 1985 vehicle
data from Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. (a) 10% dealer margin; (b) 512$
dealer margin; (c) linearly-increasing-with-price dealer margin between
0%-30%
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increasing percentage markup (c), the prices are overpredicted for low-priced models
and underpredicted for high-priced models. We interpret this as an underprediction
of margin for the low-priced vehicles and an over prediction of margin for the high-
priced vehicles given the demand model. The share dispersion begins to approach
the dispersion seen with Model 1 and Model 2 in the year 2006 case. However, shares
remain more dispersed.
6.3 Summary
This chapter defined the computational structure that is used for the automotive
vehicle design examples in Chapters 7 and 8. We pattern the computations after singe
and two-stage market equilibrium games. However, we do not prove convergence to a
market equilibrium solution. Instead we iterate among competitors until no further
design changes are observed. We also simplify the problem by designating a small
number of designing firms and designed vehicles. The designing firms control the
vehicle design variables of the designing firms. All other firms and vehicles in the
market are considered in the pricing problem, but the vehicle designs of these vehicles
remain fixed.
The second element of this chapter is an analysis of the price equilibrium com-
putational results to be employed as a subgame in all of the two-stage design and
price formulations. The purpose of these tests were to test the pricing game behavior
in isolation of the design game in order to gain confidence about the suitability and
feasibility of employing the pricing subgame in the over all design game model. Using
data from dealers on vehicle cost and selling price we presented graphically the results
of the price equilibrium problem. The choice share results for Model 1 and Model 2
for the dealer data test using 2005 data appear quite similar to the real market choice
shares from the 2006 data used in Chapter 4. The pricing game for all models appears
to converge although the BLP95 model is capable of a much higher convergence tol-
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erance and well matched predicted to given prices. Both Model 1 and Model 2 have a
price offset where the predicted prices are higher than the given prices. This behavior
coincides with and is the inverse of the equilibrium pricing behavior seen in Chapter
5 where given the reported prices, the equilibrium predicted costs were much lower
than expected. All of these findings build confidence in the computational approach.
We conjecture that the offset observed in Model 1 and Model 2 would be accounted
for by incorporating alternative specific constants in the demand model estimation.
We observed that the choice share prediction of the BLP95 model was very poor.
We presented three different equilibrium price and choice share results for 1985 data
using the BLP95 demand model and three different cost assumptions in order to
examine the change in the price and choice share behavior when the BLP95 model
was used for a model year over which it was estimated. In all three cases the choice
share predictions appear more reasonable although perhaps remaining overly price-
sensitive. The price predictions were not as accurate as in the 2005 dealer data case,
which could be expected based on the simplistic cost assumptions made rather than
using dealer cost data.
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CHAPTER VII
Local and Global Measures for Bi-objective
Tradeoffs
Quantitative studies of tradeoffs between competing objectives are ubiquitous.
They typically focus on finding Pareto points [Steuer (1986)] and the preference
structure for selecting one point among many or vise versa. Preferences or constraints
that lead to the tradeoff relationship are assumed fixed.
However, changes to the mathematical structure and input parameter values of
the optimization model can lead to changes in the shape of the attainable set and its
Pareto boundary. These changes can be captured by the objective function gradients
and constraint activity shifts. Furthermore, psychologists have shown, and recent
work in the design community has begun to explore, that decision maker preferences
do not necessarily exist a priori. This finding implies decision maker preferences may
be influenced by evolving tradeoffs—hence the value of studying them systematically
[Slovic (1995); Kulok and Lewis (2007); Besharati et al. (2006); MacDonald et al.
(2007b)].
This chapter encompasses portions of the papers [Frischknecht and Papalambros
(2008); Frischknecht et al. (2009b)]. The goal in this chapter is to establish a method-
ology and metrics for comparing the type of public versus private goods tradeoffs pre-
sented in Chapter 8. We can think of of each set of parameter values used as inputs
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to a vehicle design and market simulation problem as corresponding to a product
development or policy scenario. For a given scenario, the public versus private good
tradeoff can be captured as a tradeoff between vehicle fuel consumption and the firm’s
profit. The optimization results can then be represented as a Pareto set. The meth-
ods presented in this chapter provide an approach for measuring differences in the
Pareto set from one scenario to another in order to facilitate the discussion of what
represents a desirable scenario. Essentially, using the optimization framework, we can
study how changes in parameter values (or possibly the analysis models) change the
tradeoff, or alignment, of the competing objectives.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes a bi-
objective problem formulation and categorizes changes to this problem formulation
that lead to changes in the Pareto set. Section 2 introduces global metrics for com-
paring Pareto sets, and Section 3 introduces local metrics. Section 4 gives examples
of how the metrics can be used, and Section 5 summarizes the chapter.
7.1 Pareto set analysis
A wide body of literature in the decision sciences [Keeny and Raiffa (1976)] and
the engineering community [Das (1999); Kasprzak and Lewis (2001)] studies how to
formulate preferences given a particular tradeoff. The Pareto set, in particular, has
received much attention, including how the Pareto frontier relates to sensitivity in the
objective functions [Lootsma (1999)]. Additionally, analogies to postoptimal analysis
in single objective problems have been proposed, particularly for vector objective
linear programming [Kornbluth (1974); Gal and Leberling (1977)].
This chapter formalizes metrics for comparing tradeoff scenarios. We hypothesize
that we can measure how much two objectives compete in a Pareto problem. The
less they compete the more aligned they are. A multicriterion or Pareto optimization
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problem is stated as:
min f(x)
subject to: h(x) = 0; g(x) ≤ 0; x ∈ S; (7.1)
Here f(x) is a vector of criteria of interest fn, n = 1, . . . , N . The set of variable
values x that satisfy all equality h, inequality g, and set constraints S is the feasible
(design) domain, X . The range set of all vectors f mapped from the feasible domain is
the attainable setA = {f(x)|x ∈ X}. A point inA, f(x∗), is said to be non-dominated
or Pareto optimal, if there exist no f(x) such that f(x) ≤ f(x∗) and fn(x) < fn(x∗)
for at least one n.
Ideal values f ◦n are the optimal criterion values obtained optimizing one criterion
at a time:
f ◦n = min(fn(x)|h(x) = 0, g(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ X ), n = 1, . . . , N (7.2)
Nadir values fNn are the worst values for each criterion found in the set of Pareto
optimal points. For a bi-criterion problem the nadir value for one criterion can be
found when the other criterion reaches its ideal value [Ehrgott and Tenfelde-Podehl
(2003)]:
fNn = {(fn(x)|fl(x) = f ◦l } (7.3)




We consider now Pareto set analysis, or how we can compare different Pareto
sets. A design scenario is defined here as the Pareto set generated by a given problem
statement and its associated parameter values. A design scenario can be classified as
superior to another using the concept of a meta-Pareto set, which includes all non-
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dominated criteria vectors selected from the union of all the individual Pareto sets
under consideration [Athan and Papalambros (1996); Mattson and Messac (2003)].
Cohon [Cohon (1978)] discusses special cases of mathematical conditions for non-
inferiority introduced by Kuhn & Tucker [Kuhn and Tucker (1951)] where objectives
are redundant or completely conflicting. Lootsma [Lootsma (1999)] suggests examin-
ing a cross-effect matrix, whose rows are the values for all criteria at the individual
optimum for each criterion, to observe competition between objectives. Several de-
gree of conflict and similarity measures have been proposed for pairwise comparison
of alternatives or for linear programs. Purshouse & Fleming [Purshouse and Fleming
(2003)] characterize regions of objective space as independent, conflicting, or har-
monious. Carlsson & Fuller [Carlsson and Fuller (1995)] define interdependence of
objectives, degree of objective conflict, and problem complexity for the linear case.
Deng [Deng (2007)] presents a conflict index between two alternatives and defines a
metric for similarity to the ideal point.
The design of the solution set (rather than a single-point design) is important in
many design scenarios. These scenarios share a characteristic that design decisions
are not all made simultaneously, but some may be made before others (configuration
design), some decisions may be more flexible then others, or be repeated at a higher
frequency (dynamic control, product platforming, design for adjustability), and some
decisions (or exogeneities) may be uncertain (robust design, product development
investment planning, regulatory policy). In the general case, systems characterized
by multiple objectives will exhibit a tradeoff relationship between improvements for
both objectives. Considering how the Pareto set changes with changes in the problem
formulation can facilatate design of the attainable set in addition to illustrating the
tradeoffs between specific solutions.
Changes to the mathematical structure and input parameter values of a bi-objective
programming problem can lead to changes in the shape of the attainable set and its
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Pareto boundary. We illustrate the link between the terms described in Sections 7.2
and 7.3 and outcomes of the Pareto set using a simplified automotive vehicle design
problem and a two-dimensional nonlinear programming examples.
The task of the designer abstracted to a mathematical decision-making problem
is to specify the functional forms of the objective and constraint functions (referred
to as system specification in the dynamic systems terminology), then partition model
elements between parameters and variables, specify parameter values, and find effi-
cient values for design variables (referred to as system identification in the dynamic
systems terminology). We classify changes to a system design problem formulation
(summarized in Table 7.1) according to this definition of system specification and
identification. Each of these decisions may affect the Pareto set. For example, chang-
ing parameter values is equivalent to a traditional parametric study and fits in system
identification. The examples listed in Table 7.1 reflect changes to the example prob-
lem specified in Equation (7.18).
Table 7.1: Classification of System Design Model Changes
System Modeling Stage Change Example
Specification
Objective functional form -
Constraint functional form -




Parameter values p = 5
Section 7.2 discusses global metrics that are so named because they require in-
formation about the extreme points of the Pareto set and require evaluation of more
than one Pareto point. The metrics described in Section 7.3 are referred to as local
metrics because they are computed at a specific Pareto point.
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7.2 Global multicriterion tradeoff metrics
We introduce here three global metrics to compare the nature of multiobjective
tradeoffs that have similarities to previous work with the advantage that the new
metrics are relatively inexpensive to compute and can be applied to a wide range
of problem types. The new metrics can be applied to compare Pareto sets when
the system design model has changed (i.e., the functional form of objectives and
constraints) in addition to comparing tradeoffs for a single problem definition.
The concept of criterion alignment is introduced to compare Pareto sets in terms
of how much their objectives compete with each other. Two objectives are said to
be aligned when both attain their ideal values simultaneously. A Pareto curve is
more aligned than another when (i) the effective curvature of the normalized Pareto
curve is greater; (ii) it spans a smaller area in the criterion space; (iii) it is less
sensitive or “flat”. Three metrics, each emphasizing a different aspect of criteria
alignment, are proposed in order to facilitate comparisons between design scenerios:
Effective curvature, area, and sensitivity. With the exception of curvature, the metrics
are relative and can be used to compare tradeoffs only for problems with the same
objectives f . Computing the effective curvature metric requires examining the Pareto
frontier, while the other two metrics can be computed from knowing the ideal points.
7.2.1 Effective curvature
The effective curvature κ indicates the relative convexity or concavity of a par-
ticular tradeoff. To calculate κ we normalize the Pareto set between 0 and 1 for
each criterion: f ′n(x) = (fn(x)− f ◦n) /
(
fNn − f ◦n
)
, and define the minmax solution
LA∞ = minL∞ = min ‖f ′‖∞ = max {|f ′1|, |f ′2|}, that minimizes the maximum devia-
tion from either ideal value, 0 < LA∞ < 1. This solution is at the intersection of the
curve f ′2 = f
′


















Normalized criterion space showing competition severity as a function of
Pareto set curvature









, 0 < LA∞ ≤ 12 , convex








< LA∞ < 1, concave
(7.4)
Thus κ is a monotonically decreasing, smooth, piecewise function with respect to
LA∞, with vertical asymptotes at 0 and 1 and an inflection point at 0.5. Criteria com-
pete less as κ increases, indicating increasing convexity and LA∞ closer to 0. Figure 7.1
shows differences in curvature for a normalized Pareto set. In general,
−∞ < κ <∞

limLA∞→1 κ→ −∞, perfectly competing
−∞ < κ < 0, severely competing
0 < κ <∞, marginally competing
limLA∞→0 κ→∞, perfectly aligned




The area metric is the area of the rectangle that inscribes the Pareto set, defined
as Φ = |XsYs| where Xs = (fN1 − f ◦1 )/λ1, Ys = (fN2 − f ◦2 )/λ2 for the bi-objective
problem, with λn, n = 1, 2, chosen by the designer, to compute a scaled range for
criterion n. Criteria compete less or are more aligned, as the area is reduced.
A useful heuristic for selecting λn is to consider the smallest change in fn that
would be meaningful, i.e., one that gives a unique solution in a practical application.
For example, for a miles/gallon criterion, a difference of 0.1 mpg may be the smallest
significant unit. The scaled values of fn would then be multiples of the significant
unit. Setting λ = 1 maintains the original scale. Scaling based on a significant unit
is useful for comparing Pareto sets because the scale of the relative changes in each
criterion is preserved. This would not be the case if the Pareto set was normalized or
if a value unique to each design scenario was used, such as f ◦n. Selecting scaling factors
implies some judgment on the relative value of each criterion, just as normalizing or
leaving criteria unscaled implies a relative weighting.
7.2.3 Sensitivity
The sensitivity metric is defined relative to each criterion ∆Xs = Ys/Xs, ∆Ys =
Xs/Ys. A lower value of ∆Xs means criterion Y is less sensitive to changes in criterion
X. The sensitivity metric reflects the change in one criterion given a change in the
other criterion over the entire Pareto set; it indicates the shape of the rectangle that
inscribes the Pareto set. A criterion is more or less sensitive as the rectangle becomes
more eccentric. Balanced sensitivity occurs when Ys/Xs = 1.
7.2.4 Pareto set comparisons
Criterion alignment is just one aspect of Pareto set comparison. It should be












Alternative Pareto set exhibiting reduced area and sensitivity at the ex-
pense of objective values
does not indicate preference for a given design scenario over another in terms of the
numerical objective values of the Pareto set. For example, introduction of additional
constraints may reduce the value of the area or sensitivity metrics compared to a
baseline case by reducing the attainable set, see for example Figure 7.2). The Pareto
set would then exhibit increased alignment at the expense of the objective values.
7.3 Local multicriterion tradeoff metrics
To clarify the motivation of the discussion that follows it is helpful to think about
the vehicle design problem as a design and control problem. The design variables are
physical characteristics of the vehicle. The control variable is the vehicle price. In
the simplest case where a producer is only considering the public impact of its own
isolated actions, the public objective (minimize fuel consumption per vehicle sold)
is a function of design variables alone. The private objective (maximize profit) is a
function of design variables and vehicle price. The public objective is analogous to
a design objective and the private objective is analogous to a control objective in a
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co-design and control problem.
One method for solving a design and control problem is to first solve the de-
sign problem to optimality and then solve the control problem to optimality given
the results from the first stage. This method works well when the design problem
has highest priority and the design problem is not influenced by the control vari-
ables. More priority can be given to the control problem by solving the problem
as a weighted-sum single objective problem with more weight added to the control
problem. Even in this case, the computations can proceed in the same sequential
fashion–first design, then control. The analogy to public and private tradeoffs in a
market systems context comes when we realize that the two-stage design and price
equilibrium game we established in Chapter 6 is analogous to the sequential solution
strategy just described for design and control problems. Each vehicle producer solves
the vehicle design problem (the top-level game) assuming that the price (control
variables) will be solved to optimality given a set of design variables (the subgame).
The design of modern smart products requires concurrent optimization of the ar-
tifact design and its controller. This so-called co-design problem [Fathy et al. (2001);
Reyer et al. (2001)] is often performed in a sequential manner for reasons of con-
venience and tradition: design the artifact first, and then design its controller. In
general, such a strategy will yield non-optimal solutions, compared with a simulta-
neous or all-in-one optimization of the combined system [Fathy et al. (2001); Reyer
et al. (2001)], particularly when bidirectional coupling exists between the two sub-
problems, for example, when each of the two objectives depends on some variables
and parameters of the other subproblem [Reyer et al. (2001)]. However, there exists
a large class of problems where coupling is unidirectional, for example, the artifact
criterion f1(x1) depends only on the artifact design variables x1 while the control
criterion f2(x1,x2) depends on both the artifact variables and the controller design
variables x2, so that the system objective becomes: F = w1f1(x1) + w2f2(x1,x2),
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where w1, w2 are weights. An example of such a formulation is a linear positioning
device where the artifact objective is steady-state displacement and the controller
objective is settling time. Such a partitioning is inherent when the artifact criterion
is independent of the controller variables as measured by the partial gradients of the
objective and constraint functions with respect to the controller variables. Partition-
ing artifact and controller variables may be desirable for practical purposes in cases
where the effect of the controller variables on the artifact criterion is deemed small
enough, or where the analytical or computational means are not available to treat ar-
tifact and control variables simultaneously for the controller objective. One strategy
for the latter case above is to solve the system-level problem as a nested optimiza-
tion one [Reyer et al. (2001); Fathy (2003)], where the system solution is found with
respect to x1, with the optimal x2 computed as a function of x1 by solving the “in-
ner” optimal controller problem first [Fathy et al. (2001); Fathy (2003)]. This nested
problem formulation is distinguished from the simultaneous one using the notation





Note that the linear scalarization used here reflects typical practice in the control
literature. Since this is known to fail in cases of nonconvex Pareto sets, the ac-
tual computation can be done using nonlinear scalarization [Athan and Papalambros
(1996)] or some other method, several of which were described in Section 2.3.
Viewing the co-design problem as a bi-objective Pareto formulation without scalar-
ization and weights, we can examine how much the two objectives compete or are
aligned [Cohon (1978)]. Intuitively, it would appear that objective alignment must
relate to objective coupling. Quantifying this relationship will provide deeper insights
in the nature of both the alignment and coupling concepts, and their implications for
understanding coupled multi-objective problems. In what follows, we show how a
measure of objective alignment (the polar cone of objective gradients) is related to
the coupling vector derived for a problem with unidirectional coupling, and how the
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measure of constraint decoupling can be normalized when the system design problem
is considered as a bi-objective problem. These measures help to understand how the
Pareto set is affected by changes to the system design problem formulation.
7.3.1 Objective Coupling and Objective Alignment
Multi-objective programming typically focuses on finding Pareto points and defin-
ing the preference structure for selecting one point among many [Steuer (1986)]. Sev-
eral researchers have applied the concept of objective function gradient differences
in order to compare solutions [Purshouse and Fleming (2003); Carlsson and Fuller
(1995); Deng (2007)]. Lootsma examined how the Pareto frontier relates to sensitivity
in the objective functions [Lootsma (1999)]. Additionally, analogies to postoptimal
analysis in single objective problems have been proposed, particularly for vector ob-
jective linear programming [Kornbluth (1974); Gal and Leberling (1977)]. Others
have also discussed the idea of comparing different Pareto sets using the concept of
a meta-Pareto set, which includes all non-dominated criteria vectors selected from
the union of all the individual Pareto sets under consideration [Athan and Papalam-
bros (1996); Mattson and Messac (2003)]. We adopt the polar cone of the negative
gradients as our measure of objective alignment, and we will consider how this mea-
sure changes, and the attendant implications for the Pareto set, with changes in the
problem formulation.
The decision space can be partitioned into three disjoint sets with respect to a
feasible point x: Points [x1, . . . ,xn]
> ∈ Rn that are superior, Q<(x); points that are
equal or inferior, Q≥(x); and points that cannot be compared, Q∼(x). The set Q<(x)
is equivalent to the interior of the polar cone of the negative objective gradients
Q<(x) = {k| − k>∇f i > 0; i = 1, 2} (7.6)
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where k is an n-dimensional vector with origin at x [Zadeh (1963); Cohon (1978)].
The angle between the boundaries of the polar cone can then be taken as a measure
of objective function alignment at a particular x. A polar cone angle of π corresponds
to the case where the gradients of both objectives at x are parallel. The polar cone
angle collapses to 0 when objective gradients are parallel with reversed signs.
The interdependence of the multiple objectives for a given system is critical to
its design [Balling and Sobieszczanski-Sobieski (1996); Bloebaum et al. (1992); Ha-
jela et al. (1990)]. The complete co-design problem with unidirectional coupling is
formulated as [Fathy (2003)]
min
x1,x2
w1f1 (x1) + w2f2 (x1,x2)
subject to: h1 (x1) = 0; h2 (x1,x2) = 0
g1 (x1) ≤ 0; g2 (x1,x2) ≤ 0 (7.7)
where f1 (x1) is the artifact objective function, f2 (x1,x2) is the controller objective
function, x1 is the vector of artifact design variables, x2 is the vector of controller
design variables, h are the system equality constraints, and g are the system inequality
constraints, and w1 and w2 are the weights associated with the objective functions f1
and f2, respectively.
7.3.2 Definitions
We adopt several terms to aid in explaining changes in the Pareto set. First, we
define terms related to the unidirectional coupled system problem. Next, we define
terms related to the bi-objective problem. Then, we define terms related to both
problems.
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Consider the nested system design problem





where the asterisk denotes that the optimal values for x2 have been found with respect
to x1. The coupling vector Γv [Fathy (2003)] defined by Equation (7.9) is derived
from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for the weighted-sum











= W∇fn2 (x1) (7.9)
To simplify the notation in Equation (7.9), we set w1 from Equation (7.8) equal to 1
and substitute W for w2. The inner term is the gradient ∇fN2 (x1). Γv is assumed to
be a row vector.
Objective decoupling
Objective decoupling occurs when the inner term of Γv vanishes. In this case
the solution to the single-objective problem, min f1, will also be the solution to the
weighted-sum system objective problem [Fathy (2003)].
Constraint decoupling
Constraint decoupling occurs when there is a range of values for W for which a
given x∗ is the system optimal solution. This behavior occurs when the gradients of
the active constraints at the system optimal solution can form convex combinations
equal to the system objective gradient for a range of objective gradient directions,
controlled by W .
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Objective alignment
For a bi-objective problem, two objectives are said to be aligned at a particular
design point x if the angle between the objective gradients is 0, or equivalently if the
angle described by the polar cone θ< of the two negative objective gradients is π.
The polar cone has an appealing geometric interpretation in that the larger θ< the
greater the region of simultaneously improving directions, or the greater the objective







, {k1| − k1∇f1(x) = 0; k2| − k2∇f2(x) = 0}. (7.10)
A convenient way to identify the appropriate k1 and k2 for a problem with two design
variables is to recognize that k1 should be orthogonal to −∇f1 and in the plane
defined by f1 and f2. We preserve the polar cone measure for the n-dimensional
case but calculate it directly from the objective gradients: θ< = π − ξ, where ξ =
arccos((∇f1 · ∇f2)/(|∇f1||∇f2|)).
Coincidence
Two objective criteria are said to be coincident when the single-objective mini-
mizers of the design variables shared between the objectives are equal. Namely, there
exists some vector x∗| f1(x∗) = f ◦1 , f2(x∗) = f ◦2 . A relative measure of coincidence
to compare two Pareto sets is the L2 norm of the design variables between objective
ideal points ||(xf◦1 − xf◦2 )||2.
Dominance
One Pareto set is said to dominate another Pareto set when each member of the




Two objectives are said to be independent at a particular design point x when
Γv = 0 or when θ
< is undefined.
Pareto slope
The coupling vector Γv is related to the slope of the Pareto frontier of the bi-
objective problem [Peters et al. (2009)]. At a given Pareto-efficient point x∗ using









= ∇fn2 > · (1/∇f1). (7.11)
7.3.3 Quantification of Alignment and Objective Coupling
We begin with the necessary conditions for an efficient point to a bi-objective
minimization problem [Kuhn and Tucker (1951)] as in Equation (7.1):




h = 0 (7.12)
Comparing Equation (7.12) to the first-order optimality conditions for Equation (7.7)
we see that the co-design problem is a special case of the bi-objective problem where
the weighting factors were chosen a priori. In previous work on co-design coupling, em-
phasis has been placed on comparing f1 to the weighted system objective w1f1 +w2f2
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rather than comparing f1 and f2 directly. However, the coupling vector Γv is difficult
to interpret because it is directly proportional to the subjective weighting value W
and the units of measurement for the objective function. Comparing the two objec-
tives directly frees the designer from implying a scale W , or “exhange rate”, between
objectives before studying the attainable set. Objective alignment is a function of
gradient direction only (not magnitude). It is still possible that the gradient direction
is affected by the scale of the controller variables x2 since they do not appear in the
artifact objective function.
Objective alignment can be calculated for a unidirectional coupled problem follow-
ing the definition of alignment above. This is a straightforward process if the whole
gradients are available: ∇f1(x1),∇f2(x1,x2). However, it can be challenging to for-
mulate or compute the whole gradients when the controller objective is formulated as





. For example, assume fn2 (x1) is
a black-box simulation. We can then compute ∇fn2 (x1) and observe ∂x∗2/∂x1. How-
ever, we require ∇f2(x1,x2). If we assume we can compute ∇f2(x2) analytically or by
evaluating the conventional control problem f2(x2), then we can back out the missing
component: ∂f2/∂x1 = ∇fn2 − ∂f2∂x2 ∂x2∂x1 .
7.3.4 Normalized Constraint Decoupling
Returning to the geometric interpretation of the weighted-sum objective in the
design variable space, the sum of any two vectors with positive weighting factors
((1 − w)f1 + wf2| w ≥ 0) will be a new vector that lies between the two original
vectors assuming the same origin. The necessary conditions for the optimal system
design problem imply that the weighted-sum-objective vector can be formed by a
convex combination of the gradients of the active constraints. Constraint decoupling
requires that, at a given Pareto point for a system design problem with weight w,
the span of the convex combination of satisfied constraints (including degenerate
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constraints) will similarly satisfy the necessary conditions for optimality for a system
design problem with some other weighting factor t 6= w.
The constraint decoupling ratio φ can be calculated at an ideal point (f ◦1 ) by
first calculating the angle between the two single-objective gradients ∇f1,∇f2. We
can then find the limiting weighting value w∗, and compute the angle between the
weighted-sum system-objective gradient and ∇f1. Assuming the system design ob-
jective is a convex combination of the single objectives, the limiting weighting value
can be found by solving the following problem where ∇f1,∇f2,∇g,∇h have been




subject to: (1− w)∇f1 + w∇f2 + β>∇g + λ>∇h = 0
−β ≤ 0; λ 6= 0. (7.13)
The ratio φ evaluated at an ideal point is then the ratio of the angle between
the maximum weighted-sum objective gradient with the same optimal solution as the
ideal point and the single-objective gradient, and the angle between the two single-
objective gradient vectors:
φ = arccos
( ∇f1 · ((1− w∗)∇f1 + w∗∇f2)
|∇f1|| ((1− w∗)∇f1 + w∗∇f2) |
)
/ arccos




The amount of constraint decoupling, or the range of weighting values for which
the constraint decoupling conditions hold, will change with the objective scaling.
However, φ, based on the gradient directions will take a value between 0 and 1 and
will not change with objective scaling. Figure 7.5(c) illustrates this case where the
dashed line shows the limiting gradient direction for which the system design problem
will have the same solution as the single-objective problem f1. A normalized measure
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Algorithm for evaluating objective alignment and coupling measures for
multiple problem formulations figure produced by D.L. Peters
(1 − υ)∇f1 + υ∇f2, where υ is the minimum weighting value for which x∗ is the
system design problem solution.
Given a fixed set of constraints, increasing objective alignment will result in a
higher φ. Given a fixed set of objectives, decreasing satisfied-constraint alignment
will result in higher φ.
Figure 7.3 summarizes the steps described above into an algorithm for systemat-
ically analyzing the Pareto set for objective alignment and coupling. The “compare
results” step of the algorithm is illustrated in the next sections.
7.4 Pareto set analysis examples
Section 7.4.1 presents an example of Pareto set analysis applying the global mea-
sures. Section 7.4.2 presents an example of Pareto set analysis applying the local
measures.
154
Table 7.2: Explanation of fuel economy constraint
Constraint Description
g15
Minimum combined fuel economy rating must be greater than the minimum
fuel economy parameter
7.4.1 Pareto set analysis with global measures
This section illustrates a simplified vehicle design optimization problem that em-
ploys the scaling-based cost model from Chapter 5 and a simple logit model from the
literature [Boyd and Mellman (1980)].
Problem formulation
The engineering models are the same as described in Chapter 3. The constraint
set is the same as given as Equation (3.2) with the addition of a constraint:
g15 = zMPG − vMMPG ≤ 0 (7.15)
on fuel conusmption used to calculate Pareto points to the following problem using
the ε-constraint method [Osyczka (1984)]:
min f |f = [π, zMPG] (7.16)
by varying the minimum fuel economy constraint parameter vMMPG between the
nadir and ideal values of fuel economy fNMPG and f
◦
MPG. Table 7.2 gives a description
of the fuel economy constraint.
Vehicle simulations were configured to represent a standard automatic transmis-
sion front wheel drive vehicle with a gasoline engine. In addition to powertrain spec-
ifications (i.e., gear ratios, gear shifting schedule, engine number of cylinders, vee or
inline configuration, bore, and stroke, valvetrain configuration, and final drive ratio)
Cruise also receives other vehicle parameters as inputs, including curb weight, frontal
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area, drag coefficient, tire radius, and center of gravity location under various loads.
Over 30 parameters were tuned for midsize crossover vehicles based on data from one
2007 model. All other parameters were left at the default passenger vehicle levels.
Vehicle demand model
A logit model was chosen for representing demand, due to its ease of interpreta-
tion congruent with random utility theory [Train (2003)], and widespread use. We
considered only vehicles from a very narrow class and thus reduced the risk of violat-
ing the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption with the introduction or
exclusion of a particular vehicle. All other purchase possibilities are represented in
the utility of the outside good νog.
The choice share of a given product Pr(i) is defined for the logit model as the











δkα(zk) for k attributes, (7.17)
where νi is the systematic component of utility for product i, νog is the utility of the
outside good, δk is the systematic utility coefficient or part-worth corresponding to
attribute k, α is a function that relates vehicle characteristic zk to the systematic
utility expression.
From the literature of demand models for the automotive industry [Berry et al.
(1995); Petrin (2002); Berry et al. (2004)] we adopted a model similar to Boyd & Mell-
man [Boyd and Mellman (1980)]. It assumes aggregate (homogeneous) preferences,
a logit form of the choice model, and a utility model that is linear in the coefficients
with vehicle attributes: price, fuel consumption, the inverse of 0-60 acceleration time,
and the styling factor Styl1 based on external vehicle dimensions.
The Boyd & Mellman model was estimated using model year 1977 vehicle data,
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and as such, caution should be taken when interpreting results. Vehicle price was
converted to 1977 dollars using the consumer price index; 0-60 times improved dra-
matically from 13.8s in 1977 to 9.6s in 2007 [USEPA (2007)]. A 1s shift (rather than
the full 4.2s) to acceleration times generated vehicle designs similar to the existing
market for the baseline scenario implying that preference for acceleration increased.
Conveniently, the assumed price of gas in 1977 dollars was $0.70 (roughly $2.40
in 2007 dollars—at the low end of the observed range of gas price in 2007). The
average decrease in fuel consumption (≈ 30%), as tested by the EPA, is accounted
for by using the updated adjusted values [USEPA (2006b)] for fuel economy, rather
than the EPA test values, and then shifting the mpg value by the 0.7mpg remaining
difference, implying people value improvements in fuel economy at roughly the same
level but expect higher average fuel economies.
The model was further calibrated by setting market size to the total vehicles
sold in the US in 2007 (14.87 M), and νog was set to produce a total demand for
the 9 hypothetical vehicles roughly equivalent to the 2007 sales of the real vehicles
(≈ 600, 000). Adjusting market size and νog in this way rather than using the segment
market size and a modest νog did not shift the design decisions of Firm X, but did
provide downward pressure on prices to bring them inline with observed values.
Market demand for each vehicle is estimated to be the product of the market size
cap and the choice share. Other choice model formulations such as the mixed logit
[Train (2003)] allow for individual taste heterogeneity. Studying the impact of choice
model selection on the Pareto set outcomes could be the subject of future work.
Calibrating models between years is difficult because the purchase power of the
dollar has decreased, the average vehicle attributes have changed, and the average
price of vehicles in real dollars has increased [Berry et al. (1995)].
Attributes of the competing vehicles are listed in Table 7.3. Vehicle model names
are prefaced by ‘x-’, indicating that the zAcc060 and the zMPG attributes given are
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Table 7.3: Hypothetical midsize crossover vehicle market excluding Firm X vehicle
Model zAcc060 zMPG zL103 zW105 zH101 zSty1
B&M
Util.
xEdge 7.7 19 185.7 75.8 67.0 3.9 5.75
xEndeavor 8.4 19 190.8 73.6 69.6 3.80 5.42
xHighlander 7.9 19 184.6 71.9 67.9 3.78 5.52
xMurano 8.0 20 187.6 74.0 66.5 3.93 5.82
xSanta Fe 8.2 19 184.1 74.4 67.9 3.81 5.48
xXL7 7.9 18 190.8 73.6 69.6 3.80 5.43
xTribeca 8.3 19 189.8 73.9 66.4 3.97 5.68
xVue 8.4 21 181.3 71.5 66.5 3.8 5.64
based on our simulation—not on the corresponding vehicle model’s real world reported
performance. Time is given in seconds, fuel economy in miles/gallon, and length in
inches. The zStyl1 attribute and utility are dimensionless. We assume all vehicles use
regular gasoline.
Price Equilibrium Solution Strategy
Each competitor optimizes profit with respect to vehicle price given the product
designs and prices of all competitors. Firm X then optimizes product design and price
variables, concluding one iteration. Iterations continue until price changes fall below
a threshold constraint (≈ $80). The vehicle prices (and Firm X design variables) are
now set such that no firm can make a different decision that would improve its own
profits while the choices of the other firms remain fixed, thus approximating a Nash
equilibrium [Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)].
A complete product equilibrium process would allow each competitor to optimize
designs as well as prices with respect to all others’ designs and prices. However, given
the use of a homogenous multinomial logit model and identical underlying engineer-
ing and cost models, each firm would choose identical designs and prices, as seen in
[Michalek et al. (2004)]. Instead, assuming fixed competitor designs coincides with
vehicle planning where a firm makes some educated assumptions about the products
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14,870,000 9.1 8% 9
Relative Cost
Breakdown
Powertrain Chassis Body Wheels
0.3 0.35 0.3 0.05
Choice Model
Coefficients
δMPG δAcc060 δStyl1 δPrice
-0.339 0.375 1.37 -0.000286
competitors will produce. During product launch and subsequent sales, all competi-
tors are at liberty to adjust prices freely while the designs remain fixed. Competitive
behavior [Chintagunta et al. (2006)] among automotive manufacturers considering
the full market has been modeled, see for example [Sudhir (2001); Goldberg (1995)].
The simplified approach shown here includes competitive effects sufficient to illustrate
trends without greatly increasing the computational complexity of the model.
Design Scenarios
We examine design scenarios that translate into model changes and new Pareto
sets. The criterion alignment metrics and the overall objective values of the Pareto
sets are compared. We divide design scenarios into four ‘mechanisms’: technology,
preference, competition, and regulation. Table 7.4 gives the initial parameter values
for the baseline case. Table 7.5 lists each design scenario and the corresponding model
changes. Each model change is implemented individually, and all other parameter
values are kept at the baseline levels. The unscaled results are shown in Figure 7.4.
All design scenarios consider 9 producers including Firm X.
Baseline Case
The vehicle price (MSRP ), market share (within segment), and expected profit
for each firm are listed in Table 7.6 for thef ◦−profit solution. Table 7.7 shows the
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Powertrain cost 20% 40%
Preference
Accel. Indifference δAcc060 = 0








Price-cutting $21,000 (xVue) $23,000 (xVue)
Market size volatility 12,870,000 16,870,000
Regulation
Price-ceiling $20,000 $22,000 $24,000
Table 7.6:
Prices, market shares, and expected profits for all firms for the baseline
case
xEdge xMurano xHighlander xSanta Fe xTribeca
MSRP $26,900 $26,700 $26,000 $26,300 $25,900
Market Share 12% 13% 10% 9% 12%
Profit $314M $373M $197M $151M $319M
xVue xXL7 xEndeavor Firm X
MSRP $25,900 $26,900 $27,100 $27,400
Market Share 11% 10% 8% 15%
Profit $257M $193M $68M $543M
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Table 7.7:
Firm X vehicle attributes for ideal −profit and fuelconsump values for
the baseline case
Model zAcc060 zMPG zL103 zW105 zH101 zStyl1 Util.
Firm X f ◦−profit 7.2 18.4 196.6 74.4 67.0 4.05 6.03
Firm X f ◦fuelconsump 9.8 21.1 187.3 74.2 67.0 3.90 5.48
attribute values for f ◦−profit and f
◦
fuelconsump for the baseline case.
Technology
Two technology scenarios are considered. The drag coefficient is changed to 0.4
and 0.34 from 0.37, and the powertrain cost parameter is changed from 30% to 20%
and 40%. The difference in cost is absorbed evenly by the chassis and body subsys-
tems.
Preference
Individual preferences for products change over time based on externalities (e.g.,
rising fuel prices or increased public concern for global warming) and based on changes
to the performance levels and salience of the observable characteristics of a product.
Advances in technology and government regulation are two influences that may change
the observable product characteristics of a product such as the automobile. For
example, increased consumer interest may be placed on fuel economy and derivative
characteristics of advanced powertrains (e.g., range, access to refueling). Advertising
is another mechanism that influences preferences, but it is ignored here.
The importance of acceleration in the baseline case is contrasted to the case where
consumers are completely indifferent to 0-60 acceleration given that the vehicle meets
towing, top speed, and 30-50 mph acceleration requirements.
We postulate new fuel consumption coefficients in the demand model assuming
preference is proportional to cost of transportation in real dollars. This analysis as-
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sumes that preference for the other attributes with respect to price remain unchanged,
which has the unavoidable side effect of changing the elasticities between fuel con-
sumption and the other attributes. The coefficients are listed with the corresponding
fuel price in 2007 dollars: δMPG = {−.239, $1.69;−.339, $2.40;−.439, $3.10;−.639, $4.51}
Several alternative vehicle styling forms were considered. Three forms are re-
ported, i) A longer, lower, wider form, where increases in width are more important
than increases in length; ii) minimalist styling that emphasizes reduction in all three
exterior dimensions; iii) an “inverted” form that is taller, shorter, and thinner.
Changing parameter values or functional form of product attributes in the utility
model changes the computed values of utility. The utility of the outside good was
updated to preserve the relative difference between the average utility value of the 8
original vehicles and the utility of the outside good for all preference and regulatory
scenarios. Finally, all firms will react to changes in consumer preference. However,
only Firm X changes vehicle design in this example. The resulting profits should be
considered inflated relative to market expectations, but the trend in vehicle design
(i.e., the relative change of fuel economy) should be preserved.
Competition
Two scenarios are considered that deal with the competitive landscape facing
Firm X. First, the effect of a price-cutting strategy by another firm is examined
at approximately $3,000 and $5,000 below the baseline equilibrium price. Second,
market volatility is considered by varying annual US vehicle market size ± 2 million
vehicles.
Regulation
Numerous regulatory scenarios can be explored using the proposed framework.
Only one policy, a mandatory price ceiling at $24,000, $22,000, and $20,000, is re-
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ported here. A natural consequence of a price ceiling policy is that demand exceeds
supply. Losses by many firms in these scenarios indicate that the worst performing
firms would exit the market and fewer vehicles would be produced overall.
Discussion
The results of each design scenario, including the baseline case, are shown in
Figure 7.4 grouped by mechanism. The criterion alignment metrics are listed in
Table 7.8. The Scenario Dominance section below compares the relative objective
values of the Pareto sets across the scenarios, and the Tradeoff Metric section discusses
the criterion alignment metrics.
Vehicle length (zL103) is large at and shrinks along the Pareto frontier. Vehicle
cost, fuel consumption, and acceleration are all negatively correlated with vehicle
size. Vehicle height (zH101) is constrained by the minimum sitting height constraint.
Vehicle width (zW105) is constrained by the rollover constraint and vehicle length
and wheelbase are constrained by the minimum angle of departure and cargo volume
constraints. In the absence of preference valuation for cargo volume, legroom, or
other spatial features of the vehicle, Firm X will seek to build the smallest vehicle
possible. The style attribute, which rewards increases in length and width, moves the
design away from the constraint boundaries at the most profitable solutions. Vehicle
length, wheelbase, and width are above average for the hypothetical marketplace
and vehicle height is slightly below average. The minimum towing grade constraint
becomes active at f ◦fuelconsump.
The attainable set for all scenarios is limited by the same set of constraints on
vehicle characteristics. The scenarios have the effect of shifting output levels of the
objective functions (e.g., the technology scenarios) and shifting the boundary of the
attainable set that is Pareto optimal (e.g., the preference scenarios). New scenarios







































































































Figure 7.4: Results for all design scenarios showing −Profit vs. Fuel Consumption
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Baseline 5.7 131,000 103
Technology
CD = 0.34 6.1 142,000 109
CD = 0.40 7.4 117,000 93
Powertrain cost 20% 6.3 149,000 98
Powertrain cost 40% 5.3 118,000 107
Preference
Accel. Indifference 0.02 5,750 168
Fuel economy -0.239 5.3 186,000 102
Fuel economy -0.439 6.4 95,000 101











Price-cutting $21,000 5.7 131,000 102
Price-cutting $23,000 5.7 131,000 102
Market size volatility (12,870,000) 5.7 114,000 89
Market size volatility (16,870,000) 5.7 149,000 116
Regulation
Price-ceiling $24,000 6.1 87,000 80
Price-ceiling $22,000 7.2 57,000 60
Price-ceiling $20,000 0.3 10,000 98
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attainable set. On the other hand, the Pareto frontier in an unconstrained problem
would depend only on the gradients of the objective functions. Reviewing Figure 7.4
most of the Pareto sets follow a similar form characterized by a distinct “elbow”
separating a region of gradual decrease in profits for about 1/2 the fuel consumption
change from a steeper region of profit loss for the remaining fuel consumption change.
The similar form across most scenarios is a result of the similar constraint activity
across those scenarios. The top speed constraint is active up to the elbow in the
direction of decreasing fuel consumption and is no longer active beyond that point.
Also near the elbow, EngBore meets the lower bound imposed by the model. How-
ever, EngBoretoStroke does not reach its lower bound so the engine displacement
continues to decrease modestly as fuel consumption decreases.
Scenario Dominance
The globally dominant meta-Pareto set tracks along the market size of 16.87
million, then follows the indifference to acceleration, and then the CD = 0.34 scenario.
In the low fuel consumption region, expensive powertrains produce results in the
market similar to higher preference for fuel economy. When powertrains are expensive
(40% vs. 30%), fuel economy improves for the max profit solution; however, it is still
more profitable to balance acceleration and fuel economy rather than reduce engine
size and cost, and focus on fuel economy. Such a result may explain one reason why
many hybrids have been tuned towards performance and not solely to maximize fuel
economy.
Intuitively, increased market size increases profits. Non-intuitively, artificially
lowering the price of a single vehicle had a negligible effect on Firm X decisions. This
result demonstrates one of the weaknesses of the simple logit model: there is no way
to account for the substitution patterns we would expect, i.e., more sales for the
reduced price model coming from shifting demand within the segment rather than
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the entire vehicle fleet (the outside good). Preliminary studies using the segment size
as the market size and a modest value of outside good utility showed results for a
price cut by one firm very similar to a price ceiling on the entire segment.
Tradesoff Metric Comparison
Values for the three metrics are listed in Table 7.8. Each metric shows a range of
values across the analyzed scenarios. Area and sensitivity were computed using scale
factors of λ−profit = $100, 000 and λfuelconsump = 0.02 gal/100 mi.
The acceleration indifference scenario comes closest to showing how the bi-objective
problem can collapse to a single solution when the gradients of the two objectives are
very similar. The importance of the Styl1 attribute preserves a tradeoff. Another
type of collapse could occur when one objective becomes completely indifferent to the
other objective. This can occur when the gradients of each objective are uncoupled
or only weakly coupled. In other words, the objectives depend on few, if any, of the
same design variables.
Comparing the metric values and Figure 7.4 shows that localized effects of the
Pareto curves are not accounted for by the metrics. The tradeoff region of interest to
a vehicle producer is the region immediately around the max profit point. For most
scenarios, the tradeoff in this region is much more shallow than the overall tradeoff
as indicated by the sensitivity metric, and the curvature is much closer to 0 than
indicated by the curvature metric. The metrics could be reapplied to a designated
region of the Pareto curve to define metrics for local curvature, area, and sensitivity.
There are clear changes to the nature of the tradeoff as the MPG attribute in-
creases in importance. The area decreases as fNfuelconsump decreases. The curvature
decreases dramatically between the baseline and the δMPG = −0.639 case because
the shallow tradeoff region is no longer Pareto-optimal, and the sensitivity increases
because the range of fuel consumption decreases dramatically while the range of
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Table 7.9:





Technology + − − +
Preference + mixed mixed +
Competition − none − −
Regulation − mixed − mixed
profit changes less. The styling importance impact on profit and fuel consumption is
mixed. Particularly interesting is the Styl1(1) scenario where width is valued more
than length. Increased profits can be achieved and a firm is severely penalized for
decreasing fuel consumption.
Reduced drag coefficient leads to increase in the area metric as the Pareto set
improves compared to the baseline case, which is inconsistent with the trend in the
preference scenarios. One interpretation of these results is that improvements in
vehicle design (e.g., improved drag characteristics) have great potential for decreasing
environmental impact, but these changes alone will lead only to marginal changes at
f ◦−profit when they occur in isolation of other model changes.
Price ceiling scenarios decreased fuel consumption at the cost of reduced profit
levels. Trends for the metrics are summarized in Table 7.9. For example, the first line
of the table should be read, “As preferences change such that the objective values
of the Pareto set improve, curvature and area decrease while sensitivity increases.”
Some trends are not monotonic. Results for effective curvature were mixed over all the
scenarios. As a whole, the tradeoff metrics show increasing alignment for Pareto sets
with improved objective values when changes are made with respect to technology or
preference, and they show increasing alignment for Pareto sets with inferior objective
values when changes are made with respect to competition or regulation.
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Discussion
The area metric is of practical significance to decision makers in that larger tradeoff
area means more to gain (lose) in the tradeoff decision. The area metric also appears
to give the best overall assessment of criterion competition considering the working
definition of criteria alignment, i.e., both objectives achieve single objective optimality
simultaneously. The other two metrics show increased competition for most cases
when the area metric decreases. The smallest area values coincide with the smallest
curvature values, likely indicating that, as ideal values move closer together for a
given problem formulation, smaller regions of the attainable set boundary are Pareto
optimal, and are thus more and more closely approximated by a straight line. This
effect should be explored in other multi-objective problems with different Pareto
frontier shapes (e.g., a concave frontier), and future work should investigate directly
how the problem structure (i.e., objective gradients and constraint activity) relates
to the metrics. The curvature metric, which can be compared across problems, may
serve to classify multiobjective problems according to typical Pareto frontier shapes.
The enterprise vehicle design problem is an example of a class of problems where
decision maker preferences are heavily weighted to one objective (e.g., profit). The
sensitivity metric can be useful in such problems, especially if it is applied locally
around the solution. A firm considering producing a vehicle away from f ◦−profit for
strategic reasons could then formulate a risk assessment for each scenario given the
sensitivity of profit with respect to its choice. Scenarios with lower ∆Xs values will
be less sensitive to design choices away from f ◦−profit.
Another insight drawn from the metrics is that decreased objective competition
does not predicate superior solutions compared to a more competing scenario. For
example, one intuitive yet important trend in the results is that, when the area
metric decreases due to changes in the objective gradients (e.g., consumer indifference
to acceleration), the design scenario has potential to improve objective values for
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both stakeholders. However, when area decreases are due to changes in constraints
(e.g., a price ceiling), the objective values of the scenario decreases for at least one
stakeholder.
Caution should be taken in interpreting the results of this study. The intent
is not to represent a true market equilibrium, but to represent a design scenario
as it may appear to a vehicle manufacturer making assumptions about the vehicle
designs of competitors. Significant obstacles remain in studying maximum profit
formulations in vehicle design including questions about underlying demand model
validity, econometric interpretations of changes to the demand model parameters, and
realistic cost models, among others. Furthermore, other regulatory scenarios can be
considered, such as a CAFE standard, fuel tax, or CO2 tax. Therefore, the numerical
results presented here are useful in illustrating the proposed concept of public and
private alignment rather than suggesting specific decisions.
7.4.2 Pareto set analysis with local measures
We now demonstrate examples of problem formulation changes and observe the
corresponding changes to the Pareto set for a two-variable nonlinear programming
problem modified from Problem 10 in [Hock and Schittkowski (1981)]:
min [f1 = 0.5x
2
1 − 7x1, f2 = x22 − x1x2 − px2]>
subject to: x22 + 4x
2
1 − 25 ≤ 0, p = 7 (7.18)
The problem is illustrated graphically in Figure 7.5. Case (a) shows the unmodified
problem, case (b) shows the case where p = 5, and case (c) includes the additional
constraint x2 − 5 + 2x1 ≤ 0. The dashed line in case (c) indicates the degree of
constraint decoupling for the problem.
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Figure 7.5:
Graphical representation of problem given in Equation (7.18) and modi-
fications from Table 7.1. Panel (a) shows the unmodified problem. Panel
(b) shows the case where p = 5. Panel (c) shows the case where the
constraint x2 − 5 + 2x1 ≤ 0 has been added
ble 7.10. The results have been categorized by their reflection on the Pareto set.
Performance refers to the placement of the Pareto set in the objective space. When
one Pareto set dominates another Pareto set it is said to have improved performance.
Sensitivity refers to the the slope of the Pareto frontier. Evaluated locally, sensitivity
is defined as df ∗2 /df
∗
1 . Evaluated over the entire Pareto frontier it represents the cost
in one objective to achieve the ideal value for the other objective. Parity refers to
the similarity in the decision to be made in order to minimize each objective f1 and
f2 singly. One measure of parity is the measure of coincidence between ideal values
(||(xf◦1 −xf◦2 )||2). Complete parity requires that the decision maker chooses the iden-
tical decision in order to minimize both objectives, in other words, the objectives are
coincident. We use the polar cone angle of the negative objective gradients θ< eval-
uated at an ideal point xf
◦
1 as an alternative measure of parity given that objectives
with a polar cone angle = π will be coincident. A degenerate case of complete parity
is when the objectives are independent.
171
Examining Table 7.10, case (a) dominates the other cases and so is superior in
the performance criterion. However, if parity is important, then case (b) would be
superior. For reducing sensitivity of f2 with respect to f1 case (c) would be superior.
Table 7.10: Pareto Set Analysis Results
Criterion Case a b c
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It should be noted that objective alignment on the Pareto set as measured by the
polar cone of the objective gradients is different from the general notion of objective
alignment that is perhaps best characterized by the measure of coincidence. In fact
high polar cone angles along the Pareto frontier could be an indication of an undesir-
able problem formulation in some design scenarios. For example, in an unconstrained
bi-objective problem, by definition the polar cone angle will be 0 at all points along
the Pareto set. High polar cone angles along the Pareto set may imply that the
feasible design space is far away from both unconstrained objective optima.
Increased parity may similarly result from constraint tightening (either through
parameter changes or adding constraints). Both polar cone angle increases and lower
coincidence distance may also be achieved through reformulation of the objective
functions.
The notion of sensitivity is particularly useful for problems characterized by a pri-
mary objective and a secondary objective. For example in a product design problem
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with a market system objective such as maximize profit, a producer will primarily
be concerned with satisfying the profit objective although the producer may also be
concerned with other objectives such as environmental impact for strategic or other
reasons. In this case it would be valuable to assess the local sensitivity, or incre-
mental cost to the profit objective for decreases in environmental impact. Decreased
sensitivity may result from a decrease in the coupling term due to constraint refor-
mulation, objective reformulation, parameter/variable repartitioning, or modification
to parameter values.
7.5 Discussion
Systematically studying changes to the Pareto set due to changes to the multi-
objective formulation can yield deeper insights into the system-level design problem.
We motivate Pareto Set analysis, or comparing Pareto sets from alternative design
scenarios by abstracting the design problem to a decision making problem that in-
volves system specification and system identification. Changes to the design problem
at the specification or identification stages give rise to unique design scenerios with an
accompanying unique Pareto set in the case of multiobjective problems. The general
Pareto analysis approach involves selecting several Pareto efficient points for analysis.
At a minimum, the two ideal points should be selected. These points can be evaluated
for each change in problem formulation such as a change in the functional form of the
objective function or a repartitioning of variables and parameters. Numerical mea-
sures were then presented that describe each Pareto set in terms of its performance or
dominance over other problem formulations, sensitivity of one objective to changes in
the other objective, and the parity faced by the decision maker in the objective space
and in the decision space when considering the difference between the single-objective
solutions.
The desirability of a given Pareto set, or problem formulation, over another should
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be dictated by the design context. There are numerous design contexts where the
designer is concerned with the attainable solution set and not only a point design
solution. Such problems include the nested co-design problem described here and a
wide variety of problems where the “control,” or partitioned variable design decisions,
may be made asynchronously to the other design decisions. The performance, sensi-
tivity, and parity attributes of a particular design problem represent a multi-objective
problem of their own.
Plots of Pareto sets such as Figure 7.5 are typical and very useful analysis tools for
bi-objective problems. However, as computational expense increases, it is not always
feasible to generate a suitable graphical representation of the Pareto set. The methods
presented in this chapter provide a series of concrete steps to make the most out of
a small number of analysis runs by connecting the local behavior of a bi-objective
problem to the characteristics of the Pareto set. Future work may seek to extend
the numerical measures described here to higher-dimension problems where graphical
representation is similarly problematic.
7.6 Summary
We presented results using the three global metrics to measure bi-objective trade-
offs in the vehicle design problem. We illustrated how the metrics could be used to
discuss differences across design problem and market simulation problem scenarios of
the type formulated in Chapter 6.
We presented additional local measures that can be evaluated at individual Pareto
points and illustrated their application with a nonlinear programming example. Bor-
rowing from traditional system design from the design and control literature, we have
shown how the particular case of combined optimal design and optimal control, or
co-design, can be represented as a system design problem or alternatively as a bi-
objective programming problem with an artifact objective and a controller objective.
174
The coupling vector derived for a system problem with unidirectional coupling was
shown to be related to the alignment of competing objectives, as measured by the
polar cone of objective gradients, in the bi-objective programming formulation. We
also showed how the measure of constraint decoupling can be normalized when the
system problem is considered as a bi-objective one.
Chapter 8 illustrates the optimization results for numerous scenarios. The Pareto
sets are plotted for two different sets of scenarios. Following the approach illustrated
in Section 7.4.1 for the simplified automotive vehicle design example, the metrics
described in this chapter could be applied to the results in Chapter 8 to gain further
insight into the public versus private good tradeoff.
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CHAPTER VIII
Public Versus Private Tradeoff Studies in Vehicle
Design
The first goal of this chapter is to examine in practice the modeling framework that
has been proposed in the previous chapters including comparing differences between
different demand models and different cost models. The second goal of the chapter
is to examine the public versus private automotive vehicle design tradeoff problem in
the context of the results.
Vehicle manufacturers typically update and redesign the vehicles in their portfolio
over several years. Improving the fuel economy of the next vehicle scheduled for
introduction or redesign is one way a firm could consider reducing the environmental
impact of its fleet. The public versus private tradeoff problem is therefore posed as
the fuel consumption rating of the designed vehicle versus the expected firm profit.
Chapter 7 presented a simplified example based on studying a single vehicle class
in isolation. That study relied on the scaling cost model from Chapter 5 and a simple
logit model of demand from the literature [Boyd and Mellman (1980)]. This chapter
goes beyond that example by implementing the GTDI and HEV technology models
from Chapter 3, the two newly estimated demand models from Chapter 4 as well as a
mixed logit model from the literature [Berry et al. (1995)], the empirical cost model
and equilibrium cost model from Chapter 5, and the full US fleet price equilibrium as
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a subgame to the design problem as described in Chapter 6. The succeeding sections
present results from a range of design scenarios. Each design scenario is defined by the
number and name of the firms that are designing vehicles, the powertrain technology
of each vehicle, the demand model employed, the number of random coefficient draws
for each individual, and the cost model employed. For simplicity and consistency the
same 6563 individuals used to estimate the demand models from Chapter 4 were used
to execute the market simulations in this chapter except where noted. All scenarios
generate the optimal vehicle design of 1 to 3 midsize crossover vehicles. Each scenario
is solved for the two ideal points and three intermediate Pareto points of the firm profit
versus fuel consumption rating tradeoff.
The outcomes of interest for each scenario are the values of the design variables,
the vehicle attributes including price, the designed vehicle sales volume, the designing
firm’s profit, and measures of the environmental impact of the scenario. The measures
of environmental impact include fuel consumption rating of the designed vehicle,
expected annual fuel consumption from sales of the designed vehicle, the designing
firm’s projected fuel consumption from all vehicle sales, the expected midsize crossover
vehicle segment fuel consumption based on all midsize crossover vehicles sold, and
the expected US fleet fuel consumption based on all vehicles sold. Notably, the
annualized fuel consumption measures for the US fleet do not always fall with reduced
fuel consumption ratings of the designed vehicle illustrating that the public versus
private decision problem facing firms is more complex than simply improving the fuel
consumption of a single vehicle in their fleet.
The total market size M was fixed for all scenarios at 16,109,855 vehicles. This
is approximately the number of vehicle sales in 2006. While actual firm names are
referenced (Hyundai, Toyota, GM), it is noted that the design scenario results should
not be interpreted in the context of the 2006 market. As discussed in Chapters 5 and
6, the lack of alternative specific constants in the demand models means that vehicle
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share predictions do not match the 2006 market. Therefore, policy interpretations
including optimal design decisions should not be made with respect to the real market.
Section 1 develops the problem formulation used in each scenario. Section 2
presents the results for scenarios where a single firm designed a vehicle with a con-
ventional powertrain. Section 3 presents the results for scenarios where a single firm
designed a vehicle with a GTDI powertrain. Section 4 presents the results for sce-
narios where a single firm designed a vehicle with a hybrid powertrain. Section 5
presents results for scenarios where three firms designed vehicles of varying power-
trains. Section 6 compares the results across demand, cost, and powertrain models.
Section 7 discusses the public versus private tradeoff implications from the results.
Section 8 summarizes the chapter including points for future work.
8.1 Problem Formulation
The engineering models including the design variables are the same as described
in Chapter 3. The constraint set is the same as given as Equation (3.2) with the
addition of a constraint:
g15 = zMPG − vMMPG ≤ 0 (8.1)
on fuel conusmption used to calculate Pareto points to the following problem using
the ε-constraint method [Osyczka (1984)]:
min f | f = [πf , zMPG] (8.2)
by varying the minimum fuel economy constraint parameter vMMPG between the
nadir and ideal values of fuel economy fNMPG and f
◦
MPG. Table 7.2 gives a description
of the fuel economy constraint.
The profit objective πf is the firm profit. This means that the firm takes into
account the price and profitability of its entire fleet when setting design variable values
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for the designed vehicle. Additionally, profits are calculated based on an assumed
markup by the dealer. In other words, firm profits are determined by taking the
product of a vehicle’s sales and the margin between the firm cost and the price paid
by the dealer (i.e., not the consumer purchase price MSRP ). The price paid by the
dealer is assumed to be the MSRP less a percentage of the MSRP assigned to be
the percentage difference between the dealer invoice price and the MSRP as given in
the Chrome Systems database [Chrome Systems Inc. (2008)]. Consumer demand is
determined based on the MSRP . However, the price equilibrium subgame is executed
for firm profit and is therefore based on dealer price rather than MSRP .
Vehicle simulations were configured to represent a standard automatic transmis-
sion front wheel drive vehicle. In addition to powertrain specifications (i.e., gear
ratios, gear shifting schedule, engine number of cylinders, vee or inline configuration,
bore, and stroke, valvetrain configuration, and final drive ratio) the engineering de-
sign model as described in Chapter 3 also receives other vehicle parameters as inputs,
including curb weight, frontal area, drag coefficient, tire radius, and center of gravity
location under various loads. Over 30 parameters were tuned for midsize crossover
vehicles based on data from one 2007 model.
As described in Chapter 6, computations proceeded with designing firms maxi-
mizing profit until based on the specific market simulation, the convergence tolerance
on changes in design attributes was met. All scenarios were executed as two-stage
game formulations where the vehicle prices for the entire market were solved as a
subgame to the overall vehicle design problem. These formulations are described in
Section 6.1.2.
Unless otherwise noted the population for the BLP95 model was generated from
1000 random draws from a lognormal distribution representing income. The pop-
ulation for Model 1 and Model 2 was generated from the identical 6563 individual
survey sample used in the model estimations. One draw for the random coefficients
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was taken for each individual. The lower bounds on the scaled engine bore variable
were lowered from -1 to -1.5 for the conventional model, from -1 to -2 for the GTDI
and HEV model, and the upper bound on engine bore was raised from 1 to 2 for the
HEV model. This was done because it was noticed that the engine bore variables were
consistently hitting their bounds. Relaxing the constraints allowed the final drive ra-
tio and engine bore to stroke ratios to adjust to more common values. The resulting
optimal engine displacements and horsepower ratings with unconstrained engine bore
values were in the range of midsize crossovers in the market in 2006 although lower
than the 2007 Ford Edge after which the conventional vehicle model was originally
patterned.
Tolerances for the price equilibrium game for Model 1 and Model 2 were 1e-11
for minimum choice share to be included in calculation Ptol, 1e-8 for the maximum
combined gradient norm Gtol, and 1e-8 for the minimum improving step size rstol.
Tolerances for the price equilibrium game for the BLP95 model were the same for the
minimum choice share and 1e-12 for Gtol, and 1e-15 for rstol. The price equilibrium
calculation consistently converged according to the combined gradient norm criterion
as defined in Equation (6.6).
The convergence tolerance for the design game ztol was 1e-3. Attribute differences
were normalized over the attribute value from the preceding iteration. This means
that a ztol =1e-3 required that no vehicle attribute deviated by more than 1/10th of
1 percent from the previous iteration values.
The optimization algorithm implemented for the design problem was a version
of sequential quadratic programming implemented in Matlab under the optimization
function ‘fmincon’. Gradients were computed using finite differencing with the for-
ward difference method. The maximum difference was set to 1e-1. The minimum
difference was set to 1e-2. The tolerance on the design variables was set to 1e-6. The
tolerance on the objective function was set to 1e+2. The tolerance on the constraints
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was set to 1e-5. The objective function values represented dollar values and were
typically on the order of 1e+8–1e+9. The larger than typical tolerance on the objec-
tive function is therefore an artifact of objective scale. The optimization algorithm
would terminate when changes in the objective function were on the order of 1e+1
to 1e+3 dollars. This behavior was deemed suitable given the noise from the price
equilibrium game and the discontinuities introduced by computing the weighted sum
of the choice shares from each individual for each vehicle alternative for changes in
the vehicle design.
8.2 Single Designed Vehicle with Conventional Powertrain
Results are presented in this section for various design scenarios where a single
firm has been selected as the designing firm and a single midsize crossover vehicle
with a conventional gasoline engine has been selected as the designed vehicle. The
subsections are organized in order to facilitate comparison between problem formula-
tion differences in the design scenarios. Design scenarios are compared across demand
models and cost models (Section 8.2.1), designing firms, the number of random co-
efficient draws per individual in the simulated population, and changes in consumer
preference for fuel consumption (Section 8.2.2). We report the values of the design
variables, the vehicle attributes including price, the designed vehicle sales volume,
and the designing firm’s profit for each scenario. We present the Pareto sets for the
profit versus fuel consumption tradeoff for an representative scenario in the discus-
sion in Section 8.2.3 . Comparisons of the other environmental impact metrics are
presented in Section 8.7.
8.2.1 Comparing Results across Demand and Cost Models
Table 8.1 presents the design variable values for design scenarios with a single
designed vehicle and a single designing firm (Hyundai). Table 8.2 presents the vehicle
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attributes for design scenarios with a single designed vehicle and a single designing
firm (Hyundai), and Table 8.3 presents the simulated market outcomes. Each of the
scenarios reported is a maximum profit scenario. In other words, there was no con-
straint set on vehicle fuel consumption. The table rows are labeled by demand model
(BLP95, Model 1, Model 2) and by cost model (Emp, Eq). Examining the design
variables in Table 8.1 shows that there are large differences between the optimal vehi-
cle designs under the BLP95 model versus the new models. There are no significant
differences in the optimal vehicle designs between Model 1 and Model 2, and there
are small differences in the designs between the empirical and the equilibrium cost
model.
The BLP95 vehicle has a large engine and small body compared to the Model
1 and Model 2 vehicles leading to a lower fuel economy rating and higher power to
weight ratio as shown in Table 8.2. The design differences between the empirical and
equilibrium cost models for Model 1 and Model 2 led to small differences in the engine
displacement, the power to weight ratio, and other performance metrics.
Referencing the market outcomes found in Table 8.3 shows that the BLP95 model
suggests a low price and achieves very low sales volume compared with the Model 1
and Model 2 results with the same empirical cost model. The empirical cost model
for Model 1 and Model 2 projects higher prices, sales volumes, and profits compared
to the equilibrium cost model. Model 2 consistently prices lower than Model 1 and
achieves higher sales volume and higher profits on the designed model. However,
Model 1 projects higher overall firm profits than Model 2. The BLP95 demand
model favors Hyundai in terms of total sales, and the Model 1 demand model with














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.2.2 Comparing Results across Firms, Fuel Economy Preference, and
Draws
Table 8.4 presents the design variable values for design scenarios with a single
designed vehicle and a single designing firm. All scenarios employ the Model 2 demand
model and the equilibrium cost model. However, the first three rows represent three
different designing firms (Hyundai, Toyota, or General Motors). The fourth row
represents a case where the mean of the random coefficient for fuel consumption in
the demand model has been doubled from −0.8553 to −1.7106. The fifth row presents
results for the case that the number of draws per individual from the distribution of
random coefficients was 40 rather than 1. Table 8.5 presents the vehicle attributes for
the same design scenarios as Table 8.4 and Table 8.6 presents the simulated market
outcomes for the same scenarios. Each of the scenarios reported is a maximum profit
scenario. In other words, there was no constraint set on vehicle fuel consumption.
The table rows are labeled by designing firm (Hyundai,Toyota, General Motors), the
number of draws (1, 40), and row 4 of each table indicates that fuel consumption
preference has been doubled (2xMPG).
Tables 8.7-8.9 present additional results for design scenarios with differing number
of draws using Model 1 demand and the equilibrium cost model. In this case a subset
of only 500 individuals is used from the full 6563 individuals from the estimation
population. The smaller population allowed a higher number of draws to be tested,
in this case 128, without running into computer memory constraints. The top row
presents results from a scenario with 1 draw for each individual from the distribution
of random coefficients, and the bottom row presents the results from a scenario with
128 draws. Examining the design variables in Table 8.4 shows that there are no
differences in design variables across designing firms, fuel economy preference, and
number of draws except for very small differences in the final drive ratio for different





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ratio in the increased preference for fuel economy scenarios. These differences were
not large enough to change the fuel economy and horsepower to weight attributes at
the reported precision in Table 8.5.
The Hyundai and Toyota vehicles report similar prices in Table 8.6. However,
the Toyota vehicle has double the sales volume. The GM vehicle has the lowest
price and a sales volume in between the Hyundai and Toyota vehicle. Although
the case with the increased fuel economy preference did not lead to design changes,
the market outcome resulted in simultaneously higher price and higher sales volume
for the Hyundai vehicle. There are small differences in price, sales, and firm profit
between the 1 Draw and the 40 Draw case. Sales volume and profit at the designed
vehicle and firm level all declined in the 40 Draw case.
Examining the design variables in Table 8.7 shows that there are no differences in
design variables across the number of random coefficient draws. There are noticeable
difference in the projected market outcomes just as there were market differences
between the 1 Draw case and the 40 Draw case with the 6563 population in Table 8.6.
In this case increasing the number of draws led to a lower designed vehicle price and
lower sales volume.
8.2.3 Discussion
The primary finding from the results in this section is the similarity in design
solutions across all scenarios with the exception of the BLP95 scenarios. The design
solutions are all highly constrained. The constraints come from the specific require-
ments to stay within the midsize crossover vehicle class in terms of size and towing
capacity. The range of size for a midsize crossover vehicle in terms of vehicle footprint
is very similar to a midsize sedan. The average consumer according to Model 1 prefers
larger vehicles, and the average consumer’s ideal footprint according to Model 2 is




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in size over the allowable range of size for a midsize crossover vehicle. The market
simulations which then take into account the change in demand for the change in cost
to produce a larger vehicle all suggested that firms should make the largest vehicle
possible. In this case the vehicle size was limited by a practical constraint on the
wheelbase design variable, a practical constraint on the vehicle width, and an SAE
specification on departure angle that prohibits the tail end of the vehicle protruding
too far from the rear wheels.
The other result that was common across the scenarios was that each scenario
exhibited the same tradeoff solution between power to weight ratio and fuel con-
sumption. This may have resulted because the degrees of freedom of the powertrain
variables were taken away by the gradeability constraint and the top speed constraint.
Again it appears that for Model 1 and Model 2 high power to weight ratios were not
valued as highly as a larger, more fuel efficient, and less expensive vehicles. Anecdo-
tally, Ford introduced a midsize crossover vehicle to compete in the segment focused
on in this study in 2007. Then, they introduced a larger slower crossover in 2009.
The trend across the crossover segment has been to lengthen the vehicle with even
some small crossovers such as the Toyota RAV4 achieving third row seating.
The designed vehicle according to the BLP95 model in Section 8.2.1 projects lower
sales than the other demand models because consumers according to the BLP95 model
are more price sensitive. Sales are then weighted to the very least expensive vehicles.
The design constraints on size and towing capability inhibit the designed vehicle from
becoming smaller and less costly to build, and so it is not competitive with the least
expensive vehicles in the market. Additionally, the BLP95 model scenario predicts
higher total sales for Hyundai than in the other scenarios because Hyundai has several
small inexpensive models on the market.
The scenarios that combine the empirical or equilibrium cost models with the
Model 1 or Model 2 demand model result in grossly inflated profits compared to
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the real market. The combination of demand and cost model result in per vehicle
profit margins that are very large. We conjecture that introducing alternative specific
constants would resolve this issue by increasing sales volume of less expensive cars
and reducing sales volume of luxury models. The overall effect would be downward
pressure on prices in the case of the empirical cost model and higher equilibrium costs
in the case of the equilibrium cost model.
Model 2 marginally benefits smaller less expensive cars compared to Model 1 as
seen in the predicted market shares plot in Figure 4.3. Shares and designed vehicle
profit are therefore higher for Model 2. However, total firm profits are higher for
Model 1. The higher firm profits for Model 1 versus Model 2 could be some evidence
that a demand model that resolved the mismatch between actual and predicted sales
would resolve the inflated profit margins.
The small design differences that were observed between designing firms in Sec-
tion 8.2.2 may mean that different firms are motivated to design different vehicles
based on their specific context. Whether these differences are driven by differences in
brand value or by a firm’s existing portfolio or both should be a topic of future work.
For the given problem formulation these details may be difficult to determine because
the design decisions are in a highly constrained space. These points of exploration
are in addition to exploring the differences that emerge when firms have different
technology and cost capabilities.
For the case of Hyundai as the designing firm it appears that increasing the number
of draws decreases sales volume and profit. More runs can be taken in future work to
examine wether this result is stable and if it holds for other firms or designed vehicle
segments.
Figure 8.1 shows the public versus private tradeoff with various measures for
the public tradeoff for the design scenario from Tables 8.1-8.3. Figure 8.1(a) shows
the designed vehicle fuel consumption rating in gallons per 100 miles plotted versus
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the firm’s profit1. As the designed vehicle is constrained to improve fuel economy
beyond the maximum profit design firm profit decreases. While the initial thought
was to use the fuel consumption rating of the designed vehicle to represent the public
interest (Figure 8.1(a)), the market simulation results indicate that the aggregate
fuel consumption of the US fleet can actually increase rather than decrease when
the designed vehicle fuel consumption is reduced. This is the case for the design
scenarios with the Model 2 demand model and either the empirical or the equilibrium
cost model.
Figure 8.1(b) shows how the sales-weighted fuel consumption rating for a given
firm (Hyundai) changes with change in the designed vehicle. The fuel consumption
rating decreases with decreasing designed-vehicle fuel-consumption for all scenarios.
The firm sales-weighted fuel consumption rating for the BLP95 scenario is much
lower than the other scenarios. This is again indicative of the sales mix under the
BLP95 scenario that is heavily weighted towards less expensive vehicles with higher
fuel economies.
Figure 8.1(c) shows the fuel consumption of the midsize crossover segment. The
reporting is given in average-vehicle-mile-traveled gallons. What this means is that we
can calculate a projected annual fuel consumption of the new midsize crossover vehicle
sales by assigning an average vehicle-miles-traveled to the segment car buyers. For ex-
ample, if the average-vehicle-miles-traveled per new car buyer were 12,000 miles/year
and the segment per average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel consumption was 16,000 gal-
lons, then the projected annual fuel consumption of the new midsize crossover sales
would be 12, 000× 16, 000 = 192× 106 gallons of gasoline.
We can also calculate an average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel consumption for the
entire US fleet. These results for each scenario are presented in Figure 8.1(d). The
increasing aggregate fuel consumption in the Model 2 scenarios resulting from de-
1Here profit is listed with negative values as a convention so that the improving direction is
toward the bottom left corner of the plot
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US Fleet per Average-Vehicle-Mile-Traveled
Fuel Consumption, 1e4 of gallons
Figure 8.1:
Pareto results for a single conventional designed vehicle with Model 2
demand model and equilibrium cost model (a) Vehicle fuel consumption
rating in gallons per 100 miles versus negative firm profit; (b) Firm sales-
weighted vehicle fuel consumption rating in gallons per 100 miles versus
negative firm profit; (c) Segment per average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel
consumption in 10,000’s of gallons versus negative firm profit; (d) US fleet
per average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel consumption in 10,000’s of gallons
versus negative firm profit;
creasing the fuel consumption for the designed vehicle beyond the maximum profit
value indicates that potential buyers substitute away from the designed vehicle to a
vehicle that on average is less fuel efficient. In the other scenarios they substitute on
average to a vehicle that is more fuel efficient.
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8.3 Single Designed Vehicle with GTDI Powertrain
Results are presented in this section for various design scenarios where a single
firm has been selected as the designing firm and a single midsize crossover vehicle with
a GTDI gasoline engine has been selected as the designed vehicle. The subsections are
organized in order to facilitate comparison between problem formulation differences in
the design scenarios. Design scenarios are compared across demand and cost models
(Section 8.3.1) and across designing firms (Section 8.3.2). We report the values of
the design variables, the vehicle attributes including price, the designed vehicle sales
volume, and the designing firm’s profit for each scenario. We present the Pareto sets
for the profit versus fuel consumption tradeoff for each of the different designing firms
scenarios in the discussion in Section 8.3.3. Comparisons of the other environmental
impact metrics are presented in Section 8.7
8.3.1 Comparing Results across Demand and Cost Models
Table 8.10 presents the design variable values for design scenarios with a single
designed vehicle and a single designing firm (Hyundai). Table 8.11 presents the vehicle
attributes for design scenarios with a single designed vehicle and a single designing
firm (Hyundai), and Table 8.12 presents the simulated market outcomes. Each of
the scenarios reported is a maximum profit scenario. In other words, there was no
constraint set on vehicle fuel consumption. The table rows are labeled by demand
model (BLP95, Model 1, Model 2) and by cost model (Emp, Eq). Examining the
design variables in Table 8.10 shows that there are large differences between the
optimal vehicle designs under the BLP95 model versus the new models. There are
small differences in the optimal vehicle designs between Model 1 and Model 2 and
between the empirical and equilibrium cost models.
The BLP95 vehicle has a large engine and small body compared to the Model




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































leading to a lower fuel economy rating and higher power to weight ratio as shown in
Table 8.11. The design differences between the Model 1 and Model 2 scenarios led
to small differences in the engine displacement, the power to weight ratio, and other
performance metrics.
Referencing the market outcomes found in Table 8.12 shows that the BLP95 model
suggests a low price and achieves very low sales volume compared with the Model 1
and Model 2 results with the same empirical cost model. The empirical cost model
for Model 1 and Model 2 projects higher prices, but lower sales volumes and profits
compared to the equilibrium cost model. Model 2 consistently prices lower than
Model 1 and achieves higher sales volume and higher profits on the designed model.
Model 2 also projects higher overall firm profits than Model 1 for the equilibrium cost
model, but lower overall firm profits for the equilibrium model. The BLP95 demand
model favors Hyundai in terms of total sales, and the Model 1 demand model with the
empirical cost model again projects the highest firm profits similar to the conventional
technology case.
8.3.2 Comparing Results across Designing Firms
Table 8.13 presents the design variable values for design scenarios with a single
designed vehicle and a single designing firm. All scenarios employ the Model 1 demand
model and the equilibrium cost model. However, the first three rows represent three
different designing firms (Hyundai, Toyota, or General Motors). Table 8.14 presents
the vehicle attributes for the same design scenarios as Table 8.13 and Table 8.15
presents the simulated market outcomes for the same scenarios. Each of the scenarios
reported is a maximum profit scenario. In other words, there was no constraint set
on vehicle fuel consumption. The table rows are labeled by designing firm (Hyundai,
Toyota, General Motors). Examining the design variables in Table 8.13 shows that
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bore, final drive ratio, and engine bore to stroke ratios for different designing firms.
These differences were not large enough to change the fuel economy, and only the
GM scenario reports a different power to weight ratio at the reported precision in
Table 8.14.
The market performance is very similar to the conventional technology case.
Hyundai and Toyota vehicles report very similar prices in Table 8.15. However, the
Toyota vehicle has more than double the sales volume. The GM vehicle has the lowest
price and a sales volume in between the Hyundai and Toyota vehicle.
8.3.3 Discussion
powertrain difference more noticeable perhaps because technology able to achieve
a higher fuel economy so closer to a saturated level with fuel economy
The GTDI technology allows the designed vehicle to achieve higher fuel economy
while still meeting the gradeability and top speed constraint. The Model 1 and
Model 2 demand models push the design in this way while maintaining the largest
vehicle possible. The BLP95 scenario produces a smaller powerful vehicle similar to
the conventional case. Overall the designs are again very similar across scenarios.
One reason that powertrain differences are slightly more noticeable in the GTDI
scenarios may be because fuel economy is higher. The marginal benefit of increasing
fuel economy may be closer to the marginal benefit of increasing the power to weight
ratio for example.
The design solutions again are all highly constrained. The constraints come from
the specific requirements to stay within the midsize crossover vehicle class in terms
of size and towing capacity. The Model 2, empirical cost model case does not strictly
constrained by the top speed constraint. Both Model 1 and Model 2 reward increases
in size over the allowable range of size for a midsize crossover vehicle. The market
simulations which then take into account the change in demand for the change in cost
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to produce a larger vehicle all suggested that firms should make the largest vehicle
possible. In this case the vehicle size was limited by a practical constraint on the
wheelbase design variable, a practical constraint on the vehicle width, and an SAE
specification on departure angle that prohibits the tail end of the vehicle protruding
too far from the rear wheels.
The other result that was common across the scenarios was that each scenario
exhibited a very similar tradeoff solution between power to weight ratio and fuel con-
sumption. This may have resulted because the degrees of freedom of the powertrain
variables were taken away by the gradeability constraint and the top speed constraint.
Again it appears that for Model 1 and Model 2 high power to weight ratios were not
valued as highly as a larger, more fuel efficient, and less expensive vehicles.
The designed vehicle according to the BLP95 model in Section 8.2.1 projects lower
sales than the other demand models because consumers according to the BLP95 model
are more price sensitive. Sales are then weighted to the very least expensive vehicles.
The design constraints on size and towing capability inhibit the designed vehicle
from becoming smaller and less costly to build, and so it is not competitive with
the least expensive vehicles in the market. Additionally, the BLP95 model scenario
predicts higher total sales for Hyundai than in the other scenarios because Hyundai
has several small inexpensive models on the market. It appears that for the designed
vehicle in the BLP95 scenario the maximum profit design was to differentiate as much
as possible from the rest of the Hyundai portfolio and capture what was available of
a very small market for high power to weight ratio.
Just as in the conventional technology case the scenarios that combine the empir-
ical or equilibrium cost models with the Model 1 or Model 2 demand model result
in grossly inflated profits compared to the real market. The combination of demand
and cost model result in per vehicle profit margins that are very large. We conjecture
that introducing alternative specific constants would resolve this issue by increasing
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sales volume of less expensive cars and reducing sales volume of luxury models. The
overall effect would be downward pressure on prices in the case of the empirical cost
model and higher equilibrium costs in the case of the equilibrium cost model.
Model 2 marginally benefits smaller less expensive cars compared to Model 1 as
seen in the predicted market shares plot in Figure 4.3. Shares and designed vehicle
profit are therefore higher for Model 2. However, total firm profits are split. In the
equilibrium cost case, firm profits are higher for Model 2, and in the empirical cost
case profits are higher for Model 1.
The small design differences that were observed between designing firms in Sec-
tion 8.3.2 may mean that different firms are motivated to design different vehicles
based on their specific context. Whether these differences are driven by differences in
brand value or by a firm’s existing portfolio or both should be a topic of future work.
For the given problem formulation these details may be difficult to determine because
the design decisions are in a highly constrained space. These points of exploration
are in addition to exploring the differences that emerge when firms have different
technology and cost capabilities.
Figure 8.2 shows the public versus private tradeoff with various measures for the
public tradeoff for the design scenario from Tables 8.13-8.15. Figure 8.2(a) shows
the designed vehicle fuel consumption rating in gallons per 100 miles plotted versus
the firm’s profit2. As the designed vehicle is constrained to improve fuel economy
beyond the maximum profit design, firm profit decreases. While the initial thought
was to use the fuel consumption rating of the designed vehicle to represent the public
interest (Figure 8.2(a)), the market simulation results indicate that the aggregate
fuel consumption of the US fleet can actually increase rather than decrease when the
designed vehicle fuel consumption is reduced. This is the case for all of the design
2Here profit is listed as a change from the profit at the maximum profit case. This allows data
for all three firms to be presented on the same plots. A positive profit value actually indicates a
decrease in profit of the given magnitude. This notation maintains the convention that the improving
direction is toward the bottom left corner of the plot
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Pareto results for a single GTDI designed vehicle with Model 1 demand
model and equilibrium cost model; (a) Vehicle fuel consumption rating in
gallons per 100 miles versus negative firm profit; (b) Firm sales-weighted
vehicle fuel consumption rating in gallons per 100 miles versus negative
firm profit; (c) Segment per average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel consump-
tion in 10,000’s of gallons versus negative firm profit; (d) US fleet per
average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel consumption in 10,000’s of gallons ver-
sus negative firm profit;
Figure 8.2(b) shows how the sales-weighted fuel consumption rating for a given
firm (Hyundai, Toyota, or GM) changes with change in the designed vehicle. The
fuel consumption rating decreases with decreasing designed-vehicle fuel-consumption
for Hyundai, marginally for Toyota, and actually increases very slightly for GM. This
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shows that the sales-weighted average fuel consumption for Hyundai without sales
from the designed vehicle is lower, it is slightly lower for Toyota, and it is higher
for GM. It also shows that GM has better substitutes for the designed vehicle than
Hyundai, for example. They both lose about 41,000 total vehicle sales in the scenario
where the designed vehicle has minimum fuel consumption. This was on a loss of
43,000 designed vehicle sales for Hyundai and 87,000 designed vehicle sales for GM.
As a percentage of total sales the GM loss is much smaller (1% vs. 10%).
Figure 8.2(c) shows the fuel consumption of the midsize crossover segment. The
reporting is given in average-vehicle-mile-traveled gallons. What this means is that we
can calculate a projected annual fuel consumption of the new midsize crossover vehicle
sales by assigning an average vehicle-miles-traveled to the segment car buyers. For ex-
ample, if the average-vehicle-miles-traveled per new car buyer were 12,000 miles/year
and the segment per average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel consumption was 16,000 gal-
lons, then the projected annual fuel consumption of the new midsize crossover sales
would be 12, 000 × 16, 000 = 192 × 106 gallons of gasoline. The segment fuel con-
sumption is going down both because of the increased fuel efficiency of the designed
vehicle, but also because of the reduction in sales of the designed vehicle. Only a
fraction of the consumers that substitute away from the designed vehicle will remain
in the narrowly defined midsize crossover segment.
We can also calculate an average-vehicle-mile-traveled fuel consumption for the
entire US fleet. The results for each scenario are presented in Figure 8.1(d). The
increasing aggregate fuel consumption for all firms beyond the third decrease in de-
signed vehicle fuel consumption results from potential buyers substituting away from
the designed vehicle to a vehicle that on average is less fuel efficient. The behavior in
this plot can be contrasted with Figure 8.1(d), where for the Model 1 scenarios the
US fleet fuel consumption always decreased. We can interpret this by noting that the
maximum profit design for the GTDI technology has a much higher fuel economy to
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begin with than the conventional technology design. When buyers substitute away
from this vehicle there reaches a point where the benefit from the (decreasing) sales
of the designed vehicle are outweighed by the higher fuel consumption values of the
substitute vehicles.
8.4 Single Designed Vehicle with HEV Powertrain
Results are presented in this section for various design scenarios where a single
firm has been selected as the designing firm and a single midsize crossover vehicle with
an HEV powertrain has been selected as the designed vehicle. The subsections are
organized in order to facilitate comparison between problem formulation differences in
the design scenarios. Design scenarios are compared across demand and cost models
(Section 8.4.1). We report the values of the design variables, the vehicle attributes
including price, the designed vehicle sales volume, and the designing firm’s profit for
each scenario.
8.4.1 Comparing Results across Demand and Cost Models
Table 8.16 presents the design variable values for design scenarios with a single
designed vehicle and a single designing firm (Hyundai). Table 8.17 presents the vehicle
attributes for design scenarios with a single designed vehicle and a single designing
firm (Hyundai), and Table 8.18 presents the simulated market outcomes. Each of
the scenarios reported is a maximum profit scenario. In other words, there was no
constraint set on vehicle fuel consumption. The table rows are labeled by demand
model (BLP95, Model 1, Model 2) and by cost model (Emp, Eq). Examining the
design variables in Table 8.16 shows that the only difference between the optimal
vehicle designs under the BLP95 model versus the new models are the engine bore
and engine bore to stroke ratio. There are no differences in the optimal vehicle designs


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The BLP95 vehicle has a larger engine but with smaller horsepower and the same
large body compared to the Model 1 and Model 2 vehicles. This is different than
the other two technologies where the BLP95 scenarios had small vehicles and more
powerful engines.
Referencing the market outcomes found in Table 8.18 shows that the BLP95 model
suggests a lower price and achieves extremely low sales volume compared with the
Model 1 and Model 2 results with the same empirical cost model. The empirical cost
model for Model 1 and Model 2 projects higher prices, but lower sales volumes and
profits compared to the equilibrium cost model. Model 2 prices lower than Model 1 for
the empirical cost model but higher than Model 1 for the equilibrium cost model. In
both cases the Model 2 scenario achieves higher sales volume and higher profits on the
designed model. Model 2 also projects higher overall firm profits than Model 1. The
BLP95 demand model no longer favors Hyundai in terms of total sales given the high
popularity of the HEV designed vehicle in the other demand model scenarios. The
Model 2 equilibrium costs scenario, in particular, has very high HEV sales volume.
An oversight in the HEV simulations was not updating the power to weight ratio
to reflect the benefit of the electric machines. The additional effective horsepower for
the HEV vehicle because of the electric machines was accounted for in the vehicle mass
and vehicle cost calculations. However, it was not added to the vehicle attributes used
by the demand models. Correcting for this oversight would lead to higher power to
weight ratios and presumably higher demand for these vehicles than already projected.
8.4.2 Discussion
The HEV results are substantially different than the other two technologies. The
designed vehicles all have very high performance characteristics in terms of towing
and acceleration, and the fuel economy is also very high. The designed vehicles are
much more expensive than the other technology cases. However, the combination of
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high attribute levels more than overcomes the high price for consumers in the Model 1
and Model 2 scenario where sales volumes and profits are the highest of any scenario.
8.5 Three Designing Firms with one Designed Vehicle Each
Results are presented in this section for various design scenarios where three firms
have been selected as the designing firms and a single midsize crossover vehicle from
each firm is selected as the designed vehicles. Each firm is assigned a particular
powertrain technology. The subsections are organized in order to facilitate comparison
between problem formulation differences in the design scenarios. Design scenarios
are compared across demand models where all firms produce conventional designs
(Section 8.5.1) and across demand models and technology assignment (Section 8.5.2).
We report the values of the design variables, the vehicle attributes including price,
the designed vehicle sales volume, and the designing firm’s profit for each scenario.
Comparisons of the other environmental impact metrics are presented in Section 8.7
8.5.1 Comparing Results across Demand Models for Conventional De-
signs
Table 8.19 presents the design variable values for design scenarios with three de-
signed vehicles and three designing firms (Hyundai, Toyota, and GM). Table 8.20
presents the vehicle attributes for design scenarios with three designed vehicles and
three designing firms (Hyundai, Toyota, and GM), and Table 8.21 presents the simu-
lated market outcomes. Each of the scenarios reported is a maximum profit scenario.
In other words, there was no constraint set on vehicle fuel consumption. The table
rows are labeled by demand model (Model 1, Model 2), by cost model (Eq), and
by the designing firm (Hyundai, Toyota, Japan). Examining the design variables
in Table 8.19 shows that there are only small differences in final drive and engine


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































designs are very similar to the single designed vehicle scenarios in Section 8.2.2.
The attribute values for the three designed vehicles in Table 8.20 are also very
similar to the respective single designed vehicle cases in Section 8.2.2. The design
differences between the Model 1 and Model 2 scenarios led to small differences in the
engine displacement, vehicle mass and acceleration times.
Referencing the market outcomes found in Table 8.21 shows that again similar to
the single designed vehicle cases, Hyundai and Toyota have similar prices and GM
has a much lower price. Toyota and GM have similar sales volumes, and Hyundai has
less than half the others’ sales volumes. The Model 1 scenario has higher prices and
lower sales volume than the Model 2 scenario. The designed vehicle profits are higher
in the Model 2 scenario, but the firm profits are higher in the Model 1 scenario.
8.5.2 Comparing Results across Designing Firms for Multiple Technolo-
gies
Table 8.22 presents the design variable values for design scenarios with three de-
signed vehicles and three designing firms assigned to a particular technology (Hyundai,
Conventional or GTDI; Toyota, GTDI or Conventional; GM, HEV). Table 8.23
presents the vehicle attributesfor design scenarios with three designed vehicles and
three designing firms assigned to a particular technology (Hyundai, Conventional or
GTDI; Toyota, GTDI or Conventional; GM, HEV), and Table 8.24 presents the simu-
lated market outcomes. Each of the scenarios reported is a maximum profit scenario.
In other words, there was no constraint set on vehicle fuel consumption. The table
rows are labeled by demand model (Model 1, Model 2), by cost model (Eq, Emp), by
the designing firm (Hyundai, Toyota, Japan), and by powertrain technology (Conv,
GTDI, HEV).
Examining the design variables in Table 8.22 shows that there are powertrain











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































vehicle size is the maximum allowable in all cases. The individual designs for the
conventional vehicle correspond well to the single designed cases from Section 8.2.2.
The powertrain variables for the GTDI designs shifted slightly from Section 8.3.2,
and the HEV designs are similar for the empirical cost model, but different for the
equilibrium model compared to Section 8.4.1.
The attribute values for the three designed vehicles in Table 8.23 are also very
similar to the respective single designed vehicle cases with the exception of the equi-
librium cost model HEV cases. These cases are also different from the single designed
vehicle cases because the designing firm for the HEV in the multi-firm case is GM
rather than Hyundai as in the single designed vehicle case.
Referencing the market outcomes found in Table 8.24 shows that the sales volume
and profit trends described in the previous sections held in the cases of multiple
firms with differing technologies. The two Model 1 empirical costs scenarios show
a behavior where the Toyota vehicle commands a higher price than the Hyundai
vehicle whether it designs a conventional or GTDI vehicle. The GTDI vehicle gains
a higher sales volume in both cases, but when Hyundai designs the GTDI vehicle the
difference between sales is much less than when Toyota designs the GTDI vehicle.
For the equilibrium cost case for both Model 1 and Model 2 Toyota prices the GTDI
vehicle below the conventional vehicle from Hyundai.
Examining the behavior of GM with the hybrid vehicle design shows interesting
behavior between the two cost models. In the case of the empirical cost model, GM’s
costs are similar to the other firms. It then prices the HEV much higher than the
other firms. The HEV is still popular, but achieves sales volumes on the order of
the other vehicles. The equilibrium cost case where GM’s costs are much lower than
the other firms shows that GM prices the hybrid well below the other vehicles and
achieves very large sales volumes.
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8.5.3 Discussion
The results for the multi-firm cases are similar to the single designed vehicle cases.
The differences in price and shares are reflective of differences in brand value which
also led to differences in cost according to equilibrium cost model. Because of this the
interaction between the firms in terms of vehicle price and sales volume, the market
outcomes are different between the two cost different cost models even though the
designs are for the most part similar.
8.6 Comparing Results across Design Scenarios
Across all scenarios there were small differences in powertrain variables between
scenarios with different cost models and demand models. The GTDI designed vehicles
had larger changes in powertrain variables, and the HEV designed vehicles had larger
changes still. There were some small differences between the single designed vehicle
scenarios and the multi-firm design scenarios particularly for the GTDI technology.
Further work should explore wether this behavior holds in more general cases or if it
was related to the highly constrained design space in these problems.
Vehicle size reached its upper bound for all cases except for the conventional and
GTDI BLP95 scenarios. We had expected to see differences in vehicle design between
the Model 1 and Model 2 demand models and in the cases with multiple random
coefficient draws per individual versus the 1 draw cases. However, the expected
changes hinged on differences in vehicle size. The footprint size of a midsize crossover
is very similar to a midsize sedan. The market simulations indicated that preference
for increased size was stronger than increased fuel economy or increased power to
weight for both Model 1 with the preference for size linear in footprint and for Model
2 with preference for size quadratic in footprint. We conjecture that based on the
elasticity plots for both Model 1 and Model 2 in Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.8, 4.12, were we to
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design two seaters, full size vans, or pickup trucks we may have observed differences
in design outcomes between demand models and between number of draws. These
segments show the most difference in own and cross-elasticity values between the two
demand models and between number of draws.
The vehicle attribute tables show that the design variable differences did lead
to significant differences in predicted 0-60 mph acceleration times. However, the
acceleration times were not used in the demand model. In the past, researchers have
noted that the power to weight ratio could serve as a surrogate for some consumer
perceived attribute such as acceleration. The fact that the acceleration time and
power to weight ratios are not perfect corollaries raises the question of what are the
right attributes to include in the demand model, and how are consumers perceiving
differences in design.
The enhanced performance capability of GTDI technology allowed the engine
displacement to be dropped considerably. The resulting design weighed less and was
less costly while improving fuel economy. Power to weight was comparable. In general
the GTDI vehicles enjoyed higher sales and profit than the conventional technology
vehicles. The trend of improving technology was even greater for the HEV designed
vehicles, which enjoyed the largest profits and highest sales volumes.
The differences in market outcomes were much larger than differences in design
variables across scenarios. For example, the GTDI and HEV vehicles had higher sales
volumes with equilibrium cost model than with empirical cost model. The opposite
was true for the conventional technology. The conclusion is then that even when
the vehicle design is highly constrained or exhibits similar behavior under different
demand models, the details of market outcomes can vary widely depending on the
other details of the market simulation including the cost model, the demand model,
and how the consumer population was simulated in terms of the number of draws.
The brand coefficients clearly play a role in the price equilibrium game in terms
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of the price charged by a specific firm and the market share of the vehicle. The
brand coefficients are simply very granular alternative-specific constants. We expect
the influence of adding alternative-specific to the demand models to also make a
large difference in price and sales volume as did the brand coefficients. Beyond the
influence of the brand constants it would be interesting to explore the influence of a
firm’s portfolio on its own prices and sales volume.
The succeeding paragraphs discuss some of the shortcomings of the existing engi-
neering, cost, and demand models.
The engineering model is currently limited to a narrow range of design variable
and parameter values. One next step is to enhance the engineering model to accom-
modate vehicle designs over a range of vehicle classes and performance requirements.
The HEV performance model appears overly optimistic in terms of its combined fuel
economy and acceleration times compared to current vehicles on the market. The
optimism may come from the lack of a missing performance consideration or unre-
alistic engine properties. Another source for the very high attribute values in the
market simulations could be the hybrid cost model. The performance model could
be presenting the technology capabilities correctly, however, the electric machine and
battery costs could be lower than reality.
The costs for alternative technologies were introduced as incremental to the base
vehicle cost. This methodology appears to have worked as expected for the empirical
cost model case. However, for the equilibrium cost model case, the base vehicle
costs are clearly unrealistic. For the scenarios with homogeneous technologies such
as the conventional technology scenarios, the equilibrium cost model contributed to
market simulation outcomes with reasonable prices. However, in the cases with mixed
technologies, unexpected and unrealistic dynamics unfolded where (what are held as)
expensive technology vehicles were priced well below conventional vehicles.
The equilibrium cost model with its negative costs revealed failings in the multi-
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firm scenarios. The baseline GM vehicle had a negative cost. This meant that even
with the added HEV technology costs, GM was able to lower the price of the HEV
and capture a very large market share. The empirical model does not exhibit this
behavior because all costs were positive and equivalent across brands for equivalent
vehicle designs.
In order to consider a firm’s portfolio design decisions modifications must be made
to the cost structure. For example, the current cost models consider only variable
cost. However, the automotive industry is a capital intensive industry that requires
significant investment costs for each new vehicle line introduced. Additionally, savings
can be captured by sharing components and assembly facilities as a platform for
multiple vehicles. A cost model that took these factors into account may be more
likely to suggest an interior solution for vehicle size rather than seek to maximize
vehicle wheelbase and length. For example, the midsize crossover vehicles typically
have a midsize sedan counterpart. The common wheelbase of these vehicles allows
them to share many chassis components and a common assembly facility. Were the
cost model to account for the additional investment cost required to develop a new
vehicle platform, the optimal design decisions would reflect this cost.
The largest shortcomings for the demand models are the inaccuracy of baseline
market shares predictions and the resultant high profit margins in the market simu-
lations. As discussed previously, the most straightforward way to resolve these issues
is to estimate demand models that incorporate alternative-specific constants for each
vehicle alternative.
The power to weight ratios of the optimal vehicle designs appeared to be lower than
the power to weight ratios of the vehicles in the market. In general, the optimal vehicle
design improved fuel economy at the expense of power to weight ratio compared to
the baseline 2006 midsize crossover vehicles. This opens the question of whether
power to weight is really valued less than what is produced by the market, or if
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the demand model specification did not adequately capture the factors that most
influence consumer preferences.
The opposite behavior of the US fleet fuel consumption for the different demand
models shown in Figure 8.1 leads to the question of which model more accurately
reflects the real market. Further works should address how to test different demand
models and the respective market simulation outcomes.
8.7 Discussion of Public versus Private Tradeoff
Sections 8.2.3 and 8.3.3 present figures showing the relationship between various
measure of the public objective of reduced fuel consumption with the private objective
of firm profit. Depending on the demand model, the vehicle technology, and the level
of fuel consumption required, a reduction in fuel consumption of the designed vehicle
may lead to an increase or decrease in the total fuel consumption of the US fleet.
This statement is made assuming a fixed number of vehicles sold in a given year and
the average number of vehicle-miles-traveled per individual vehicle owner is the same
across all vehicle classes.
The maximum profit design for each corresponds to the maximum sales volume
case for each scenario. As fuel consumption is constrained to decrease, sales of the
designed vehicle decrease. Given a fixed number of new vehicles sold, the consumers
who leave the designed vehicle purchase some other vehicle. The vehicle they purchase
could have a fuel consumption rating greater or smaller than the designed vehicle.
The US fleet fuel consumption will increase if the substitute vehicle has higher fuel
consumption than the designed vehicle. US fleet fuel consumption will decrease if
the substitute vehicle has lower fuel consumption. Particularly, in the conventional
case in Figure 8.1, for the Model 2 scenarios, the US fleet fuel consumption goes up
when the fuel consumption of the designed vehicle increases. What this means is that
individuals are substituting to a higher fuel consumption vehicle on average. The
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opposite behavior is true for the Model 1 scenarios.
Therefore, the market simulation according to Model 2 indicates that having the
designed midsize crossover vehicle is helpful in reducing US fleet fuel consumption.
This is because the US fleet fuel consumption increases when the designed vehicle
sales are reduced. The results for the Model 1 scenario indicate that the US fleet fuel
consumption would decrease without the designed vehicle in the market, since US fleet
fuel consumption decreases with decreasing designed vehicle sales. The substitution
patterns for the two models must then be markedly different. This is a very interesting
result given that the two demand models appear to fit the data similarly well based
on the estimation fit and the demand model parameter coefficients significance.
There is a clear conflict between selling vehicles and reducing US fleet fuel con-
sumption if we assume that the average vehicle miles traveled is the same for each
new vehicle sold. According to some of the design scenarios, a firm could reduce
US fleet fuel consumption by redesigning its products to be more fuel efficient than
market expectations or by repricing—in both cases making less profit, but this is not
a sustainable way for the firm to operate. It is also not clear that such a strategy
could be used to the firms advantage in terms of PR value. In both cases, redesigning
cars for higher fuel efficiency or raising prices on high fuel consumption vehicles, they
would be saying, ”We want you to buy fewer of our cars so we use less gas.”
In any case, the market simulations appear to indicate that forcing a technology
beyond the market is a dangerous game. The Model 2 scenarios for the conventional
vehicle give no expectation of improvement of public objective in terms of US fleet
fuel consumption by improving fuel economy of a single midsize crossover. It would
be interesting to explore the impact of changing fuel consumption for vehicles in other
segments.
The GTDI and HEV technologies provide a different approach to the public ver-
sus private tradeoff problem. The advanced technologies allow increased performance.
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The market simulations indicate that the increased performance can be used to de-
crease fuel consumption in the case of the maximum profit designed vehicles. The
US fleet fuel consumption for the GTDI designed vehicle with Model 1 and the equi-
librium cost model is about 75.85e4 gallons per average-vehicle-mile-traveled. The
US fleet fuel consumption for the conventional designed vehicle with Model 1 and
the equilibrium cost model is about 76.06e4 gallons per average-vehicle-mile-traveled.
Introducing the GTDI vehicle reduces US fleet fuel consumption at a profit for the
firm.
Because the GTDI maximum profit vehicle has lower fuel consumption than the
conventional maximum profit vehicle, the effects on US fuel consumption of decreas-
ing the fuel consumption below the maximum profit design are more pronounced.
Examining Figure 8.2 shows that for Model 1, which showed monotonically decreas-
ing US fleet fuel consumption for the conventional case in Figure 8.1, there is a point
where US fleet fuel consumption will begin to increase.
The success of the technology strategy hinges on the cost per performance tradeoff
of the technology and the underlying consumer demand. If the consumer demand is
in the direction of increased performance rather than decreased fuel consumption, the
impact of the new technology on fuel consumption will be negligible.
8.8 Summary
This chapter presented a problem formulation for conducting market simulations
to examine the vehicle design decisions of profit maximizing firms. Four primary
design scenarios were explored, and the impact on the design scenario of changing
one of the modeling elements was examined. The results of the market simulation
are vehicle design variables, vehicle attributes, vehicle prices, sales volumes, firm
profits, and firm, segment, and US fleet fuel consumption. These outputs allow the
exploration of the tradeoff between firm profit and fuel consumption.
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The first scenario considered the design of a single midsize crossover vehicle using
conventional powertrain technology by a single designing firm. Market simulations
were run for changes in the demand model, the cost model, the designing firm, the
preference for fuel consumption, and the number of random coefficient draws per
individual in the simulated population. Vehicle designs for all scenarios were large
vehicles with marginal differences in powertrain variables, except for the BLP95 de-
mand model scenarios, which were small vehicles with high power to weight ratios
and high fuel consumption. Market outcomes such as vehicle price, sales volume, and
firm profit were more varied.
The second scenario considered the design of a single midsize crossover vehicle us-
ing GTDI powertrain technology by a single designing firm. Market simulations were
run for changes in the demand model, the cost model, and the designing firm. Vehicle
designs for all scenarios were large vehicles with marginal differences in powertrain
variables, except for the BLP95 demand model scenarios, which were small vehicles
with high power to weight ratios and high fuel consumption. Market outcomes such
as vehicle price, sales volume, and firm profit were more varied.
The fuel consumption rating for the GTDI vehicles were categorically higher than
the conventional vehicles. The effect of decreasing designed vehicle fuel consumption
below the maximum profit designed vehicle were mixed depending on the vehicle
technology and the demand model. Decreasing fuel consumption for the conventional
designed vehicle for the Model 2 demand model case actually increased US fleet fuel
consumption.
The third scenario considered the design of a single midsize crossover vehicle using
HEV powertrain technology by a single designing firm. Market simulations were run
for changes in the demand model, the cost model. Vehicle designs for all scenarios were
large vehicles with marginal differences in powertrain variables. The BLP95 demand
model scenarios had larger changes in powertrain variables. Market outcomes such
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as vehicle price, sales volume, and firm profit were more varied.
The fourth scenario considered the design of a three midsize crossover vehicles
by three designing firms. Market simulations were run for changes in the demand
model for the case where all designing firms designed conventional vehicles. Market
simulations were run for changes in the demand model and the cost model and the
technology of the designing firm for the case where the designing firms each designed
a vehicle with a different technology. Vehicle designs for all scenarios were large
vehicles with marginal differences in powertrain variables. Market outcomes such
as vehicle price, sales volume, and firm profit were more varied. Particularly, the
pricing strategy and the sales volume changed for the HEV designing firm between
the empirical and the equilibrium cost models.
In general, the market simulations pushed the vehicle designs to the largest pos-
sible size, the smallest gradeability, and the lowest top speed allowed for the midsize
crossover segment. The market outcomes of price, sales volume, and profit were much
more varied across the scenarios than the vehicle designs.
Improving fuel economy of vehicles beyond market equilibrium may be good for
PR, but it may not improve the sales-weighted average vehicle fuel consumption rating
because of lost sales and reduces the total fuel consumption attributable to the firm’s
new car sales mostly by reducing the firm’s sales. The action may or may not reduce
the fuel consumption of the US fleet given a fixed set of new car buyers.
Areas for improvement include reestimating demand models with alternative-
specific constants in order to match historical sales. This could make interpretation
with respect to the real market more reliable. Continued exploration of consumer
utility specification is desired to better capture consumer decision-making behavior.
For example, the vehicle designs were constrained to remain in within a pre-defined
class through towing and size constraints rather than through consumer preferences.
The equilibrium cost model can be reestimated with the new demand models in or-
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der to reach reasonable (nonnegative) costs for each vehicle. Fixed costs, investment
costs, and platforming costs should all be considered in defining the producer’s deci-






This dissertation establishes a methodology for evaluating automotive vehicle de-
sign according to private (firm profit) and public (fuel consumption) criteria. The
methodology set forth relies on previously-made developments from engineering, eco-
nomics, and marketing. New work in this dissertation includes the development
of several models that can be applied to other similar problems. Specifically, the
problem formulation integrates models of demand, cost, and product performance
in order to implement a game-theoritic formulation of producer behavior where pro-
ducers choose the attributes of the products they produce and the prices they will
charge in order to maximize profit (Chapter 6). Two variations of a newly estimated
mixed-logit discrete choice model of new car buyer purchase behavior are developed
for incorporation as demand models (Chapter 4). Three cost model formulations
are developed and compared in the context of the problem formulation (Chapter
5). An explicit representation of an automotive manufacturer’s technology capabil-
ity in the form of a comprehensive yet stylized engineering performance model of a
midsize crossover vehicle is developed (Chapter 3). A methodology for developing
and estimating mixed-logit choice models accessible to the design for market systems
researcher is documented (Chapter 4).
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Novel measures for analyzing and comparing Pareto sets are developed (Chapter
7). These measures can be applied to studying the public versus private tradeoff in
the automotive industry or another industry. The application of these measures was
demonstrated for a simple nonlinear programming example and a simplified vehicle
design problem.
Hypothetical scenarios were evaluated in order to test the vehicle design problem
formulation involving the design of a single vehicle within a price-equilibrium market
context and the design of multiple same-segment vehicles within a price-equilibrium
market context (Chapter 8). The results of the market simulation are vehicle design
variables; vehicle attributes; vehicle prices; sales volumes; firm profits; and firm,
segment, and US fleet fuel consumption. These outputs allow the exploration of the
tradeoff between firm profit and fuel consumption. Similar models using the same
structure could be set up for a different market rather than the automotive vehicle
market. Measures for the private and public objectives could be defined and the
tradeoffs explored.
The differences in scenario outcomes based on differences in the demand and cost
models were explored. The results show that improving the fuel economy of a specific
vehicle does not always lead to a reduction in US fleet fuel consumption. This is
due to substitution patterns where new car buyers substitute toward less fuel efficient
vehicles.
There are several improvements that could be made to enable the market sim-
ulation results to be useful at a practical level. We feel that to be useful for real
market insights, the market simulations need to predict baseline market shares that
start from the real market position and profits should be projected at reasonable
levels. This could be accomplished in large measure by including alternative-specific
constants for the vehicle alternatives in the choice model estimation. Finally, the
difficult underlying question remains that is how well do the models produce realistic
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behavior as the design scenario deviates from the current market. The proposal of
two different demand models that produce very different substitution patterns based
on the same market data as shown in this dissertation is a start at addressing this
question.
9.2 Contributions
The primary contribution of this dissertation is that disparate developments from
several academic fields have been brought together in a single mathematical problem
formulation for a large-scale product development problem. The integrated problem
formulation will allow study of interdisciplinary issues related to product development
in a new way. While ongoing work from other researchers has similarly begun to
develop comprehensive problem formulations, one aspect that is new for this problem
formulation is that the vehicle design problem is set in the context of full market
price equilibrium. This work also demonstrates some of the challenges that must be
addressed in such formulations. Specifically, comparing the empirical cost model to
the equilibrium cost model shows that the empirical cost model resulted in grossly
inflated prices for the given demand model. The equilibrium cost model produced
realistic price projections. However, due to the irregularities of the equilibrium cost
model the scenarios with that model produced nonintuitive pricing behavior for the
case of multiple firms designing different technologies. Scenarios with the empirical
cost model, while producing inflated prices, maintained economic intuition. Problems
with both cost models may be addressed by developing demand models that match
sales data.
The demand models illustrated two points. The first point is that without alternative-
specific constants used to match demand model projected sales to actual market
sales the market outcomes of the hypothetical scenarios can not be interpreted in
the context of the real market. This has been known in marketing for some time.
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However, it has become common practice in the design for market systems engineer-
ing community to adopt demand models from the literature without employing the
alternative-specific constants for those models. The second point is that changes in
the functional form of the utility specification can alter substitution patterns–and
thus market outcomes–significantly even when both models appear to fit the under-
lying data similarly well. We showed this by estimating and then employing a model
with preference monotonic in vehicle footprint and another model where preference
was quadratic in vehicle footprint. In other words individual consumers had an ideal
vehicle footprint. While the two differing models did not result in large changes in
the designed vehicles, the vehicle price, sales volume, and the overall market fuel
consumptions changed much. This result has important implications for the public
versus private tradeoff. In one model a certain policy pursued by a firm or public
entity could be expected to improve the public objective. However, according to a
competing model, the same action could be detrimental. A first clue for effects such
as these can be gleaned at the level of the demand model by studying the own- and
cross-elasticities for the product attributes in addition to price.
A second contribution of the dissertation is the application of the notion that we
can explore the tradeoff between private interests and public interests by simulating
market response under different hypothetical scenarios. We can then gain deeper
insights by examining the tradeoff relationships between the different scenarios. New
local and global measures were defined or reemphasized for application in comparing
results of market simulations. The local measures are defined around a single Pareto
point. The global measures are defined by the ideal points of each objective and the
shape of the Pareto set.
These contributions have extended engineers’ capability for developing and ap-
plying choice models to design problems by illustrating the impact of choice model




Several next steps can be taken to improve the modeling framework. Future work
remains to expand the engineering design model to encompass a broader range of
vehicle sizes and performance requirements. This is an important piece to fully explore
the implications of the differing demand models because the most dramatic differences
in elasticities of demand with respect to vehicle footprint occur for the luxury models
and for specialty market segments such as the two-seaters or minicompacts and the
pickup trucks. The engineering model must be capable of predicting performance for
these vehicles.
There remains much to be learned about the relationship between the consumer
utility function and the optimal vehicle design result. Perhaps studying the colinearity
of attributes such as high fuel economy and small size can be fruitful in understanding
how to pose a utility specification that better captures purchase behavior in the
context of the vehicle design.
Also, future work should study the difference in optimization outcomes between
a model that was estimated without alternative-specific constants and one with
alternative-specific constants. We expect that a model estimated with alternative-
specific constants will overcome many of the difficulties with unrealistic share predic-
tions and inflated profit margins.
The number of variables and the number of products designed can be increased.
Perhaps homotopy techniques can be applied for solving for Pareto points in order
to reduce the computational burden of performing a full design optimization with
nested price equilibrium calculations.
More work can be done to explore cost models and their implications for design
optimization.
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Comparing demand model prediction on data from another year is also an obvious
next step.
An obvious omission from the modeling framework has been the consideration
of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard (CAFE) enforced in the United
States. This modeling piece has been avoided on a practical level because it com-
plicates the equilibrium cost model estimation significantly. It also complicates the
solution to the price equilibrium game. Another practical reason for avoiding CAFE
is that it is difficult to prescribe its effects for a given model year. Several automakers
(primarily European manufacturers) do not comply with CAFE and prefer to pay a
penalty. US manufacturers have traditionally kept CAFE. However, there is a compli-
cated bookkeeping for CAFE that allows manufacturers to carry over CAFE penalties
in one year and then make them up in a succeeding year. Still, Japanese manufactur-
ers historically exceeded the CAFE standard because they produced mostly smaller
cars. All of this does not yield easily to a neat mathematical description.
The traditional effect ascribed to CAFE by the US automakers is that they must
lower their prices on their most fuel efficient models in order to sell more of these
vehicles or raise prices on their least fuel efficient vehicles in order to sell less. Re-
gardless of the producer decisions the demand model estimation should be unaffected.
Consumers observe vehicle attributes and prices and make purchase decisions with
no consequence from CAFE. In this sense the demand models developed here are
reflective of the US market under CAFE.
The missing piece is to have a cost model that reflects producers’ costs and then
enforce (some) producers to abide by CAFE standards in any hypothetical market
scenario. The empirical cost model could be adjusted for CAFE by adjusting the firm
margin with respect to the dealer margin for fuel efficient vehicles. In the equilibrium
cost case, new maximum profit conditions need to be defined and solved given the
CAFE constraint on some firms. Enforcing CAFE during the price equilibrium cal-
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culations is more problematic and requires further research into a numerical method
that can make this problem tractable.
9.3.2 Enhancing Choice Paradigm
There are several aspects of the choice paradigm implied by the current approach
that should be reconsidered. One topic would be to compare exploded-logit with
stated consideration as pseudo observations (what we did in this dissertation) vs.
single purchase observations with conditional choice sets based on the stated consid-
ered vehicles.
There may also be a computationally efficient approach to expanding the vehicle
alternatives in the choice set to allow many more covariates by conditioning the choice
set in a smart way. This is an important step in the vehicle design problem because
being able to identify a greater number of vehicle attributes that influence choice will
allow the vehicle design decision space to grow.
There are three additional directions related to demand modeling that are high-
lighted here for consideration in future work to improve the performance of demand
models for design optimization studies.
The first is to consider alternative utility specifications that represent fundamen-
tally different decision-making behaviors. A body of research continues to show that
models incorporating heuristic decision rules can perform as well or better than mod-
els based on compensatory trades in many decision-making scenarios[Hauser et al. (In
Review)]. The evaluation methods presented here can be used to test such alternative
functional forms for various behavioral hypotheses. Areas for exploration in design
research include models with dummy-coded attribute levels similar to [Michalek et al.
(2005)] that allow highly nonlinear attribute weightings; rigorous exploration of pref-
erence thresholds and cutoffs continuing the work of Wassenar [Wassenaar et al.
(2005)]; and in place of random coefficients, random functional forms or stratified
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functional forms of utility based on demographics or latent class analysis, which al-
low different individuals to think about the same choice differently.
The second is to explore modifications to the representation of the the consumer
choice paradigm. The choice paradigm employed in conventional econometric de-
mand models of the automotive industry coincides with that of consumers making
compensatory choices across the entire new-vehicle fleet when making a purchase de-
cision. Enforcing this paradigm presumes consumers consider all new-vehicle makes
and models at the time of purchase. Researchers have suggested that this paradigm is
unrealistic from a cognitive-ability perspective, and it excludes a multistage decision
process where a consumer’s decision rules change from one stage to the next. An
alternative two-stage decision process, where the consumer first identifies a subset
of all possible alternatives as the consideration set and then makes compensatory
trades between the attributes of the consideration set, has shown some promise in
the choice modeling literature [Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990); Horowitz and Louviere
(1995)]. Additionally, incorporating the Heckman selection process [Heckman (1979)]
to reconcile differences between an overall population and a sub-population of prod-
uct purchasers (as we had with the new-car buyer survey) may yield fruit in treating
the outside good as it relates to setting overall market demand.
The third area is to compare fundamental limits of aggregate and disaggregate
data as well as revealed and stated-choice data. Individual-choice level or disaggregate
data are difficult and costly to obtain. However, when available, analysts derive
significant benefit. The theme for this work could be to describe the best demand
modeling behavior for design optimization to be expected from an aggregate vs. a
disaggregate source, and similarly what is the best modeling behavior that can be
derived from revealed choice vs. stated choice data in the context of design.
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9.3.3 Cost Modeling Improvements
Cost modeling could be enhanced by expanding the firm’s perspective to include
annual fixed costs and investment costs. This is particularly important for the auto-
motive industry where products are capital intensive and product decisions are made
with a long lead time. It will be a challenge to develop cost model forms that allow
incorporation of more supply side information (e.g., economies of scale, investment
costs, etc.) and that can maintain compatibility with the existing market equilibrium
simulations.
We also lack cost models that can be related back to technology design decisions
(i.e., engineering variables), but do not require the extensive proprietary data sources
held by manufacturer’s. The empirical cost model was a first step to develop suitable
models with publicly available data. An extension would be to identify the best meth-
ods for estimating costs empirically and the best sources of non-OEM-proprietary
data.
We made assumptions about the relationships between dealer and OEM profits.
More work can be done to explore these assumptions.
9.3.4 Expand Application Domains
The integration of demand, cost, and design into a maximum-profit-firm-design-
decision can be applied beyond the automotive industry. Other transportation and
energy related domains to consider would be vehicle and grid integration, consumer
electricity consumption, and multi-mode transportation systems. Consumer products






NOTE: The nomenclature in this appendix does not match the nomenclature
used throughout the document. Instead notation that largely matches the Matlab
code implementation of the model has been preserved.
An engineering model was developed to represent the technical performance of
the vehicle. It calculates the characteristics listed in Table A.1 using using AVL
Cruise software package [16] powertrain simulations, curve-fits from empirical data,
and analytical expressions. Design variables and other model parameters are listed
in Table A.2. The gear shifting program is also specified as shown in Figure A.1.




The engine configuration, engine bore, bore to stroke ratio, and the number
of cylinders are used to calculate other size related engine characteristics. The
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MPG B&M, BLP [mi/gal] fuel economy
Acc060 B&M, BLP [s] 0-60 mph time
Styl1 B&M [-] exterior proportions
Size BLP [in2] exterior size
Acc3050 - [s] 30-50 mph accel. time while towing
Grad65Tow - [%] max grade at 65 mph while towing
MaxSpeed - [mph] vehicle top speed
CV I - [ft3] cargo volume index behind 2nd row
A147 - [◦] ramp breakover angle
A107 - [◦] angle of departure
A106 - [◦] angle of approach
CGlong - [mm] center of gravity in long. direction
CGvert - [mm] center of gravity in vert. direction
V ehMass - [kg] vehicle curbweight
GVWR - [kg] gross vehicle weight rating
V ehM%front - [%] percent vehicle mass on front wheels
EngLength - [mm] estimated engine length
FrontArea - [m2] frontal area
CrushSpace - [mm] crush space-bumper to driver heel
MaxDecel - [m/s2] est. peak decel. in front crash test
MG1 (HEV) [kW] peak power electric machine 1
MG2 (HEV) [kW] peak power electric machine 2
Table A.2: Partial list of vehicle parameters
Veh. Char. Design Var. Units Description
EngBore X [mm] engine bore
EngBoretoStroke X [-] bore to stroke ratio
FinalDrive X [-] final drive ratio
L103 X [mm] exterior length
W105 X [mm] exterior width
H101 X [mm] exterior height
L101 X [mm] wheelbase
PGR X(HEV) [-] planetary gear ratio
BPow X(HEV) [kW] peak battery power
EngNofCyl - [-] number of engine cylinders
GearRatio - [-] gear ratios (1-6)
V ehGTankV ol - [l] gas tank volume
L104 - [mm] dist. f. bumper to f. axle
H103-1 - [mm] dist. f. bumper to f. axle
H103-2 - [mm] dist. f. bumper to f. axle
H156 - [mm] dist. f. bumper to f. axle
V ehLegRoom1 - [mm] driver legroom
V ehLegRoom2 - [mm] 2nd row legroom
V ehHeelPointX - [mm]
longitudinal location of driver heel
point
MidRailThick - [mm] mid-rail thickness
MidRailWidth - [mm] mid-rail width
V ehTurnRad - [mm] minimum turn radius
WheelDiam - [mm] wheel diameter
H108 - [mm] tire static rolling radius
CD - [-] vehicle drag coefficient
V ehSeatCap - [-] max seating capacity












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EngDepth equation assumes that the engine is a 60◦ vee configuration and provides
an estimate for the depth of the engine at the engine base. The EngExpMass calcu-
lation comes from two linear regressions of engine data provided by Mike Anderson of
GM in a lecture slide from a guest lecture in AUTO 501, Fall 2006 (See Figure A.2).
The estimated length of the engines comes from summing the bore diameters, then
using a 10 mm cylinder offset for line, or 26 mm cylinder offset for vee engines1.
Additional length has been added to account for transmission package.
EngStroke [mm] = EngBore/EngBoretoStroke (A.1)
EngDisp [cc] = EngNofCyl × EngStroke/10× π(EngBore/2/10)2 (A.2)
EngDepth [mm] = 2EngBore cos (π/180× 30) + 50 (A.3)



















(EngBore+ 10) + 16 + 25.4(3 + 6)
)




The maximum tire steering angle and the lateral tire flop distance are used to
compute the powertrain width constraint. These values are a function of the mini-
mum vehicle turn radius and the tire radius. Inequality A.8 shows the constraint that
the powertrain and wheels must package within the overall vehicle width assuming
a transverse engine orientation following Figure A.32. The tire steering angle is the
1As per an example given from the Mike Anderson AUTO 501 slides
2Anderson, M., K, 2005, Powertrain Design and Integration, Lecture Slides, Automotive Engi-
neering 501, University of Michigan, guest lecture, Ann Arbor, MI, 7.
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O  LINE ENGINES
- Correlation Factor, R
2
 = 0.68
- Sample Size, N=29
!   VEE ENGINES
- Correlation Factor, R
2
 = 0.73
- Sample Size, N=71
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2V, Iron Block, Iron Heads
2V, Iron Block, Aluminum Heads
4V, Iron Block, Aluminum Heads
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On Average, Engine Mass is
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On Average, Transmission Mass is 






Engine mass as a function of configuration and displacement. Figures
and linear regressions of engine data provided by Mike Anderson of GM
in a lecture slide from a guest lecture in AUTO 501, Fall 2006
maximum steering angle of inside wheel required to achieve a given vehicle turning ra-
dius3. The tire flop is a distance in the vehicle width (transverse) dimension assumed
to be width needed for minimum turn radius + 1.5 inches.
TireSteerA [-] = arctan (L101/(V ehTurnRad−W101/2)) (A.6)





W105− 254 ≥ 2TireF lop+ 2MidRailWidth
+EngLength+ 50.8 (A.8)
3This equation came from from Dr. Thomas Gillespie guest lecture slides in AUTO 501, Fall
2006
233
Integrated Vehicle System Design










(1) Two-Wheel Drive (2WD)
(a) Front-Wheel Drive (FWD)
(b) Rear-Wheel Drive (RWD)
(2) Four-Wheel Drive (4WD) or 
All-Wheel Drive (AWD)
(a) Part-Time Systems
(i)  Engaged Automatically 
Upon Demand
(ii) Engaged Manually by 
Operator
(b) Full-Time Systems
POWERTRAIN AND DRIVELINE CONFIGURATIONS
COMMON AUTOMOTIVE
ARRANGEMENTS
• Most Vehicles Are Front-Engine
• Small and Midsize Cars
! Transverse Front-Wheel 
Drive (TFWD)
! Optional On-Demand All-
Wheel Drive (TAWD)
• Luxury Cars, Trucks, and SUVs
! Longitudinal Rear-Wheel 
Drive (LRWD)
! Optional On-Demand or 
Full-Time All-Wheel Drive 
(LAWD)
• Some Large Cars
(Acura RL and Chrysler LH)
! Longitudinal Front-Wheel 
Drive (LFWD)
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TFWD VEHICLE SIDE VIEW PACKAGING
Downward 
Vision Line
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mm 25 2    
Width
Rail  M/C 2    
Flop
Tire 2   
Width
Track    
Width
Powertrain
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CLEARANCES
Thermal Clearance
• 40 mm clearance is generally 
required between thermally 
sensitive components and exhaust 
manifolds or catalytic converters
! 25 mm clearance to a thin heat 
shield with a 15 mm air gap 
less the material thickness
Load Clearance
• 10 mm - 15 mm for manually 
loaded components
• 20 mm - 25 mm for automatically 
loaded components
Dynamic Clearance
• 10 mm between 
components when the 
powertrain moves and/or 
the suspension travels to 
full jounce or rebound due 
to:
! shipping loads 
! maximum acceleration, 
braking, or cornering
! driving over a pothole 
at high speed 
! rocking vehicle free of 
mud or snow
Figure A.3:
Powertrain packaging in vehicle width dimension. Figures provided by




Three other dimension conversions are required for computing other vehicle char-
acteristics or for input into the AVL Cruise powertrain simulations. They are the
trackwidth W101, the vehicle frontal area V ehFrontArea, and the distance from the
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front axle to the trailer hitch V ehHitchtoFAxle.
W101 [mm] = W105− 10× 25.4 (A.9)










V ehHitchtoFAxle [mm] = L103 + 4× 25.4− L104 (A.11)
Vehicle mass properties
{VehicleCG.m}
NOTE: Throughout the Vehicle mass properties section all vehicle dimensions are
assumed to be given in inches unless otherwise stated, and all masses are assumed
to be given in pounds-mass. This is different than the rest of the report where the
default specifications are millimeters and kilograms.
Vehicle mass properties consist of the vehicle curbweight and gross vehicle weight
rating, the distribution of mass among vehicle subsystems, the spatial distribution
of mass throughout the vehicle, and the wheel assembly inertia. Derivation of each
property is given below.
Curbweight and GVWR
{VehicleCG.m}
A regression was fit (R2:0.92) to estimate curbweight for each light-duty truck
vehicle class using data for 2005 light-duty trucks from Ward’s automotive yearbook
[24]. Each of the 8 class was fit with one of three different forms of the regression
equation. Here, δFWD, δAWD, δ4WD, δRWD are dummy variables {0,1} for driveline
configuration; δCargo is a dummy variable for specifying cargo van vs. passenger van;
δTCrew, δTExtended, δTRegular are dummy variables for pickup cab configuration. The
235
regression for the CUV class is a function of shadow area V ehPArea and engine
displacement. The regression for the LxSUV class which includes all sizes of luxury
SUVs and CUVs is a function of exterior box volume V ehPV ol and engine displace-
ment. The regressions for the remaining classes are functions of exterior box volume
and EngExpMass.
Table A.3 indicates the equation used for each class and the R2 value for each fit.
Table A.4 lists the coefficient values for the vehicle mass equations for each class.









+ C5δFWD + C6δAWD + C7δ4WD + C8δRWD
















+ C5δFWD + C6δAWD + C7δ4WD + C8δRWD
+C9δCargo + C10δTCrew + C11δTExtended + C12δTRegular + C13 (A.14)

















+ C5δFWD + C6δAWD + C7δ4WD + C8δRWD
+C9δCargo + C10δTCrew + C11δTExtended + C12δTRegular + C13 (A.16)
Gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) is the total loaded weight of the vehicle in-
cluding the vehicle, occupants, and other payload that should not be exceeded during
operation of the vehicle. While this value is not critical to the vehicle simulations, is
a recognized vehicle specification. It serves as a check on the vehicle design to ensure
that the expected GVWR is sufficient for the expected vehicle capacity. GVWR is
estimated based on class average payload percentages of the GVWR. Table A.5 lists,
and Figure A.4 shows graphically, the average fraction of the GVWR that is allo-
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Table A.3: Vehicle curbweight regression equation by vehicle class
Class Eqn. R2 Sample
CUV 1 0.92 98
Lpkup 2 0.84 395
LSUV 2 0.94 78
LVAN 2 0.80 56
MSUV 2 0.90 127
Spkup 2 0.70 87
SVAN 2 0.56 70
LxSUV 3 0.83 68





















































Figure A.4: Payload percent of GVWR by vehicle class and driveline
cated to payload (i.e., passengers and cargo) in terms of vehicle class and driveline
configuration.
GVWR is then assigned to a vehicle based on the following equation.
GVWR = V ehMass/(1− V ehPayload%) (A.17)
Payload capacity is determined by taking the difference of GVWR and V ehMass.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the average fully occupied passenger weight.
V ehPayloadMass = GVWR− V ehMass (A.18)




Vehicle mass is distributed between the several vehicle subsystems using estimated
vehicle mass, GVWR, and estimated engine mass, and a baseline mass distribution4
(See Figure A.5). Powetrain mass is estimated and taken from the total vehicle mass,
then the remaining mass is divided between the remaining subsystems preserving the
same relative ratios as the parition given in Figure A.5. Figure A.6 shows an example
applied to the CUV segment. V ehMass, EngExpMass, and GVWR to estimate the
remaining mass of the vehicle. Powertrain mass for FWD vehicles excluding engine
is assumed to be 5% of vehicle curbweight5. Powertrain mass in Figure A.5 is 14%
and payload is 33% of GVWR, leaving 53% remaining. Payload mass was 25.2%,
and powertrain mass was 0.05 × V ehMass + EngExpMass(≈ 11.4%V ehMass) =
16.4%/(100− 25.2%) = 12.3% of GVWR in the crossover example. The mass of each
4Baseline mass distribution comes from a slide presented in AUTO 501 by guest lecturer Dr. Don
Malen. He proposed the distribution as“typical of a body-frame integral mid-size vehicle”
5Anderson, M., K, 2005, Powertrain Design and Integration, Lecture Slides, Automotive Engi-
neering 501, University of Michigan, guest lecture, Ann Arbor, MI, 25-64.
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Vehicle Mass by Subsystem
Typical Mid-size Body-Frame Integral Vehicle




















Figure A.5: Mass breakdown by vehicle subsystem





Mpwtrn% = MEngExpMass% +MDriveline% (A.21)
The subsystem mass percent breakdown as a percentage of GVWR (as shown in the
pie chart on the right in Figure A.6) is then electrical, 2%; body, 15%; suspension,
12%; trim, 22%; wheels, 6%; fuel and exhaust 4%; bumpers, 1%. The vehicle mass
is broken down further for some subsystems. V ehGasTMass is found from the fuel
and exhaust subsystem by
V ehGasTMass = V ehGasTV ol × V ehGasDens (A.22)
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Figure A.6: Mass breakdown by vehicle subsystem for mid-size crossover
The remaining fuel and exhaust mass is assigned to the exhaust system
ExhaustMass = Mfuel&exhaust%− V ehGasTMass (A.23)
Wheel mass is 1/4 of the wheels subsystem and includes tire and wheel assembly.
WheelMass = MWheels%× V ehMass/4 (A.24)
We assume 20% of driveline mass is located at each axle. and that the remaining
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driveline mass is concentrated in the transmission box.
V ehFrontAxleMass = 0.2× 0.05× V ehMass (A.25)
V ehRearAxleMass = 0.2× 0.05× V ehMass (A.26)
TranMass = MDriveline%× V ehMass




The model estimates the longitudinal and vertical position of the vehicle center of
mass as measured from the ground plane and the frontmost point on a base equipped
model. The relationships developed here are derived by estimating mass allocations as
described in the previous section and the spatial distribution of this mass as described
in this section. Vehicle occupancy, passenger weight, driver and second row legroom,
and other vehicle dimensions are inputs.
One purpose of establishing center of mass position is to populate the center of
gravity table for the AVL Cruise software powertrain simulations. AVL Cruise in-
terpolates between the table values to find the values for the test specified vehicle
loads. Distributed or point loads, as appropriate, were postulated for each subsystem
mass (See Figures A.7 and A.8). Locations of passenger and cargo masses were in-
corporated for different loading conditions by considering legroom and overall vehicle
length. Three load cases (i.e., curbweight-no occupants; ≈half occupants-half cargo;
GVWR-full occupants-full cargo) are used to the center of mass positions and hitch
heights for each table entry. A sprung mass vertical deflection of 2 inches is assumed
between curbweight and GVWR. The relative percent weight on each axle is also
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Figure A.7: Sketch of vertical mass distribution
computed. The height from the ground to the top of the wheel (excluding tire), and
the height from ground to the top of the tire are give as follows.
V ehTopofWheel = H108 + 1/2V ehWheelDiam (A.28)
V ehTopofT ire = H108 + TireDynRollRad (A.29)
Legroom dimensions as specified on vehicle comparison websites are 10 inches greater
than corresponding SAE dimensions [SAE International (2005)]
L34 = V ehLegRoom1− 10 (A.30)
L51-2 = V ehLegRoom2− 10 (A.31)
L51-3 = V ehLegRoom3− 10 (A.32)
The distance from the ground H5, and the distance from the cabin floor H30 to the
seating guide reference points (SgRP or H-point) are defined as follows, where the -#
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Figure A.8: Sketch of longitudinal mass distribution
corresponds to row number.
H5-1 = H156 + 18 (A.33)
H5-2 = H5-1 + 2 (A.34)
H5-3 = H5-2 + 1 (A.35)
H30 = H5-1−H156− 5 (A.36)
The vertical position of the engine, transmission, front and rear suspension, and
additional transmission mass (e.g., associated with AWD or 4 WD vehicles), gas tank,
front and rear axles, height at the front of the hood, height at the cowl point, cargo
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load floor, front and rear bumper, and exhaust plumbing are assumed as follows.
EngY = V ehTopofT ire (A.37)
TranY = H103-1 + 8 (A.38)
SuspensionFrontY = V ehTopofWheel (A.39)
SuspensionRearY = V ehTopofWheel (A.40)
ExtraTranMassY = V ehTopofWheel (A.41)
V ehGasTY = V ehTopofT ire (A.42)
V ehFrontAxleY = H108 (A.43)
V ehRearAxleY = H108 (A.44)
V ehHoodHeight = 0.6H101 (A.45)
V ehCowlHeight = 0.7H101 (A.46)
V ehCargoY = H195 + 1/3(H101−H195) (A.47)
V ehBumperHeightFront = H103-1 + 6 (A.48)
V ehBumperHeightRear = H103-2 + 6 (A.49)
V ehExhaustY = H156 + 4 (A.50)
The longitudinal position of the engine, transmission, passengers on rows 1-3, rear
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axle, gas tank, cargo load floor behind row 2 and row 3 are assumed as follows.
EngX = 1/2V ehHeelPointX (A.51)
TranX = EngX + 10 (A.52)
















































V ehRearAxleX = L104 + L101 (A.56)
V ehGasTX = V ehRearAxleX + V ehWheelDiam/2 (A.57)
V ehCargoX2 = V eh2RX + 10 + 1/2(L103− (V eh2RX + 10)) (A.58)
V ehCargoX3 = V eh3RX + 10 + 1/2(L103− (V eh3RX + 10)) (A.59)
Several subsystems are treated as distributed loads including body, exhaust, trim,
246
and electric. The vertical distributed loads are described as follows.
WBodyUnderHood = (BodyMass× V ehHeelPointX/L103)
/(V ehCowlHeight+ V ehHoodHeight(1− a)−H103− 1
+(a− 1)/(V ehCowlHeight− V ehHoodHeight)
(V ehCowlHeight2/2− V ehHoodHeight2/2)) (A.60)
bBodyUnderHood = WBodyUnderHood
(
1− V ehHoodHeight(a− 1)
V ehCowlHeight− V ehHoodHeight
)
(A.61)
WElectUnderHood = (0.66ElectMass)/(V ehCowlHeight−H103− 1) (A.62)
WTrim = TrimMass/(H101 + V ehCowlHeight(1− a)−H156
+(a− 1)/(H101− V ehCowlHeight)
×(H1012/2− V ehCowlHeight2/2)) (A.63)
bTrim = WTrim
(




WBodyPostHeel = (L103− V ehHeelPointX)/L103BodyMass
/(H101 + V ehCowlHeight(1− a)−H156 + (a− 1)








WElectPostHeel = (0.34ElectMass)/(H101−H156) (A.67)
The next step is to compute the mass weighted vertical center of mass locations for
each distributed load as follows, where a = 0.25 is a coefficient splitting trim and
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body weight in the vertical direction between above and below cowl point.
V GBodyUnderHood = WBodyUnderHood(1/2(V ehHoodHeight2 −H103-12)
+
a− 1
V ehCowlHeight− V ehHoodHeight
×(V ehCowlHeight3/3− V ehHoodHeight3/3))
+bBodyUnderHood/2(V ehCowlHeight2 − V ehHoodHeight2)
(A.68)
V CGElectUnderHood = WElectUnderHood(V ehCowlHeight2/2−H103− 12/2) (A.69)
V CGTrim = WTrim(1/2(V ehCowlHeight2 −H1562)
+
a− 1
(H101− V ehCowlHeight (H101
3/3− V ehCowlHeight3/3))
+bTrim/2(H1012 − V ehCowlHeight2) (A.70)
V CGBodyPostHeel = WBodyPostHeel(1/2(V ehCowlHeight2 −H1562)
+
a− 1
H101− V ehCowlHeight (H101
3/3− V ehCowlHeight3/3))
+bBodyPostHeel/2(H1012 − V ehCowlHeight2) (A.71)
V CGElectPostHeel = WElectPostHeel(H1012/2−H1562/2) (A.72)
The longitudinal distributed loads are described as follows.
WBody = BodyMass/L103 (A.73)
WExhaust = ExhaustMass/(L103− EngX) (A.74)
WTrimL = TrimMass/((V eh2RX − V ehHeelPointX)
+(L103− V eh2RX)) (A.75)
WElectUnderHoodL = 0.66ElectMass/V ehHeelPointX (A.76)
WElectPostHeelL = 0.34ElectMass/(L103− V ehHeelPointX)
The mass weighted longitudinal center of mass locations for each distributed load
are as follows, where b = 0.25 is a coefficient splitting trim weight between seat area
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and cargo area.
LCGBody = WBody(L1032/2) (A.77)
LCGExhaust = WExhaust(L1032/2− EngX2/2) (A.78)
LCGTrim = WTrimL(V eh2RX2/2− V ehHeelPointX2/2)
+b×WTrimL(L1032/2− V eh2RX2/2) (A.79)
LCGElectUnderHood = WElectUnderHoodL(V ehHeelPointX2/2) (A.80)
LCGElectPostHeel = WElectPostHeelL(L1032/2− V ehHeelPointX2/2)
The vertical position of the center of mass is found by summing the mass weighted
point and distributed loads and then dividing by the total mass of the system accord-
ing to the following expression.
CGvert = (EngY × EngExpMass+H5-1× PassWeight(δpass1 + δpass2)
+H5-2× PassWeight(δpass3 + δpass4 + δpass5)
+H5-3× PassWeight(δpass6 + δpass7 + δpass8 + δpass9)
+V ehGasTY × V ehGasTMass
+V ehFrontAxleY (2WheelMass+ V ehFrontAxleMass)
+V ehRearAxleY (2WheelMass+ V ehRearAxleMass)
+V ehCargoY × V ehCargoMass+ SuspenMass/2(SuspensionFrontY )
+SuspenMass/2(SuspensionRearY )




+V ertCGBodyUnderHood+ V ertCGElectUnderHood+ V ertCGTrim
+V ertCGBodyPostHeel + V ertCGElectPostHeel)
/(V ehMass+ [PassWeight]pass + V ehCargoMass) (A.81)
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The longitudinal position of the center of mass is found by the following expression.
CGlong = (EngX × EngExpMass+ V eh1RX × PassWeight(δpass1 + δpass2)
+V eh2RX × PassWeight(δpass3 + δpass4 + δpass5)
+V eh3RX × PassWeight(δpass6 + δpass7 + δpass8 + δpass9)
+V ehGasTX × V ehGasTMass
+L104(2WheelMass+ V ehFrontAxleMass)
+V ehRearAxleX(2WheelMass+ V ehRearAxleMass)
+V ehCargoX × V ehCargoMass+ LongCGBody + LongCGExhaust
+LongCGTrimL+ LongCGElectUnderHoodL+ LongCGElectPostHeelL
+SuspenMass/2(L104) + SuspenMass/2(V ehRearAxleX)




/(V ehMass+ [PassWeight]pass + V ehCargoMass) (A.82)
The relative mass split between the front and rear wheels can be found by solving
for the reaction forces at the wheels.
R2 = V ehMass(V ehLongCG− L104)/L101 (A.83)
R1 = V ehMass−R2 (A.84)
V ehM%Front = 100R1/V ehMass (A.85)




Wheel assembly inertia is an input to the AVL Cruise powertrain simulations.
This quantity is estimated by approximating the tire and the wheel as a ring and a
































WheelInertia = RubberInertia+RimInertia (A.89)
Angle of approach, departure, and ramp breakover
{VehicleCG.m}
SAE standard SAE J689 [SAE International (2005)] specifies minimum angles and
curb clearances evaluated at the manufacturer’s most severe design load, which we
take to be GVWR. Flexible bumper components should also be considered. Table A.6
lists the standards. Curbstone clearance height is measured behind the back wheels
and in front of the front wheels. The dimensions H103-1, H103-2 are chosen in our
model to represent curbstone clearance height. These SAE dimensions are specifically
assigned to the height between the ground and the front and rear fascia respectively,
but in application may not necessarily represent the shortest clearance height. Fig-
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Table A.6:





A106 16◦ Angle of approach
A107 13◦ Angle of departure
A147 12◦ Ramp breakover angle
H103-1 203mm Front curbstone clearance height
H103-2 203mm Rear curbstone clearance height





Vehicle side view from SAE J1100. Figure from [SAE International
(2005)]
ures A.9 & A.10 come from SAE J1100 and label dimensions used to evaluate SAE
J689 in our model.
The longitudinal distance measured from the front axle to the lowest point (ground
clearance) between the wheels. Although the ground clearance point is typically
biased towards the front axle, at present we assume it is located midway between
axles. L105 is the distance from the rear axle to the end of the back bumper.
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FIGURE 25—SIDE VIEW OF CHASSIS
FIGURE 26—REAR VIEW OF SIDE WINDOW SHOWING TUMBLEHOME
Figure A.10:
Chassis side view from SAE J1100. Figure from [SAE International
(2005)]
l2 = 1/2× L101 (A.90)
L105 = L103− L104− L101 (A.91)
Angle of approach
Required inputs for angle of approach calculation are the front ground clearance
height H103-1, the static loaded tire radius H108, the front overhang distance L104,
and the unloaded tire radius TireDynRollRad.
L104′ =
√
L1042 + (H108−H103-1)2 (A.92)
θ′8 = arccos (TireDynRollRad/L104
′) (A.93)
θ7 = arcsin ((H108−H103-1)/L104′) (A.94)
θ0a = 90− θ7 − θ′8 (A.95)
L104bit = TireDynRollRad sin θ0a (A.96)
L104part = L104− L104bit (A.97)
L104′fa =
√
L104′2 − TireDynRollRad2 (A.98)





Required inputs for angle of departure calculation are rear ground clearance
H103-2, static loaded tire radius H108, distance from rear of vehicle to rear wheel
axle L105, and the unloaded tire radius TireDynRollRad.
L105′ =
√





A107 = 90 (A.101)
else
θ′10 = arccos (TireDynRollRad/L105
′) (A.102)
θ9 = arcsin ((H108−H103-2)/L105′) (A.103)
θ0d = 90− θ9 − θ′10 (A.104)
L105bit = TireDynRollRad sin θ0d (A.105)
L105part = L105− L105bit (A.106)
L105′rd =
√
L105′2 − TireDynRollRad2 (A.107)




Required inputs for ramp breakover anlge are ground clearance H156-3, static
loaded wheel radius H108, longitudinal distance from ground clearance to front wheel




(l22 + (H108−H156)2) (A.109)
θ′5 = arccos (TireDynRollRad/l
′
2) (A.110)
θ4 = arcsin ((H108−H156)/l′2) (A.111)
θ0 = 90− θ4 − θ′5 (A.112)
l2bit = TireDynRollRad sin θ0 (A.113)




2 − TireDynRollRad2 (A.115)
θ6 = arcsin (l2part/l
′
2fb) (A.116)
l1 = L101− l2 (A.117)
l′1 =
√
l21 + (H108−H156)2 (A.118)
θ′2 = arccos (TireDynRollRad/l
′
1) (A.119)
θ1 = arccos ((H108−H156)/l′1) (A.120)
θ0r = 90− θ1 − θ′2 (A.121)
l1bit = TireDynRollRad sin θ0r (A.122)




2 − TireDynRollRad2 (A.124)
θ3 = arcsin (l1part/l
′
1rb) (A.125)




The NCAP rollover rating system6 was used to model a vehicles propensity for
rollover. The predicted ratings in the model rely on the static stability factor SSF
alone (i.e., no j-hook simulations have been developed). The star rating is a function of
a vehicle’s static stability factor according to the relationship plotted in Figure A.11.
The static stability factor is estimated as follows. A polynomial regression was fit
to approximate the relationship between rollover probability and static stability fac-
tor shown in Figure A.11. The verticle vehicle center of mass position used in the





RolloverScore = 16.094SSF 4 − 86.233SSF 3 + 173.3SSF 2
−155.14SSF + 52.444 (A.128)
RolloverStar = 5− floor(10×RolloverScore) (A.129)
Cargo Volume
{CargoVolume.m}
Cargo volume calculations follow SAE J1100 [SAE International (2005)]. This
standard includes 11 different formulas for computing a cargo volume index depend-
ing on the classification of the vehicle being measured. The pattern for the cargo
volume calculations is to take the product of a representative length, width, and
height. The various formulations are labeled in Table A.7 The formula included in
the model at this point is V-10 CVI-2 (station wagon CVI-maximum behind second
6NHTSA, “SaferCar.Gov Rollover - FAQs,” http://www.safercar.gov, 2008(2/4/2008)
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y = 16.094x4 - 86.233x3 + 173.3x2 - 155.14x + 52.444
R2 = 0.999
Figure A.11:
NCAP rollover crash ratings as a function of static stability factor. Fig-
ure from www.safercar.gov
Table A.7: SAE J1100 cargo volume index formulations [SAE International (2005)]
Index label Calculation Description
V1
Total volume of the individual pieces of
luggage plus H-boxes that can be stowed
This measure applies to hatchback and
stations wagons if they are partitioned
to secure hidden cargo
V2 (L204-1)×W3-2×H201 Station Wagon CVI-Maximum estimate
V3 L208-1+L209-1
2
×W3-2×H197-1 Hatchback CVI-Maximum estimate
V4
measured the same as V1 for any hid-
den cargo area below the load floor, the
rear of the front seat
This measure applies to hatchback and
stations wagons if they are partitioned
to secure hidden cargo



























×W3-2×H197-2 Hatchback cargo volume-maximum behind
second seat
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seat). Assuming the width of the interior between wheelhouse trim panel is the track
width - 20 inches:
W201 = W101− 20× 25.4 (A.130)
Assuming the interior width at the second row is ≈ track width:
W3-2 = W101 (A.131)
Assuming the interior width at third row is ≈ track width - 5 inches:
W3-3 = W101− 5× 25.4 (A.132)
Assuming cargo length from rearmost part of row 2 is Veh2RX-23 inches due to 15
inches to back of the seat and the seat recline angle, and 8 inches from rear bumper
and door:
L204-2 = L103− (V eh2RX − (15 + 8))25.4 (A.133)
Assuming cargo length from rearmost part of row 3 is Veh3RX-20 inches due to 12
inches from seat recline and 8 inches from rear bumper and door:
L204-3 = L103− (V eh3RX − (12 + 8))25.4 (A.134)
Assuming cargo load floor is at the same height as the top of the tire and there is a
3 inch thick headliner + roof hardware:
H201 = H101− (3 + V ehTopofT ire)25.4 (A.135)
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V-10: station wagon CVI-maximum behind second row seat:











NOTE: The NCAP rollover star ratings, axle weight distributions (Equation A.85),
and cargo volume index CV I for several vehicles compared favorably with those pre-
dicted by the model giving confidence in the approach. However, the model consis-
tently underestimated both CV I and RolloverScore as compared to sampled midsize
crossovers. Cargo volume and rollover constraints were relaxed (g4(minCV I) from 32
ft3 to 29 ft3, g6(maxRolloverScore) from 0.1999–a 4-star rating–to 0.21) to account
for differences between the model and real world data.
Front crash
{FrontCrash.m}
The front crash model provides a back of the envelope check on powertrain pack-
aging and vehicle geometry to reasonably ensure an appropriate front crash test
score is acheivable. Parameter estimates required to complete the analysis include
V ehicleBumperDepth(8in), MidRailY Strength, SuspenDepth(5in), PassWeight,
EngDepth, TestFrontCrushEff , V ehMass, MidRailLoadFactor, MidRailWidth,
V ehHeelPointX, MidRailThick, V ehRadDepth(6in). It should be noted that com-
ponent dimensions represent the dimension in a longitudinal direction and represent
the sum of the “thickness” of the solid elements of the component.
MidRailLoadFactor is set equal to 1/2, implying that the mid-rails absorb 1/2
the total impact. TestFrontCrushEff is a factor related to the buckling efficiency
of the mid-rail design. We take a value of 0.7. Outputs predicted are the crush
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space available given driver heel point and underhood component sizes CrushSpace,
average load on a single mid-rail TestMidRailForceAvg, and peak acceleration in a
front crash AccelTestFront. MinCrushSpace reflects the minimum required crush
space to stop the vehicle in a front impact at a velocity of TestFrontV el, taken here
to be 35 mph.
Mid-rails are assumed to be square cross-sections. Average force calculations come
from a curve-fit supplied by an SAE paper7 for square tubes with thickness and width
constraints: (width/thick) > 62.5 and 1.5in < width < 3.75in. Model constraints are
placed on the minimum crush space and peak deceleration as shown in Section A.
EngDepth is given in millimeters and V ehMass is given in kg. MidRailThick and
MidRailWidth are given in millimeters. MidRailY Strength is given in N/mm2.
Other dimensions are given in inches and lbm respectively.
CrushSpace = V ehHeelPointX
































7H. F. Hahmood and A. Paluszny, “Design of Thin Walled Columns for Crash Energy Manage-
ment”, Society of Automotive Engineers Paper 811302
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Powertrain performance characteristics
Powertrain performance is evaluated by referencing results from vehicle simula-
tions conducted using AVL Cruise software. Typical procedure is to model the vehicle
powertrain of interest within Cruise. Next, determine parameters to vary (i.e., design
variables and other parameters of interest such as drag coefficient). Then, execute a
design of experiments to obtain simulation results for all powertrain performance mea-
sures. Finally, fit the data using polynomials and/or neural nets for implementation





AVL Cruise characterizes engine performance by reference to engine maps derived
from experimental results of a baseline engine. Different baseline engine data are used
as baselines for fuel consumption maps and full load performance curves as well as
between naturally aspirated and turbo-charged direct injection engines. Engine maps
are scaled for each design iteration as functions of EngBore and EngBoretoStroke
following established scaling relationships8.
Using the peak mean piston speed and the engine geometry it is possible to cal-
culate the engine peak RPM.
RPMpeak = S̄ppeak/(2EngStroke× 10−3 −×60) (A.141)
8Chon, D. M., and Heywood, J. B., 2000, Performance Scaling of Spark-Ignition Engines: Corre-
lation and Historical Analysis of Production Engine Data, Technical Paper 2000-01-0565. Anderson,
M., K, 2005, Powertrain Design and Integration, Lecture Slides, Automotive Engineering 501, Uni-
versity of Michigan, guest lecture, Ann Arbor, MI, 25-64.
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We add 200 RPM to the peak power engine speed as an estimate of maximum engine
speed.
At a constant mean piston speed, fuel mass flow rate and the full load performance
torque curve are scaled as follows, where Ncyl is the number of cylinders of the engine.
Scaling mass flow rate in this way assumes that, at a given piston speed, BMEP is
constant between the base and the scaled engine. In most cases we assume both
base and scaled engines have the same peak BMEP, resulting in Equation A.143

















Peak power is found by taking the scaled torque at the peak mean piston speed
from Equation A.143. Peak power given in horsepower is as follows.
Ppeak = τnewpeak ×RPMpeak/5252 (A.144)
The motoring curve, representing power losses in the engine at various speeds is up-
dated by scaling power loss by engine displacement ratio. Normalization by constant
piston speed is neglected for motoring curve. Engine idle fuel consumption is assumed
to be 1.5 liters per hour for the Cruise provided 2.5 liter V-6 engine. Idle fuel con-
sumption for unique engine designs is scaled by displacement ratio. The advanced
friction module found in Cruise, which incorporates engine and valvetrain architec-
ture, based on an SAE paper9 is used to integrate frictional engine losses into the
9Patton, K. J., Nitschke, R. G., and Heywood, J. B., 1989, Development and Evaluation of a
Friction Model for Spark-Ignition Engines, SAE Technical Paper.
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Bore to Stroke 0.97
Compression ratio 10.0
Idle speed 700rpm
Max engine speed 6000rpm
Table A.9:





Bore to Stroke 1.07
Compression ratio 10.3
Idle speed 640rpm
Max engine speed 6500rpm
simulations.
Naturally aspirated spark-ignition
The fuel consumption map for the conventional vehicle is taken from a 2.5 l,
V-6 engine with BMEPPpeak=1068 kPa provided with the software. The full load
characteristic is scaled from the Duratec35 engine (BMEPPpeak=1085 kPa) used
in the Ford Edge. We assume the peak power brake mean effective pressure of the
vehicle engine (1085 kPa) and mean piston speed at peak power out (18.1 m/s) are
constant for all designs. Baseline engine details are summarized in Tables A.8-A.10.
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Table A.10:
Full load performance characteristic for 3.5 l V6 Duratec35 naturally
aspirated gasoline engine
RPM Torque (lb-ft) Power (hp) BMEP (kPa) Piston Speed (m/s)
1500 133 38 649 4.3
2000 197 75 962 5.8
2500 210 100 1025 7.2
3000 233 133 1138 8.7
3500 255 170 1245 10.1
4000 263 200 1284 11.6
4500 251 215 1226 13.0
5000 247 235 1206 14.5
5500 244 256 1191 15.9
6000 228 260 1113 17.3
6250 223 265 1089 18.1
6500 213 264 1040 18.8
Gas turbo direct injection
The GTDI baseline fuel consumption map is adapted from an SAE paper10. The
full load characteristic is adopted from a “best guess” transcription from the Eco-
Boost YouTube video hosted by Derek Kuzak. The GTDI engine is assumed to have
a peak mean piston speed of 16.7 m/s. Baseline engine details are summarized in
Tables A.12 & A.14. The fuel consumption map for the 2.0 l GTDI engine as inter-
polated by AVL Cruise is shown in Figure A.12
Additionally, AVL Cruise provides modules for modeling turbo-charger behavior.
The following figures represent the data included in the GTDI simulations. Fig-
ure A.13 was generated by examining load steps from 2 bar to full load for the engine
described in SAE 2006-01-126611. The authors presented results at various engine
speeds.
10Henning Kleeberg, Dean Tomazic, Oliver Lang, and Knut Habermann, ”Future Potential and
Development Methods for High Output Turbocharged Direct Injected Gasoline Engines,” SAE Paper
2006-01-0046
11W. Bandel, G. K. Fraidl, P. E. Kapus, and H. Sikinger, C. N. Cowland, “The Turbocharged




Full consumption map for 2.5 V6 naturally aspirated gasoline engine
from AVL Cruise
RPM BMEP (bar) Fuel Consumption (l/h) RPM BMEP (bar) Fuel Consumption (l/h)
700 -4 1.6 continued...
700 -0.5 1.61 3600 0.72 4.44
700 0 1.65 3600 2.41 6.396
700 1.6 1.88 3600 3.97 8.472
700 3.16 2.13 3600 7.04 12.18
700 4.55 2.496 3600 8.59 14.304
700 5.95 2.964 3600 10.31 16.572
700 7.32 3.552 3600 11.61 18.588
700 8.63 4.188 3600 14.68 24.804
700 9.3 4.788 3600 15.11 25.356
1200 -4 1.75 4150 -4 4.15
1200 -0.5 1.76 4150 -0.5 4.27
1200 0 1.8 4150 0 4.64
1200 0.35 1.93 4150 0.7 5.412
1200 1.82 2.35 4150 2.31 7.656
1200 3.32 2.784 4150 3.82 9.96
1200 4.73 3.516 4150 5.34 12.18
1200 6.17 4.248 4150 6.9 14.556
1200 7.59 4.968 4150 8.53 17.004
1200 8.9 5.868 4150 9.99 19.5
1200 10.21 6.6 4150 13.06 26.76
1200 10.88 6.72 4150 15.11 33.024
1700 -4 1.95 5050 -4 5.25
1700 -0.5 1.96 5050 -0.5 5.6
1700 0 2 5050 0 6
1700 0.42 2.16 5050 1.99 9.432
1700 2.06 2.85 5050 3.62 12.3
1700 3.54 3.72 5050 5.1 14.856
1700 4.89 4.608 5050 6.63 17.82
1700 6.33 5.532 5050 8.12 20.736
1700 7.83 6.516 5050 9.77 24.696
1700 9.48 7.704 5050 11.19 28.476
1700 10.93 9.432 5050 12.53 33.456
1700 12.3 10.62 5050 14.5 41.784
2550 -4 2.25 6000 -4 6.6
2550 -0.5 2.3 6000 -0.5 7.25
2550 0 2.45 6000 0 8
2550 0.73 2.976 6000 1.21 10.428
2550 2.3 4.2 6000 2.76 13.86
2550 3.8 5.688 6000 4.18 17.052
2550 5.25 7.008 6000 5.53 20.22
2550 6.71 8.304 6000 6.94 23.916
2550 8.21 9.828 6000 9.72 33.984
2550 9.55 10.992 6000 10.88 39.144
2550 12.4 15.096 6000 12.05 44.664

































Figure A.13: Boost pressure build up time as a function of engine speed
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Bore to Stroke 1.05
Compression ratio 9.8
Idle speed 850rpm
Max engine speed 6000rpm
Table A.13: Full consumption map for 2.0 l I-4 gas turbo direct injection engine
RPM Torque (lb-ft) Power (hp) BMEP (kPa) Piston Speed (m/s)
1000 150 29 1278 2.8
1650 280 88 2385 4.6
3000 275 157 2343 8.3
4000 272 207 2317 11.1
5400 265 272 2258 15.0
6000 240 274 2045 16.7
The operating points listed in Table A.15 were adopted for the 2.0 l EcoBoost con-
cept to estimate boost pressure and temperature after compressor from SAE Papers
2005-01-1144 & 2006-01-0046.
The data for boost pressure as a function of engine speed shown in Figure A.14
was modified after receiving feedback from Michael Shelby of Ford from the full load
operating points of the compressor as described in SAE 2005-01-114412.
Figure A.15 shows the air temperature exiting the turbo-charger and the inter-
cooler for various engine speeds. The air turbo-charger exit temperature data was
generated by taking the full load compressor operating points from the engine de-
scribed in SAE 2005-01-1144, SAE 2006-01-0046. Using the compressor map (also
given in the paper) for pressure and isentropic efficiency, temperature was computed
using ideal gas theory. The intercooler temperatures were generated by taking an
12Oliver Lang, Jos Geiger, Knut Habermann and Michael Wittler, “Boosting and Direct Injection
- Synergies for Future Gasoline Engines,” SAE Paper 2005-01-1144
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Table A.14:
Full load performance characteristic for 2.0 l I-4 gas turbo direct injection
engine
RPM BMEP (bar) Fuel Consumption (l/h) RPM BMEP (bar) Fuel Consumption (l/h)
1020 -2.17 0.51 continued...
1020 0 0.57 4080 -4 2.89
1020 0.56 0.64 4080 -0.5 2.97
1020 1.67 1.27 4080 0 3.23
1020 1.99 1.4 4080 1.34 6.09
1020 4.61 2.63 4080 2.6 7.92
1020 6.7 3.57 4080 6.3 14.37
1020 17.34 11.41 4080 8.56 18.23
2040 -4 1.22 4080 23.28 49.58
2040 -0.5 1.22 4225 22.62 49.88
2040 0 1.25 4371 8.92 20.34
2040 0.88 2 4662 9.61 23.39
2040 2.1 3.2 4808 0 3.68
2040 2.51 3.51 4808 1.8 7.65
2040 5.79 6.6 4808 4 11.82
2040 7.79 8.29 4808 6.87 18.47
2040 21.46 21.52 4808 19.23 48.27
2404 16.73 18.75 4881 18.55 47.26
2404 18.13 20.31 4954 16.5 42.65
2477 15.74 18.17 5100 -4 3.65
2477 18.8 21.7 5100 -0.5 3.89
2550 -4 1.56 5100 0 4.17
2550 -0.5 1.6 5100 1.38 7.84
2550 0 1.7 5100 2.92 11.11
2550 7.65 10.18 5100 4.25 14.91
2550 15.57 18.9 5100 8.25 23.2
2550 21.43 25.74 5100 11.69 30.67
2768 15.38 19.85 5172 23.16 66.99
2768 20.79 26.82 5245 9.03 26.5
3060 -4 1.9 5245 20.85 61.15
3060 -0.5 1.97 5391 9.83 29.64
3060 0 2.09 5391 18.96 57.17
3060 1.03 3.54 5537 11.77 36.45
3060 2.28 5.19 5537 14.54 45.03
3060 5.69 9.74 6120 -4 4.59
3060 7.93 12.67 6120 -0.5 5.04
3060 21.04 30 6120 0 5.56
3351 15.45 24.14 6120 1.39 9.51
3643 -4 2.24 6120 3.34 15.22






percentage difference from the charger outlet temperature. An initial guess for the
temperature difference across the intercooler was taken referencing the intercooler
described in SAE 2006-01-0046.
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1.27 1000 0.021 0.6 80
1.53 1250 0.028 0.62 106
1.5 1500 0.031 0.65 103
1.52 1750 0.042 0.675 106
1.56 2000 0.05 0.7 112
1.65 3000 0.065 0.715 122
1.62 3500 0.075 0.723 121
1.65 4000 0.085 0.721 124
1.7 4500 0.097 0.715 131
1.8 5000 0.112 0.69 143























































Turbo-charger and intercooler outlet temperatures at full load for vari-
ous engine speeds
AVL Cruise simulations
Vehicle simulations using AVL Cruise software were configured to represent a
standard automatic transmission front wheel drive vehicle with a gasoline engine. In
addition to powertrain specifications (i.e., gear ratios, gear shifting schedule, engine
number of cylinders, vee or inline configuration, bore, and stroke, valvetrain config-
uration, and final drive ratio.) Cruise also receives other vehicle inputs, including
curbweight, frontal area, drag coefficient, tire radius, and center of gravity location
under various loads. Over 30 AVL Cruise parameters were tuned for midsize crossover
vehicles based on data from one 2007 model. All other parameters in Cruise were
left at the default passenger vehicle levels. Section A shows how model parameters
are converted into three of the required Cruise inputs.
Five vehicle simulations were executed using Cruise: 1) FTP (US urban cycle) and
2) HFET (US highway driving cycle) can be used to estimate either the combined fuel
economy rating used for CAFE purposes or combined fuel economy rating according
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to 2008 EPA MPG-based guidelines13. 3) Shifting gears from standstill was used to
predict 0-60 acceleration and vehicle top speed; 4) shifting gears from 30-50 mph was
used to estimate 30-50 mph time with towing simulated by adding the max trailer
weight to the mass of the vehicle; 5) max gradeability estimates the percent grade
achievable at 65 mph with towing simulated using the virtual trailer option that
allows specification of trailer mass and an estimate of losses.
The engineering model as described above (including a call to the AVL Cruise
solver to execute the 5 simulations) was integrated using iSIGHT v10.0 system in-
tegration software. Latin hypercube design of experiments were executed for both
the naturally aspirated and (1000 runs) the GTDI vehicles (1600 runs). Execution
of 1 computer experiment run on a 3.6 GHz Pentium IV processor averaged slightly
over 30 seconds. Factors for the naturally aspirated engine vehicle included: CD
(vehicle drag coefficient), EngBore, FinalDrive, H101, L101, L103, W105, and
EngBoretoStroke. Factors for the GTDI engine vehicle included: . Design runs that
resulted in failed Cruise runs were removed from the data set. Simulations failed for
less than 10% of the runs, and failed runs typically corresponded to cases where a
combination of large vehicle size, small engine, and large final drive ratio resulted in
inability to achieve 65 mph in the acceleration test or a positive towing grade at 65
mph. The data from the computer experiments was then fit with surrogate models to
decrease computational speed for design optimization runs, and to allow integration
of the entire model in Matlab, thereby improving portability of the model.
The hybrid electric vehicle simulation is a backwards-looking simulation built by
visiting scholar Kukhyun Ahn based on his dissertation work. Similar to above, a
DOE was executed (500 runs), and the data was fit with surrogate models for each
simulation. Factors in the HEV DOE included: EngBore, FinalDrive, H101, pgratio,
batpower, L103, W105, and EngBoretoStroke. The outputs of the HEV simulation
13USEPA, 2006, Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicles: Revisions to Improve Calculation of
Fuel Economy Estimates; Final Rule, Federal Register, 71(248) pp. 77872-77969
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Combined fuel economy in miles/gallon is computed for both the CAFE re-
ported value and the 2008 window sticker value. The test values CycUSCity and
CycUSHwy are given in liters/100 km. The CAFE value is simply the harmonic


















The window sticker value is found by adopting the “MPG-based method” from the
2008 guidelines for reporting window sticker fuel economy14. This method provides
a regression formula for adjusting the city and highway test values according to the
following relationships. The new method for reporting window sticker fuel economy
presents a different weighting of city vs. highway driving for the combined fuel econ-
omy (43% city, 57% highway). However, vehicles in 2008 are being reported using
the “MPG-based method” rather than the new tests, and the old ratios (55% city,
14USEPA, 2006, Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicles: Revisions to Improve Calculation of
Fuel Economy Estimates; Final Rule, Federal Register, 71(248) pp. 77872-77969
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Vehicle range is estimated based on city and highway fuel economy and gas tank
volume. Gas tank volume is converted from liters3.
V ehCityRange = MPGCycUSCity × V ehGasTankV ol
×264.17 (A.151)













Surrogate models were obtained from the Cruise simulation data to reduce com-
putational expense (See Table A.16), using Latin hypercube experimental designs
(1000 Runs NA SI, 1600 Runs GTDI, 500 runs HEV). Failed runs were removed
from the data set before surrogate model fitting. For the NA SI and GTDI, satisfac-
tory polynomials were found for both driving cycles, the gradeability simulation, and
Acc3050Tow (R2: 0.998 City, 0.994 Hwy, 0.997 Grade, 0.998 3050). Two neural nets
were generated in Matlab, one for Acc060 and one for MaxSpeed, both of which had
R2 values for the training points and the test points above 0.99. For the HEV model,
satisfactory polynomials were found for all powertrain performance characteristics
except the CycUSHwy, and the MaxSpeed. These two outputs were fit with neural
nets.
The parameters for each polynomial are given below, grouped by powertrain tech-
nology
NA SI
For naturally aspirated spark-ignition vehicles polynomials were fit for CycUSCity,
CycUSHwy, and Grad65Tow. The elements of the polynomials are shown in N. The
values for each element correspond to the real values for a given design, however they
have been scaled between [0,2] based on upper and lower bounds for each element.
Values for the polynomial parameters are shown in CNASI . Variable upper and lower
bounds are given in Table A.17.
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Table A.16: Surrogate models by simulation and powertrain technology
Pwtrn Tech. Simulation Model type R2






























H101 L101 L103 W105 CD
Varlb = [ 86 0.95 1.1 1600 2286 3556 1600 0.33 ]
Varub = [ 100 1.18 4.0 1930 3048 5080 2000 0.42 ]
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 = C′NASIN (A.153)
GTDI
For GTDI spark-ignition vehicles polynomials were fit for CycUSCity, CycUSHwy,
Grad65Tow, and Acc3050Tow. The elements of the polynomials are shown in G. The
values for each element correspond to the real values for a given design, however they
have been scaled between [0,2] based on upper and lower bounds for each element.
Values for the polynomial parameters are shown in CGTDI . Variable upper and lower




































































































































































































































































































































































CGT DI = [ 7.5368 5.9459 2.6084 8.1527
0.6725 0.4634 2.2639 −1.9052
−0.1582 0.4656 5.1671 −3.6308
0.0716 0.1517 −0.0846 0.0
0.0 −0.0353 0.0 0.0
0.1729 0.1058 0.0 0.2328
0.2423 0.3297 −0.0956 0.2386
−0.4781 −0.3029 −1.4864 1.2364
0.1775 0.3742 −0.2098 0.0
−0.0628 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0291 0.0 0.0 −1.8901
0.0 0.0 1.6158 0.0
−0.1092 0.0535 .0 0.0
0.076 0.0216 0.1559 0.2151
0.3658 0.1388 −0.3177 1.1556
0.0319 0.0225 0.0 0.0267
0.0232 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0935 0.0519 0.1971 0.0276
0.0273 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3308
0.0289 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.1525 0.093 1.0083 0.687
0.0 0.0 −0.1223 −0.0675
0.0 0.0 −0.0918 −0.0506
−0.1421 −0.067 −0.3007 −0.2292
0.0215 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3595
0.0 0.0 0.3651 0.0
0.0 −0.0237 0.0 0.0
−0.0298 −0.0299 −0.2106 −0.1111
−0.0227 −0.0241 −0.1453 −0.1106
−0.1386 −0.0595 −0.5439 −0.4629
0.0888 0.0 0.0 0.
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4977
0.1203 0.0 0.6037 0.0336
0.0991 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0796 0.0486 −0.0659 0.0607
0.0 0.0 0.0487 0.0459
0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.0606
0.0 0.0 −0.0815 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.044
0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.0488
0.0 0.0 −0.06780 .0
0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.2344
0.0 0.0 −0.1942 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0744 −0.1144










The HEV vehicle powertrain simulations were based on data generated from HEV
simulations developed by Kuhkyun Ahn. For HEV vehicles polynomials were fit for
CycUSCity, Acc060, Grad65Tow, Acc3050Tow, MG2, and MG1. The elements of
the polynomials are shown in H. The values for each element correspond to the real
values for a given design, however they have been scaled between [0,2] based on upper
and lower bounds for each element. Values for the polynomial parameters are shown
in CHEV . Variable upper and lower bounds are given in Table A.19.
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CHEV = [ 5.5377 7.8296 7.0946 5.2934 10.7896 6.2998
0.1535 0.6885 −0.2215 −0.2005 0.4452 0.4452
0.0708 1.4549 −0.8854 −0.4827 0.0 0.0
0.094 −0.1504 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
−0.0007 1.1733 −0.5106 −0.5057 0.0 0.0
−0.1178 −0.0578 −0.4582 −0.3931 1.0002 0.0
0.095 −0.2434 0.2365 0.0831 0.0 0.0
0.2278 −0.3431 0.2709 0.0916 0.0 0.0
−0.3065 −1.−655 0.368 0.4034 −0.9582 −0.9582
−0.0611 −0.4024 0.1878 0.0423 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.1074 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 −0.4385 0.0739 0.0492 0.0 0.0
0.0152 0.0 0.0265 0.0233 0.0 0.0
0.0196 −0.016 0.047 0.0183 0.0 0.0
0.0131 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0345 0.3318 0.0 −0.0173 0.1076 0.1076
0.0 0.0274 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
−0.0164 0.0 0.0323 0.0274 0.0 0.0
0.0 −0.0198 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
−0.0195 −0.074 0.0 0.0 −0.0532 −0.0532
0.0 −0.0292 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
−0.0387 −0.416 0.0647 0.0767 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0536 0.0379 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 −0.0359 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 −0.0287 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 −0.0468 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0332 0.0381 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 −0.0355 −0.0161 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 −0.0224 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0181 0.0 −0.0586 −0.0511 0.0 0.0
0.0505 −0.0485 0.1044 0.0419 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0392 0.0381 0.0154 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0388 0.0328 0.0155 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0541 −0.0256 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 −0.0312 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0778 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0












The constraint set is as follows.
g1 = 5%−Grad65Tow ≤ 0 (A.156)
g2 = 13◦ −A107 ≤ 0 (A.157)
g3 = 12◦ −A147 ≤ 0 (A.158)
g4 = 29 ft3 − CV I ≤ 0 (A.159)
g5 = CV I − 60 ft3 ≤ 0 (A.160)
g6 = Rollover − 0.1 ≤ 0 (A.161)
g7 = 50%− 100 (1− CGlong − L104/L101) ≤ 0 (A.162)
g8 = Payload+ V ehMass−GVWR ≤ 0 (A.163)
g9 = MinCrushSpace− CrushSpace ≤ 0 (A.164)
g10 = MaxDecel − 20(9.81 m/s2) ≤ 0 (A.165)
g11 = (2TireF lop+ 2MidRailWidth+ EngLength+ 50.8)
−(W105− 254) ≤ 0 (A.166)
g12 = L101 + L104− L103 ≤ 0 (A.167)
g13 = 115 mph−MaxSpeed ≤ 0 (A.168)




g1 : Min towing grade @ 65 mph
g2 : Min angle of departure
g3 : Min ramp breakover angle
g4 : Min cargo volume
g5 : Max cargo volume
g6 : Max rollover score
g7 : Min % weight on front wheels
g8 : Min payload capacity
g9 : Min front crash crush space
g10 : Max estimated deceleration
g11 : Max powertrain width
g12 : Max wheelbase
g13 : Min top speed
g14 : Min available passenger sitting height
Other constraints that have been included in the code, but are not typically em-
ployed in the model include:
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g15 = MinBoretoStroke− EngBoretoStroke (A.170)
g16 = EngBoretoStroke−MaxBoretoStroke (A.171)
g17 = MinEngDisp− EngDisp (A.172)
g18 = EngDisp−MaxEngDisp (A.173)
g19 = MinFinalDrive− FinalDrive (A.174)
g20 = FinalDrive−MaxFinalDrive (A.175)
g21 = GearBoxRatio(1)−Max1stGear (A.176)
g22 = Min6thGear −GearBoxRatio(6) (A.177)
g23 = MinGear1to2− (GearBRatio(1)−GearBRatio(2)) (A.178)
g24 = MinGear2to3− (GearBRatio(2)−GearBRatio(3)) (A.179)
g25 = MinGear3to4− (GearBRatio(3)−GearBRatio(4)) (A.180)
g26 = MinGear4to5− (GearBRatio(4)−GearBRatio(5)) (A.181)
g27 = MinGear5to6− (GearBRatio(5)−GearBRatio(6)) (A.182)
g28 = MinHwyRange− V ehHwyRange (A.183)
g29 = MinCityRange− V ehCityRange (A.184)
g30 = (TireDynRollRad + 10 ∗ 25.4)− L104 (A.185)
g31 = MinAofApr − A106 (A.186)
g32 = MinFrontClear −H103d1d3 (A.187)
g33 = MinRearClear −H103d2d3 (A.188)
g34 = MinDriverLegRoom− V ehLegRoom1 (A.189)
g35 = V ehLegRoom1−MaxDriverLegRoom (A.190)
g36 = Min2ndRLegRoom− V ehLegRoom2 (A.191)
g37 = V ehLegRoom2−Max2ndRLegRoom (A.192)
g38 = (W101 + 7 ∗ 25.4)−W105 (A.193)
g39 = Acc3050Tow −Max30to50 (A.194)
g40 = Acc060−Max0to60 (A.195)
g41 = (L104 + TireDynRollRad + 10 ∗ 25.4)
−V ehHeelPointX (A.196)
g42 = 62.5−MidRailWidth/MidRailThick (A.197)
g43 = MidRailWidth− 3.75 ∗ 25.4 (A.198)
g44 = 1.5 ∗ 25.4−MidRailWidth (A.199)
g45 = MPGConstraint− CombinedMPG (A.200)
if Powetrain = HEV
g46 = MinTopSpeed




g15 : Min bore to stroke ratio
g16 : Max bore to stroke ratio
g17 : Min engine displacement
g18 : Max engine displacement
g19 ; Min final drive ratio
g20 : Max final drive ratio
g21 : Max 1st gear ratio
g22 : Min 6th gear ratio
g23 : Min difference 1st gear ratio to 2nd gear ratio
g24 : Min difference 2nd gear ratio to 3rd gear ratio
g25 : Min difference 3rd gear ratio to 4th gear ratio
g26 : Min difference 4th gear ratio to 5th gear ratio
g27 : Min difference 5th gear ratio to 6th gear ratio
g28 : Min vehicle range on highway
g29 : Min vehicle range in city
g30 : Min front wheel clearance
g31 : Min angle of approach
g32 : Min front ground clearance
g33 : Min rear ground clearance
g34 : Min driver leg room
g35 : Max driver leg room
g36 : Min 2nd row leg room
g37 : Max 2nd row legroom
g38 : Max wheel track width
g39 : Max 30 to 50 mph acceleration time @tow
g40 : Max 0 to 60 mph acceleration time
g41 : Min clearance between heelpoint and tire
g42 : Min midrail width to thickness ratio
g43 : Max midrail width
g44 : Min midrail width
g45 : Min miles per gallon
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